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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The adoption of specialised tribunals has become a widespread 
phenomenon notwithstanding the scarcity of empirical evidence about 
their real benefits. This thesis seeks to remedy such a gap by assessing 
the performance of the recently adopted specialised competition tribunal 
in Mexico. The analysis of the performance of this tribunal focuses on the 
feedback collected by the author in interviews with key stakeholders. In 
specific terms, this assessment reveals the nature and magnitude of the 
issues that led to the adoption of this new tribunal and the institutional 
reform it entailed.  
 
In broad terms, it offers the three following implications. First, it provides 
experimental verification about the veracity of the three most common 
benefits attributed to specialised tribunals: efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity. Second, it confirms that as different institutions take part in 
the implementation of competition law, the performance of one 
institution influences another. In the event that the judiciary is unfamiliar 
with competition law, unskilled in economics, inclined to dispose 
antitrust cases based on procedural irregularities and delays, the 
functioning of the competition agencies is obscured, and the effective 
implementation of the competition law impeded. Third, it verifies the 
connection between country specific socio-economic conditions and 
levels of implementation of competition law. These implications derive 
from the analysis of the Mexican case and the commonalities shared 
between this country and some other Latin American countries.  
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The most important lesson to be learnt from the Mexican case is that the 
adoption of specialised competition tribunals is advisable to Latin 
American countries facing similar challenges in the implementation of 
competition law. Yet the lessons offered by the Mexican case provide 
vital insights but need to be carefully adapted to ensure a suitable transfer 
to other jurisdictions. For this purpose, this thesis offers a conceptual 
framework about transplants, which applied in conjunction with their 
domestic realities, predicts a successful replication. Finally, it offers 
recommendations on what needs to be considered when adopting a 
specialised competition tribunal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
	
	
Latin American countries display specific conditions that make the 
analysis of the adoption of specialised competition tribunals particularly 
stimulating. This region has been described as one of the most unequal in 
the world,1 and has been characterised by unstable economies with low 
levels of development.2 Inefficient and untrustworthy institutions 
generally control it. In particular, the judiciaries in Latin America have 
been identified as some of the most inefficient, ineffective, and corrupt in 
the world,3 a situation that is aggravated by the dominance of the 
executive, which has diminished its independence.4  
 
In relation to competition law, a lack of political will to implement it has 
been prominent and, for centuries, policies and governmental decisions 
have clashed with the interests of competition as a result. It was just after 
an imposed trade liberalisation process that Latin American countries 
were persuaded to adopt or modernise their competition regimes, as well 
as to create or reinforce their competition authorities.5 Although the 
approach towards competition has been modified, the implementation of 
competition law is still deficient.6  
 
	
1 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America – From Despair to Hope (Oxford University 
Press 1995) 1 
2 Michal Gal, ‘The Ecology of Antitrust’ in Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons 
From Developing Countries (UNCTAD 2004) 22 
3 Joseph Staats, Shaun Bowler, and Jonathan Hiskey, ‘Measuring Judicial Performance in Latin 
America’ (2005) 47 Latin American Politics & Society, University of Miami 4, 78 
4 Ryan Salzman and Adam Ramsey, ‘Judging The Judiciary: Understanding Public Confidence in Latin 
American Courts’ (2013) University of Miami, 78–79  
5 Gal (n 2) 23 
6 OECD, ‘Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean, 10 years of the OECD – IBD Latin 
American Competition Forum’ 5 
<http://www.oecd.org/competition/latinamerica/competitioninlatinamericaandthecaribbean10yearsofth
eoecd-idblatinamericancompetitionforum.htm> accessed 8 March 2018; Dina Waked, ‘Antitrust 
Enforcement in Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-Enforcement using Resource-
Based Evidence’ (2010) 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2–3 
<https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1638874 > accessed 6 March 2018 
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Among the difficulties, the judiciary represents one of the main 
impediments to the implementation of competition law given its poor 
knowledge of competition law, the low levels of exposure to antitrust 
cases, and its excessive workload. Therefore, the main purpose of this 
research project is to test the hypothesis that the adoption of specialised 
competition tribunals is advisable in Latin American countries to tackle 
these issues. 
 
Such characteristics, combined with the lack of conclusive evidence 
regarding the benefits of specialised tribunals, reinforce the pertinence of 
studying one of the most common alternatives contemplated to alleviate 
the inefficiency, ineffectiveness and unreliability that the judiciary faces: 
specialisation. This research project seeks to remedy this lack of 
empirical evidence regarding the real benefits of specialised tribunals, 
focusing on the recent adoption of the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico.  
 
In light of the above, this research first concentrates on verifying through 
the opinions of key stakeholders whether this tribunal has managed to 
deliver the three most common factors attributed to specialisation ‒ 
efficiency, quality, and uniformity ‒ as well as establishing whether it has 
been affected by the most common drawback ‒ loss of independence. 
Lawrence Baum has described these three factors as the neutral virtues of 
specialisation, and loss of independence as a consequent negative impact. 
He has also recognised the insufficiency of the empirical evidence testing 
such virtues and drawbacks, which is the reason why these factors have 
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been chosen.7 Next, the research questions that this thesis aims to answer 
will be set out. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This research project aims to provide experiential evidence about the 
benefits of specialised competition tribunals, and to contribute to the 
literature on the necessity of specialised competition tribunals in Latin 
American countries. It will do so by exploring the following research 
questions.  
 
1. Has the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico been beneficial 
in terms of efficiency, quality, and uniformity, and has it been 
afflicted by loss of independence?  
 
2. Has the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico 
been a product of inadvertence rather than design? 
 
3. Is competition law a complex field in Latin American countries 
such that the adoption of specialised competition tribunals seems 
necessary?  
 
4. Would specialised competition tribunals outperform general 
tribunals in Latin American countries?  
 
5. Are specialised competition tribunals advisable for Latin American 
countries? 
 
	
7 Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Courts (The University of Chicago Press 2011) 32, 33, 37 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
This research project is underpinned by the use of different 
methodologies that aim to answer the research questions listed above. 
The first methodology implemented in this research is doctrinal.  
 
Doctrinal methodology 
 
The review of secondary sources such as academic commentaries and 
studies from international organisations pertaining to the notion of 
specialised tribunals allowed the advancement of the theoretical 
framework on which this research project is based. These sources covered 
the alleged benefits and drawbacks of specialised tribunals, as well as the 
lack of empirical evidence in this regard, the necessity of adopting 
specialised tribunals in competition law, and the pertinence of adopting 
them in developing countries. 
 
The study of primary sources such as legislation, as well as secondary 
sources such as parliamentary debates in Mexico, socio-legal studies, and 
Mexican governmental reports related to the case study, was fundamental 
to gain the required knowledge for an understanding of the implications 
of the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, and 
thereby extract some lessons that other Latin American countries could 
make applicable thanks to their regional commonalities ‒ one of the main 
goals of this research project.  
 
Questioning whether specialisation is advisable, this research project first 
undertook a literature review and identified two main streams within the 
relevant literature. On the one side, a cluster of scholars, among them 
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Judge Posner8, and Baye and Wright,9 consider that competition law is a 
highly complex matter. They consider that economics nourishes 
competition law and it would be unreal to expect a generalist judge to 
come to the right decision in antitrust cases based purely on precedents, 
untrained intuition and legal interpretation.  
 
On the other side, Judge Leventhal10, Wood11 and Rakoff12 do not support 
the need to adopt specialised competition tribunals since not all antitrust 
cases involve economic issues; judges just need a good sense of fairness 
to solve any case and practitioners are obliged to present the facts in such 
a manner that it is easy for judges to understand them.  
 
The theoretical framework in relation to the study of specialised courts is 
based on Lawrence Baum. He has expressed his concern about the 
scarcity of empirical evidence which proves the veracity of the neutral 
virtues repeatedly assigned to these types of judiciary: efficiency, quality, 
and uniformity,13 and the insufficiency of systematic comparable studies 
when some form of jurisdiction is transferred from a generalist to a 
specialised body.14 
 
Based on the concern expressed by Baum, the purpose of this research 
project is to remedy the insufficiency of studies proving the veracity of 
	
8 Richard Posner, ‘The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness’ (1999) 13 The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 2, 91‒99 
9	Michael Baye and Joshua Wright, ‘Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact 
of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals’ (2010) Journal of Law and Economics, 5	
10 Statement by Judge Leventhal in	David Currie and Frank Goodman, ‘Judicial Review of Federal 
Administrative Action: Quest For The Optimum Forum’ (1975) 75 Columbia Law Review 1, 80	
11 Diane Wood, ‘Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?’ 
(2013) 13 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 7 
12 Jed Rakoff, ‘Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age of Economic Expertise’ (2012) 
XVII Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 13 
13 Baum (n 7) 32, 33, 37 
14 Ibid. 
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the neutral virtues of specialisation by assessing the performance of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico. At the same time, considering 
that when this tribunal was adopted some form of jurisdiction was 
transferred from a generalist to a specialised body, the goal is also to 
provide the required systematic study that is according to Baum currently 
absent from the pertinent literature. A qualitative methodology was also 
employed in this research, and its analysis will take place in the following 
section. 
 
Qualitative Research 
 
a. Overview 
 
This research project aims to illuminate whether specialised competition 
tribunals are beneficial for Latin American countries. The assessment of 
the performance of the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico in 
terms of efficiency, quality, and uniformity is used to review whether this 
has been the case. Since this assessment is based on the personal opinions 
given by different key stakeholders, the use of a qualitative methodology 
to meet the objective appeared to be the most suitable.  
 
The first reason why Mexico makes a good case study resides in the fact 
that when the specialised competition tribunal was adopted in Mexico, 
some form of jurisdiction was transferred from a generalist to a 
specialised body. Thus, in seeking to remedy the absence of such 
systematic studies from the pertinent literature, as mentioned by Baum, 
the example of Mexico is significant. At the same time, considering the 
recent adoption of such an institutional reform, Mexico offered the 
unique opportunity to interview the judges that were transferred, and 
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whose insights were crucial for the purpose of this research project. It 
was also very advantageous to interview the members of the Comisión 
Federal de Competencia Económica (COFECE) and the practitioners who 
witnessed such a transitional period. 
 
A second reason rests on the commonalities among Latin American 
countries, which imply that the lessons offered by Mexico may be 
valuable for those Latin American countries facing similar challenges. 
Yet, in the same way that legal reforms cannot merely be transplanted, 
the lessons that can be learned from this experience should be prudently 
tailored to a country’s specific conditions to avoid resistance or failure.  
 
Another third reason is that competition law is a novel and complex field 
in Mexico, and its development has been compromised by a lack of 
knowledge of competition law amid the judiciary, along with a low level 
of competition culture, making Mexico a representative case study. 
Considering that the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal was 
intended to remedy such issues, the assessment of the performance of this 
specialised tribunal suits the emphasis of this research project. A 
description of the research sample is presented next.  
 
b. Research sample 
 
This research project focused on the experience of the following three 
stakeholder groups: 
 
1. Members of the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico 
2. Members of the competition authority in Mexico – COFECE 
3. Practitioners who worked in the field of competition law in Mexico 
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c. Chosen criteria 
 
The members of the specialised competition tribunal were chosen 
because they were all generalist judges responsible for reviewing antitrust 
cases, and were now part of the specialised competition tribunal. This 
circumstance offered a unique opportunity to reveal how they approached 
the review of antitrust cases as generalists, and how they now approached 
it as specialists. This made their perceptions very valuable for the purpose 
of this research project. 
 
In relation to the members of the Mexican competition authority – 
COFECE ‒ who make the decisions in antitrust cases, the chosen criteria 
refer to the opportunity they had to deal with the review of their decisions 
before generalist judges, and the experience they subsequently had of 
having their decisions reviewed by specialists.  
 
Finally, the practitioners who worked in the field of competition law in 
Mexico were chosen because they could offer valuable personal opinions 
about their experience, having had the opportunity to defend their clients 
before generalist judges previously responsible for the review of antitrust 
cases, and subsequently to defend them before the new specialised 
competition tribunal. Thus by having different perspectives from these 
three different groups, the data could be analysed in different ways and 
the different insights contrasted. This helped underpin the validity of the 
outcomes.  
 
One of the shortcomings of the empirical research was the lack of 
interviews with businesses or third parties; whose could have been 
collected. Their opinions would have enriched the analysis, but due to 
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financial and time restraints such groups of stakeholders were not 
included. Nevertheless, such a weakness does not compromise the 
findings that this research project provides considering the large number 
of other key stakeholders interviewed. In future, research containing 
insights from third parties would enhance the debate. 
 
d. Number of participants 
 
A total of sixteen interviewees were conducted: four tribunal members; 
four COFECE members, plus two from fieldwork; five practitioners, and 
one via Skype.   
 
The specialised competition tribunal consists of eight members (six 
magistrates responsible for the appeal instance, and two judges 
responsible for the first instance). On 20th January 2017 letters were 
addressed to every member explaining the nature and purpose of this 
research project, and requesting their participation as interviewees. The 
letters were attached to emails sent to each member, and this was 
followed up with phone calls to their secretaries during the following 
weeks. As a result, three magistrates and one judge agreed to take part in 
the interviews, meaning that 50% of the members of the specialised 
tribunal were interviewed. The other 50% did not respond. 
 
With respect to the Mexican competition authority – COFECE ‒ six 
members comprise the board of commissioners. On 29th November 2016 
letters were sent by email to all six requesting their participation as 
interviewees. Four members agreed to take part (66.6%) and the other 
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two did not respond. During fieldwork in Mexico, two members of the 
investigative department of COFECE were contacted and interviewed.  
 
Practitioners were identified using “the Legal 500”, a website that 
contains information about the best law firms in Latin America. Ten 
practitioners whose reviews were outstanding were chosen. By the time 
the sample was examined, the total number of outstanding practitioners in 
competition law had fallen, and therefore ten practitioners was considered 
sufficient for the purpose of this research project.  
 
The timeframe was also a factor; the researcher spent just two weeks in 
Mexico interviewing all of the stakeholders, so it was a rational choice to 
limit the number of practitioners. On 13th December 2016 letters were 
sent by email to all of the practitioners requesting their participation as 
interviewees. Five practitioners agreed; the rest did not respond. One 
more practitioner was interviewed via Skype; contact had been made with 
him previously during fieldwork in Mexico. 
 
The number of participants from each stakeholder group constituted a 
representative sample, and their diversity provided contrasting 
perspectives. The participants in general could be described as high 
profile, considering that they were expert lawyers or economists who 
served with the judiciary, with the executive, or with prestigious law 
firms. The majority of them were over 40 years old. The fact that all of 
the participants were specialists in competition law is significant for the 
analysis of the data collected, because their expertise in such eminent 
positions indicates that their opinions were serious, objective, and 
reflective.  
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e. Overview of information needed 
 
The type of information sought from the participants centred on their 
perceptions of the performance of the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico. Thus, similar questions were addressed to each of the 
participants, and their answers allowed a direct comparison and analysis. 
Considering that the emphasis was to collect their perceptions grounded 
on their personal experiences, semi-structured15 interviews were 
considered the most suitable, as the open questions enabled them to freely 
expand on their answers.  
 
At this juncture, it is important to mention as a caveat that due to 
financial and time restraints this research project did not examine or 
compare judicial review decisions made by generalist judges with 
decisions made by the specialised competition tribunal. The collection of 
data in this regard was cumbersome. Additionally, as Chapter 2 will 
explore in more detail, the analysis of the quality of the judicial decisions 
is a difficult undertaking, and a reason why this research limited its scope 
to the insights of the interviewees in this sense.   
 
f. Research design overview 
 
The interviews took place during fieldwork in Mexico City from the 8th 
to the 29th March 2017. The dates, times, and locations were chosen at 
the convenience of the participants. As indicated earlier, one interview 
was conducted via Skype. Overall, the length of the interviews ranged 
	
15 Semi-structured interviews consist of a guided but open questions dialogue, where the respondents 
present their descriptions and narratives more spontaneously and more deeply. Svend Brinkmann, 
Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology (Springer Link 2014) 
<https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4614-5583-7_161> accessed 11 
January 2019. 
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from 30 minutes to one hour. Considering that the participants were high 
profile, timekeeping was important. As a precautionary measure, the 
interviews were simultaneously recorded using a recorder, a mobile 
phone, and a laptop. The researcher undertook the transcription process 
of the recorded interviews. 
 
g. Data analysis and synthesis 
 
An Excel™ table was created as a repository of the data. Similar 
questions were addressed to the different stakeholder groups, so each 
question formed a category. Each stakeholder group was also categorised. 
Thus, the table comprised the number and type of participant responses, 
as well as the frequency of participant responses against each category. 
The Excel™ table was used to visualise and analyse the data developed, 
and then as the coding scheme of this research method by categorising 
the questions and the participants, and by permitting a comparison across 
them. Such a comparison facilitated the assessment of the performance of 
the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, and contributed to the 
implications of the analysis. 
 
Participants who took part in interviews were given alphabetised labels to 
preserve their anonymity (Member A, B, C, D; COFECE A, B, C, D, E, 
F; Practitioner A, B, C, D, E, F), and the analysis of the data reported 
their opinions under these labels. 
 
h. Ethical considerations 
 
The Queen Mary Ethics of Research Committee deliberated the ethical 
considerations of the proposed research, arriving at the conclusion that 
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the “…proposed work does not present any ethical concerns; is extremely 
low risk; and thus does not require the scrutiny of the full Research 
Ethics Committee…” (Ref: QMREC1786a). 
 
The structure of this thesis is presented next. 
 
STRUCTURE 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 starts by providing a 
conceptual framework about transplants. It was decided to present such 
an analysis at this stages since the topic is complex, and its understanding 
is essential for any country contemplating the incorporation of lessons 
provided by the Mexican case. Relevant commonalities between Mexico 
and some other Latin American countries are also presented throughout 
Chapter 1. Linking the theoretical framework with such similarities 
serves as a guideline to incorporate the outcomes of this research project 
with the domestic realities of each Latin American country. Similarly, it 
assists with the elaboration of the answers to research questions 4 and 5.   
 
Following the formulation of the theoretical framework, Chapter 2 then 
examines the scarcity of empirical evidence about the real benefits and 
drawbacks of specialised tribunals. Drawing on this analysis, Chapter 2 
continues to examine the different arguments in favour of, and against, 
specialised tribunals in competition law, and explores the arguments that 
support and disregard the advisability of specialised competition tribunals 
in developing countries.  
 
Section 2.4 examines the role played by international organisations, 
advocating for the adoption of specialised tribunals and focusing 
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primarily on the recommendations given to Latin American countries to 
adopt specialised tribunals in competition law. The main purpose of 
Chapter 2, then, is to justify the necessity of advancing the study of 
specialised tribunals and their adoption in the field of competition law, 
particularly in developing countries. At the same time, the theoretical 
insights of Chapter 2 serve as a cornerstone in the formulation of research 
questions 1 and 3.  
 
Chapter 3 explains the choice of Mexico as a case study. It analyses the 
characteristics of the Mexican markets in an attempt to establish how 
challenging it is to supervise them. Section 3.2 provides a background 
overview of the structure and functioning of the judiciary. This overview 
includes the main challenges faced by the judiciary in Mexico, such as 
the dominance of the executive branch, the widespread corruption, and 
the excessive workload. Section 3.3 offers a perspective on the 
development of Mexican competition regimes, and the country’s 
competition authorities. Section 3.4 examines the review process before 
and after the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal, aiming to 
offer a full picture of the implications of having created this type of 
judiciary in Mexico.  
 
The analysis provided by Chapter 3 shows the magnitude of the issues 
that surrounded the adoption of such an institutional reform. Having 
presented the domestic realities of Mexico in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 
assesses the performance of this specialised competition tribunal in terms 
of efficiency, quality, and uniformity. The assessment is based on the 
perceptions of the members of the specialised competition tribunal, the 
members of one of the competition authorities in Mexico – COFECE ‒ 
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and the perceptions of some practitioners working in that field in Mexico, 
who were interviewed for the purpose of this research project.  
 
The conclusions regarding the performance of this tribunal derive from 
comparing and calculating the number of times that the different insights 
of the respondents matched. The data analysis offered in Chapter 4 aims 
to contribute to answering research questions 1, 3, 4 and 5. Finally, 
Chapter 5 draws the strands of the thesis together, confirming the 
findings and revealing their wider implications. These findings are 
divided into broad and narrow. The broad findings reflect the overall 
implications of the analysis, where a generalisation takes place based on 
the similarities between Mexico and some other Latin American countries 
previously described in Chapter 1.  
 
Section 5.1.1 presents the narrow findings, which consist of the reasons 
behind the results shown by the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico. Among these are the amparo action, poor knowledge of 
competition, low levels of exposure, market characteristics, and the 
obstacles that impeded a better development of the Mexican competition 
regime. Section 5.1.2 addresses all of the research questions, using the 
Mexican case to deduce broader conclusions for Latin American 
countries facing similar challenges in terms of the implementation of 
competition law and remedies to be sought. 
 
The crucial insights of this research project advance the study of the real 
benefits of specialised tribunals. The findings also contribute to 
elucidating that, in light of the specific conditions of developing 
countries, and in particular those of Latin American countries, the 
adoption of specialised competition tribunals is advisable. This 
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conclusion derives from the analysis of the Mexican case, whereby the 
findings become generally applicable thanks to the commonalities 
between countries, and the theory of transplants.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This introductory chapter aimed to give an overview of the research 
methodologies used to address the research questions formulated in this 
thesis. One method used to answer the questions was doctrinal. Extensive 
literature was reviewed to present the different discussions about the 
presumed benefits of specialised tribunals: efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity, as well as the alleged drawback, loss of independence. The 
literature review looked at the arguments that have arisen among scholars 
as to the necessity of specialised tribunals in competition law, and 
particularly as to the advisability of the adoption of these tribunals in 
developing countries.  
 
In seeking to address the different research questions, a qualitative 
methodology was also applied. Three different groups of stakeholders 
were interviewed for this purpose: 1) members of the specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico; 2) members of the competition authority 
in Mexico – COFECE; and 3) practitioners in the field of competition law 
in the country. The reason why these stakeholders were chosen was 
because all of them experienced the transition from being generalist 
judges responsible for the review process of antitrust cases to being 
specialists instead. 
 
A representative number of stakeholders from each group were 
interviewed, and this diversity of perspectives gives enhanced support to 
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the findings of this research project. The extensive review of literature, 
combined with the significant number of interviews, provide this research 
project with an exceptional and comprehensive synopsis of the 
implications of the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico. This thesis also represents a remarkable opportunity to provide 
experiential analysis, and the prospect of offering some lessons. The next 
chapter presents the theoretical framework and the commonalities.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Transplants and commonalities among Latin American countries 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the main objectives of this research project is to offer some 
lessons to Latin American countries searching for practical solutions to 
problems similar to those experienced in Mexico and which provoked the 
adoption of a specialised competition tribunal. In transferring such 
lessons it is crucial that policymakers within governments understand the 
analysis of the transplantation phenomenon. The review of relevant 
literature evidences that the transplantation of legal systems, institutions 
or lessons is a complex matter.16  
 
Observing what has been done elsewhere, and how, offers a good 
comparison opportunity for countries looking to diagnose the strengths 
and weaknesses of its own institutions, policies, programmes, or laws 
under enquiry, and to quickly transfer the adopted lessons that have been 
previously tested elsewhere.17 Nevertheless, such adaptation requires the 
theoretical insights detailed in Section 1 of this chapter if failures are to 
be avoided. Lessons from other countries also need to be aligned with 
prevailing informal institutions (Section 1.1.1.). 
 
Since the analysis of transplantation is complex, and its comprehension 
crucial, the first aim of Section 1 is to provide a general conceptual 
framework of the most common definitions of the terms necessary for an 
	
16 Juan Couyoumdjian, ‘Are Institutional Transplants Viable? An examination in light of the proposals 
by Jeremy Bentham’ (2012) 8 Journal of Institutional Economics 494  
17 Richard Rose, Learning from Comparative Public Policy: A Practical Guide (Routledge 2004) 3, 6.  
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understanding of the transplantation phenomenon, and the most relevant 
theories that underpin its advance. The focus centres on the study of the 
following concepts: 1) institutions; 2) transplants; 3) institutional change; 
4) culture; and 5) design of institutional transplants.  
 
In relation to institutions, these are generally understood as being 
restraints humanly devised to bring order within society, and may be 
formal or informal. Equally, the study of the judiciary as institution 
reveals the importance of having independent and effective judiciaries, 
and brings attention to how dependent, inefficient, poor-quality, 
inconsistent, and ineffective judiciaries impact the legitimacy of such a 
branch. This section also presents a general framework for legal 
transplants, whose examination confirms that the debates around the 
correlation between law and society are abundant and remain unsettled, 
and that the theories around transplant phenomena are plenty, complex, 
and profoundly divided.  
 
Section 1 also helps highlight that, despite the unsettled nature of the 
debate, different motivations promote the vast use of transplants, 
particularly among developing countries. A typology based on such 
motivations has been designed (Section 1.1.2). Regardless of the 
motivation, it appears that the success or failure of transplants rests on the 
compatibility or not between the prevailing informal institutions of the 
recipient, such as social or cultural factors, and the new transplanted 
institution, such as a specialised tribunal.  
 
With a view to providing a better understanding of the likelihood of 
acceptance or rejection of a transplanted formal institution, Section 1 also 
illustrates how and why institutions change. From this, an analysis of 
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different theories is offered. The New Institutional Economics doctrine 
serves the purpose of this research project particularly well by clarifying 
that informal institutions are drivers of change, that they allow the 
embedment of formal institutions, and that formal and informal 
institutions change at different paces.  
 
In addition, and with a view to exploring the notion of informal 
institutions in more detail, Section 1 provides an analysis of the four main 
streams of research that explain how the acquirement of culture occurs. 
The results of this evolutionary anthropology approach are significant in 
the way they exemplify how culture is an intrinsic part of the individual 
and their development. Therefore, neglecting the study of culture when 
analysing the transplantation of institutions would be deficient. In relation 
to the design of transplants, Section 1 contrasts the various alternatives 
and shows that the ones most likely to succeed are those that recognise 
the importance of considering local needs, local knowledge, and local 
prevailing informal institutions.  
 
Against this backdrop, the second aim of this chapter is to set the scene 
for a feasible transplant of the lessons provided by the Mexican case. For 
this purpose, some commonalities among Latin American countries are 
presented in order to ascertain whether the transplant of specialised courts 
is feasible and, indeed, desirable. The identification of such 
commonalities reinforces Mexico as a relevant case, and by linking the 
theoretical framework provided in Section 1.1 with the established 
commonalities detailed in Section 1.2, we should be able to ascertain 
whether Latin American countries searching for practical solutions to the 
same issues can use the Mexican experience to suit their specific needs.  
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A more detailed study of the commonalities present among Latin 
American countries relates to the recently introduced reinforcement of 
competition law and policy, looking at when Latin American countries 
adopted their competition regimes, when their competition agencies were 
created, which countries have specialised competition tribunals, and the 
fact that their levels of enforcement are estimated to be lower than in 
developed countries. This analysis reveals that the majority of Latin 
American countries have emerging or weak competition agencies, newly 
adopted competition regimes, general tribunals reviewing antitrust cases, 
and lower levels of enforcement compared to advanced economies. 
  
Subsequently, Section 1.1.4 undertakes an assessment of levels of a 
culture of competition, seeking to show the suitability of Mexico as a 
case study, as this country is afflicted by most of the same conditions as 
the majority of the Latin American countries. The detailed examination of 
such challenging economic structures shared by the majority of the Latin 
American countries, besides serving as a gauge to infer levels of a culture 
of competition, also provokes some reflections on the quality of the 
review process in antitrust cases, as it will be explained at a later stage.  
 
Finally, Section 1.2 explores the levels of credibility of the judiciaries in 
Latin America. The objective of such analysis is to establish an indirect 
link between the levels of credibility enjoyed by the judiciary and the 
implementation of competition law. The argument goes that courts 
review whether the competition authority has interpreted and applied the 
law correctly, as well as whether the evidence used supports the 
conclusion,18 so that if the public does not perceive the judiciary as 
	
18 Maciej Bernatt, ‘Explaining Judicial Deference in Competition Law’ 
https://eulawenforcement.com/?p=727 accessed 28 September 2019  
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credible, that may signify inefficient and poor quality decision-making19 
could be derived from a limited implementation of competition law.  
 
The analysis in Section 1.1 proceeds as follows. First it explores the 
meaning of institutions. Second, it analyses the advancement of the 
theoretical framework of transplants. Third, it presents the different 
theories of institutional change. Fourth, it studies the definition of culture 
and its effect on institutions. Fifth, it describes the different designs of 
transplants, and provides some recommendations to avoid failure. Finally, 
it provides concluding remarks. 
 
Section 1.2 is structured as follows. First, it presents a general 
introduction to the main characteristics of the judiciary systems and the 
economies in Latin America. Second, it looks at when the competition 
regimes were adopted or modernised, when the competition authorities 
were created, which Latin American countries have specialised 
competition tribunals, and explores levels of enforcement.  
 
Third, it examines some indicators seeking to provoke inferences in 
relation to levels of competition culture, underlying that higher levels are 
expected in countries where specialist competition tribunals exist.20 The 
indicators are: a) income classification; b) poverty; c) economic growth 
and prosperity; d) barriers to entry; e) barriers to import; f) informal 
economy; and g) infrastructure. In light of the above, the assumption is 
that if low levels of a culture of competition are established then the 
	
19 The role of the judiciary in the implementation of competition policy has been examined by the 
OECD, ‘Policy Roundtables, Judicial Enforcement of Competition Law’ (1996) 10 
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/1919985.pdf> accessed 28 
September 2019. 
20	 ICN Advocacy Working Group, Competition Culture Project Report (2015) 3, 4 
<https://centrocedec.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/competition-culture-report-2015.pdf> accessed 16 
August 2018	
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adoption of a specialised competition tribunal may seem advisable to 
increase the levels of awareness. Fourth, it explores the levels of 
credibility of the judiciaries in Latin America. Finally, it provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
1.1. TRANSPLANTS  
 
There has been considerable research into and interest in the concepts of 
institutions, and transplants, as well as their relevance in policy 
development.21 The large number of studies seeking to explain these 
concepts has in fact impinged their understanding, due to the ambiguity 
and inconsistency observed in the use of terms, and in the explanatory 
process of the existing theories.22 To address this challenge, this section 
aims to describe and summarise the most common concepts, arguments, 
and theories in an attempt to gain a good understanding of the 
transplantation phenomenon, since the subject matter of this research 
pertains to the possible transplantation of specialised competition 
tribunals ‒ an example of a formal institution. 
 
1.1.1. INSTITUTIONS 
 
The literature review provides the most common definition of 
institutions, that given by North, according to which institutions are 
understood as the “rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”,23 
represented also as economic and political agents interacting under a 
	
21 Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘What Are Institutions’ (2006) XL Journal of Economic Issues 1, 1 
22 Christopher Kingston and Gonzalo Caballero, ‘Comparing Theories of Institutional Change’ (2009) 
5:2 Journal of Institutional Economics, 151–152; Hodgson (n 21) 1 
23 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge 
University Press 1990) 3 
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shared system of encouragements24 or as “stable patterns in social 
interactions”.25 Institutions are also defined as “a set of rules that 
structure social interactions in particular ways”,26 instruments used to 
create steady expectations of the behaviour of others by imposing 
constraints,27 simply as the outcomes of human relations and desires,28 or 
“as durable systems of established and embedded social rules that 
structure social interactions”.29 
 
Institutions have also been considered as “a complex of status-role 
relationships, which is concerned with a particular area of activity within 
any specified social system”.30 Equally, it has been indicated that 
individuals create institutions as an external tool in an attempt to give 
structure and order to their environment.31  
 
The above human-created institutions are defined as either formal or 
informal. Formal institutions are positive, explicit or written down, 
enforced by a third party,32 and usually observed for example in the form 
of constitutions and laws.33 Informal institutions are not written down, are 
	
24 Couyoumdjian (n 16) 491 
25 Martin De Jong, Konstantinos Lalenis and Virginie Mamadouh, ‘An Introduction to Institutional 
Transplantation’ in The Theory and Practice of Institutional Transplantation (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 2002) 3 
26 Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge University Press 1992) 2 
27 Geoffrey Hodgson (n 21) 2 
28 Ibid. 8 
29 Ibid. 13 
30 Howard Kaplan, ‘The Concept of Institution: A Review, Evaluation, and Suggested Research 
Procedure’ (1960) 39 Social Forces 2, 179 
31 Douglas North and Arthur Denzau, ‘Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions’ (1994) 47 
Kyklos 4 
32 North (n 23) 4; Kingston and Caballero (n 22) 154; Nils Goldschmidt, ‘A Cultural Approach to 
Economics’ (2006) Intereconomics 177; Gerard Roland, ‘Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-
Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions’ (2004) 38 Studies in Comparative International Development 
4, 111; Martin De Jong and Suzan Stoter ‘Institutional Transplantation and The Rule of Law: How 
This Interdisciplinary Method Can Enhance The Legitimacy Of International Organisations’ (2009) 2 
Erasmus Law Review 03, 318; Martin De Jong, ‘The Pitfalls of Family Resemblance: Why 
Transferring Planning Institutions Between “Similar Countries” is Delicate Business’ (2004) 12 
European Planning Studies 7, 1057–1058 
33 Couyoumdjian (n 16) 491 
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self-enforced, and exemplified as social norms or conventions derived 
from moral codes, ideologies, or culture.34  
 
From the cluster of definitions presented earlier it could be said that 
institutions are essentially humanly devised constraints, whether formal 
or informal, which aim to bring order to social interactions. Considering 
that the focus of this research project rests on the assessment of the 
performance of the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, the next 
step is therefore to study the judiciary as an institution. 
 
a. The judiciary as formal institution 
 
Of the three main institutional powers within the state, the judiciary has 
been seen as the weakest or perhaps the most neglected; in the words of 
Hamilton, the executive holds the sword, the legislature commands the 
purse, while the judiciary does not have influence over the sword or the 
purse.35 Research has also focused on the legislative and the executive, 
neglecting the study of law and courts, particularly in Latin America.36 
Despite this apparent disadvantage, the judiciary is in fact the formal 
institution that limits the power of the executive and legislative under the 
“checks and balances” role, by independently enforcing the law, and 
reviewing that law and policymaking comply with the constitution, so 
becoming the final arbiter of the law.37   
 
	
34 Kingston and Caballero (n 22) 158; De Jong and Stoter (n 32) 318; Roland (n 32) 111; De Jong (n 
32), 1057–1058; Couyoumdjian (n 16) 491; Nils Goldschmidt (n 32) 177 
35 Alexander Hamilton, John Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (Signet Classic 2003) 464; 
Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘A Confusion of Powers: Politics and The Rule of Law’ (1977) 40 The Modern Law 
Review 1, 8 
36 Staats, Bowler and Hiskey (n 3) 77–78 
37 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Judicial 
Checks and Balances’ (2004) 112 Journal of Political Economy, 2–4 
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In the field of human rights, the judiciary constitutes one of the most 
important institutions, whose function consists in protecting and 
promoting said rights.38 Regarding the interaction between public 
authorities and individuals, the judiciary protects the latter from arbitrary 
state action, and ensures their civic and political liberties.39 In relation to 
the rule of law, it has been widely agreed among scholars that an 
independent and effective judiciary is a vital factor for its application.40  
 
Economic freedom and economic growth have been equally correlated 
with independent and efficient judiciaries, under the assumption that the 
protection of property rights via enforced agreements leads to more 
developed credit markets, as this reduces the uncertainty of rights not 
being upheld and increases the willingness to invest more.41  
 
The notion of an independent judiciary refers broadly to the ability to 
perform, detached from any external political influence from the 
executive or the legislative, and particularly to the ability of every judge 
to make autonomous decisions.42 The relevant literature claims that 
independent courts are essential to effectively review competition 
decisions and to adjudicate competition law disputes between private 
parties.43 For this reason, it is essential to observe the following structural 
	
38 Winston Langley, Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues since 1945 (Greenwood Publishing Group 
1999) 174–175 
39 Staats, Bowler and Hiskey (n 3) 78 
40 Kenneth Dam, The Rule Of Law And Economic Development (Brookings Institution Press 2007) 93; 
Staats, Bowler and Hiskey (n 3) 78 
41 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches and Shleifer (n 37) 3; Kenneth Dam (n 40) 21, 93–95; Sean 
Dougherty, ‘Boosting Growth and Reducing Informality in Mexico’ (2015) OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers No. 1188, 22–23 <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/boosting-
growth-and-reducing-informality-in-mexico_5js4w28dnn28-en> accessed 12 July 2018; Giuliana 
Palumbo, Giulia Giupponi, Luca Nunziata and Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, ‘The Economics of Civil 
Justice: New Cross-Country Data and Empirics’ (2013) OECD, Economics Department Working 
Papers No. 1060, 2 <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-economics-of-civil-
justice_5k41w04ds6kf-en> accessed 13 July 2018 
42 Staats, Bowler and Hiskey (n 3) 79–80 
43 OECD, ‘Judicial Perspectives on Competition Law’ (2017) 3 
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factors: 1) selection and promotion based on merit rather than on political 
criteria;44 2) good salaries and prohibition to reduce them;45 3) life tenure 
with the only possibility of being removed for cause;46 4) fair transfers 
and promotions according to pre-established rules;47 and, 5) impartial 
assignment of cases.48  
 
Judicial effectiveness broadly refers to enforcement, under the premise 
that good laws cannot substitute a judiciary system incapable of making 
them enforceable, or that good laws can turn into bad ones if they are not 
applicable, and even that any effort to improve substantive laws is 
meaningless if they are not enforced.49 This effectiveness constitutes one 
among several indicators used to measure the performance of the 
judiciary, where factors such as efficiency, quality, and uniformity have 
been commonly included.50 In general terms, efficiency refers to the time 
to disposition of a case,51 quality reflects the knowledge of the law and its 
correct application,52 and uniformity means producing similar decisions 
in factually similar disputes. 
 
This section has reviewed the general notions of independence and 
effectiveness, and Section 1.1.2 explores where the legitimacy of the 
judiciary rests. As the judiciary lacks the ‘sword’ or the ‘purse’, its 
legitimacy resides in the levels of acceptance from the citizens.53 Thus, 
	
44 Dam (n 40) 115 
45 Ibid. 113–114 
46 Ibid. 114 
47 Randall Peerenboom, ‘Toward a Methodology for Successful Legal Transplants’ (2013) 1 The 
Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1, 16 
48 Ibid. 
49 Dam (n 40) 93–95 
50 Staats, Bowler and Hiskey (n 3) 79–80 
51 Dam (n 40) 101 
52 Staats, Bowler and Hiskey (n 3) 94 
53 John Yoo, ‘In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy’ (2001) 68 The University of Chicago Law 
Review, 781 
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when a judiciary is independent, effective, efficient, makes accurate and 
uniform decisions, positively influences the general perceptions of the 
public and translates them into acceptance, then the institution is provided 
with legitimacy.  
 
Research has shown that citizens of countries with well-performing 
judiciaries express greater confidence in those institutions,54 which is not 
the case if the judiciary is not independent or effective. If the judiciary 
system is slow, uncertain, costly, ineffective, biased, or if decisions are 
contradictory or of poor quality, citizens will bring their cases with 
scepticism or will abstain from bringing them. Equally, the powers of the 
executive and legislative will be limitless, the respect for human, civic, 
and political rights will be compromised, the implementation of the rule 
of law will be undermined, and the fostering of economic development 
will be hindered. 
 
Having established the importance of an effective judicial system, we 
now look at the assessment of the performance of the specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico in terms of efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity. This examination will help establish whether this new 
institution has enhanced the levels of acceptance of the judiciary system 
and therefore its legitimacy. The analysis of the perceptions of the 
interviewees are instructive in this respect. At the same time, these three 
factors ‒ efficiency, quality, and uniformity ‒ against which the 
assessment will take place, derive from the above theoretical analysis.  
 
After providing a basic definition of the concept of institutions, and a 
general analysis of the judiciary as institution, in order to thread out the 
	
54 Salzman and Ramsey (n 4) 88 
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factors of effective performance, Section 1.1.2 explores the meaning of 
transplants of institutions. This discussion is important, as it will allow 
conclusions to be drawn with regard to the transplantation of specialised 
courts, as institutions.  
 
1.1.2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The examination of the relevant literature shows that the debate around 
how law and society correlate is unsettled. The same can be said of the 
transplant phenomena. With respect to effective legal transplants, the 
relevant theories are often contradictory and complex. Despite the 
unsettledness, different motivations promote the widespread use of 
transplants, particularly among developing countries. One example that 
illustrates this scenario refers to developing countries adopting or 
modernising their competition regimes, as well as to creating or 
strengthening their competition authorities during the 1990s, in pursuit of 
financial aids.55 The success or failure of transplants is not easy to 
predict, but it appears that when problems arise it is essentially when 
social and cultural factors of the recipient country are abstracted from the 
analysis, or when similarities and differences are not evaluated, making 
the chosen case unsuitable.  
 
Transplant is a word that has been introduced to the legal world to 
describe the “phenomenon of borrowing, copying, or mirroring the laws 
or rules or institutions of one society for use in another”.56 As with laws, 
rules or institutions, lessons can also be transferred from one place to 
another. Incessantly, countries have been searching for experiences from 
	
55 Gal (n 2) 23 
56 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Is there a Theory of Legal Transplants?’ in David Nelken and Johannes Feest 
(eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Oregon: Hart Publishing 2001) 73  
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elsewhere in the hope of finding solutions to their own problems by 
adopting what has worked in parallel environments.57 
 
The advisability of transplants has been the source of endless debate. In 
Montesquieu’s view it was implausible that the law of one country might 
fit into the legal system of another,58 while Bentham advocated for the 
transfer of one-size-fits-all,59 the same position demonstrated by Watson, 
who considered the extent of Roman law as the best way to exemplify 
how institutions can easily be adopted,60 under the assumption that “legal 
rules move easily and are accepted into the system without too great 
difficulty […] even when the rules come from a very different kind of 
system”.61 This was further developed by theories claiming that law 
succeeds irrespective of the society in which it operates, or that law and 
rules are portable and autonomous, and can therefore be transplanted.62 
 
Legrand, who estimated that the law is the product of culture-specific 
determinations, rejected Watson’s proposition, claiming that once the law 
is moved to a different host culture the meaning changes immediately, 
making it impossible to transplant.63 The same rejection has been shown 
by Cotterrell, who has expressed that it is not possible to find logic in 
legal transplants as the concept itself is unclear, complex, and the 
variables to measure success or failure too numerous and often undefined, 
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but most importantly because communities show different social relations 
that the law cannot harmonise or integrate entirely.64  
 
Freund stated that in order to avoid rejection of a legal transplant, it was 
essential to appreciate the social and political context in which law was 
shaped.65 Middle-way approaches have been considered, where the study 
of certain conditions has been contemplated to foresee transferability, 
first looking just at the similarities, then focusing on the divergences, and 
then evaluating both.66 Later, a functionality theory was introduced, 
according to which the origin of the transplant is unimportant as long as it 
can serve well to address the same social need, underlining the 
importance of choosing a suitable case study.67  
 
Likewise, with the aim of explaining transplant processes, a typology was 
developed based on the reasons that motivate them. First, the Cost-Saving 
Transplant, whose main driver is to save money and time when finding a 
solution to a new problem.68 Second, the Externally Dictated Transplant, 
more common in developing countries and intended to satisfy foreign 
entities pursuing trade agreements, financial aid or political autonomy.69 
Third, the Entrepreneurial Transplant, where the motivation resides in the 
opportunity to gain expertise by adopting a foreign system, as well as to 
obtain political or economic benefits.70 Fourth, the Legitimacy-
	
64 Roger Cotterrell and Austin Sarat, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social 
Theory (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2006) 8, 108, 116 
65 Nelken (n 62) 10 
66 Helen Xanthaki, On Transferability of Legislative Solutions: The Functionality Test in Drafting 
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Generating Transplant, which occurs due to the prestige of foreign 
models, common in developing countries suffering from weak institutions 
where the missing authority is sought via the act of importing such 
models.71 
 
The use of transplants is common among developing countries, where 
their rejection has also been common.72 Whether the transplantation is 
voluntary or forced, if it is cost-saving or builds legitimacy, it has been 
claimed that the foundation of the problem is that the incompatibility 
between imported formal institutions and the prevailing informal 
institutions in the receiving country is what hinders the levels of 
acceptance.73 It is considered that local conditions play a more important 
role during the transplant process than the conditions of the donor.74   
 
When examining the different theories around transplants, the approach 
according to which transplants are unthinkable loses validity when we 
consider that an effective way for countries to find solutions to their 
needs is by learning from the lessons offered by their counterparts, and by 
adapting them. In the same way, the one-size-fits-all approach, where the 
assumption is that blueprints work in every case, is idealistic considering 
that every country has a unique set of socio-economic conditions, and 
without a critical consideration about what is needed and how it is 
needed, the chances of success are reduced.  
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The middle-way approaches seem to be more realistic, as the analysis of 
similarities or divergences, or both, as well as the examination of the 
suitability of the case study, is essential to make the replication feasible. 
Given that one of the purposes of this research project is to offer some 
lessons, the first thing that Latin American countries need to do is to 
establish whether Mexico is a suitable case study to satisfy their needs, 
the second is to determine their similarities or divergences, and the third 
is to adapt the lessons appropriately.  
 
Such adaptation requires compatibility between the prevailing informal 
institutions, such as moral norms, customs, and culture, and the new 
adopted formal institution, in this case a specialised competition tribunal. 
Particularly in the catching-up period, the adaptation of a foreign formal 
institution or a foreign lesson tends to be a rapid process, whereas 
informal institutions change at a slow pace, resulting in an 
incompatibility between them.75 For this reason, an understanding of how 
institutional change happens is essential, as Section 1.1.3 now shows. 
 
1.1.3. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
This section shows that ignoring prevailing informal institutions 
endangers the levels of acceptance of transplanted formal institutions, in 
this case a specialised competition tribunal. At the same time, it explores 
the pace at which new formal transplanted institutions take root and why 
it is important to marry this with the natural pace at which prevailing 
informal institutions change. For this purpose, this section starts by 
briefly exploring the theories underpinning rational and collective choices 
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(formal institutions) which downplay the role of informal rules (informal 
institutions) as drivers of change, moving to evolutionary theories where 
collective choices are inconceivable, and ending with a new movement 
where collective choices and informal rules work together as drivers of 
change. There follows a summary of the most important clusters of 
research in this area: 1) Collective choice; 2) Evolutionary theories; and 
3) New Institutional Economics.  
 
a. Collective choice theories  
 
Collective choice theories suggest that the rationality of individuals, 
organisations, communities or the state promotes a change of rules 
aspiring to obtain their own benefit.76 Some theories assign different roles 
to political actors, the judiciary, or third parties as drivers of institutional 
change.77  
 
Collective choice theorists have considered the informal rules that can be 
collectively adopted, such as ethical codes or moral norms, as drivers of 
change. Informal norms, which cannot be rationally and collectively 
evaluated, and whose evolvement is spontaneous and decentralised, such 
as social norms and conventions (moral, ideologies, culture), have been 
ignored by such theorists.78  
 
This collective choice approach rightly holds that individuals or 
communities promote institutional change but it fails to incorporate social 
conditions such as culture as promoters of it. The theory assumes that 
culture will also be ignored when the transplant of a formal institution is 
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contemplated. As a result, the compatibility gap between this informal 
institution and the new formal entity will be considerable, risking the 
levels of acceptance of the latter. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
compatibility gap suggests that if the specific social conditions of the 
Latin Americans countries contemplating the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal are not considered, then the risks of rejection of the 
incorporation of such a formal institution will be higher.  
 
b. Evolutionary theories 
 
The core of this cluster of theories centres on the Darwinian principles of 
variation, selection, and inheritance, as follows: where the change 
appears unintentionally or deliberately but in any case uncoordinated ‒ 
variation; where the successful institutions remain and the unsuccessful 
disappear – selection; and where the replication derives from learning, 
imitation, and experimentation – inheritance.79  
 
Evolutionary theories include informal rules as initiators of change but 
they are not seen as a product of collective action or political process.80 
The most important contribution of this theory is that informal rules are 
contemplated as initiators of change, but the theory does not explain why 
and how change happens from an uncoordinated process. It fails also to 
elaborate on why unsuccessful institutions remain, despite the apparent 
selection process, failing to justify the necessity of transplants if naturally 
unsuccessful institutions disappear, as in this case, an inefficient 
generalist court.  
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Most recently, a new approach has emerged, the New Institutional 
Economics, rooted in the interaction between formal rules (usually 
purposefully designed according to collective choice theories) and 
informal rules (usually spontaneously developed according to the 
evolutionary theories). This theory is explored in more detail next.  
 
c. New Institutional Economics 
 
According to Williamson, exogenously informal rules determine to what 
extent formal rules are embedded, according to four levels of institutions 
and the speed at which their rules change. Thus, it takes centuries or 
millennia for culture and norms to change (highest level – informal 
institutions), decades or centuries to change constitutions, laws, and 
property rights (second level – formal rules), years to change contractual 
relations (third level – institutions of governance), and a short time to 
change prices and quantities in individual contracts (lowest level).81 
 
Subsequently, North advanced the recognition that informal rules are the 
core of institutional change, which coexist and evolve simultaneously 
with formal rules. He recognised that formal rules are the result of a 
political process (collective choice theories) fundamentally stimulated by 
informal rules, whose evolution reflects a process of cultural transmission 
(evolutionary theories).82 In relation to how quick institutions change, 
North’s view is that institutional change is the product of an enlargement 
of small changes; he saw change as gradual,83 and path-dependent, as 
institutions evolve at the same time as mental models.84  
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Finally, Roland has argued that formal institutions change quickly and 
deliberately as products of a centralised political process called “fast-
moving”, while informal institutions change slowly, responding to a 
continuous, evolutionary and decentralised process that is “slow-
moving”.85 Institutional change according to Roland is the result of an 
upheaval of informal institutions which speeds up the change of formal 
institutions.86  
 
The New Institutional Economics doctrine serves the purpose of this 
research project by providing a valuable analysis which helps explain 
why it is important to find compatibility between the prevailing informal 
institutions of the recipient country and the new transferred formal 
institutions. The first important input is the recognition of informal 
institutions as drivers of change. The second is the identification of 
informal institutions as facilitators of embedment of formal rules. The 
third is the acknowledgment of the pace at which informal and formal 
institutions change ‒ the former very slowly, and the latter rather fast. 
The last input is that informal institutions are more likely to endure than 
formal institutions. 
 
From these deductions, it is evident why ignoring prevailing informal 
institutions endangers the levels of acceptance of transplanted formal 
institutions, in this case a specialised competition tribunal, as well as why 
it is important that the pace at which new formal transplanted institutions 
change encompasses the pace of prevailing informal ones. Section 1.1.4 
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studies the concept of culture in more detail in an attempt to provide a 
better understanding of informal rules as facilitators of embedment. 
 
1.1.4. CULTURE 
 
This section examines the concept of culture in order to specifically show 
how intrinsic is this factor to human behaviour and to appreciate why 
different cultures respond differently to the same incentive, in this case, 
the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal, which in some cases 
leads to acceptance and in others rejection. The study of the relevant 
literature suggests that culture plays an important role in the process of 
accepting imported formal institutions and presents the link between the 
various theories and the adoption of institutions.  
 
The concept of culture has been the object of much academic study, with 
the assumption that the study of culture is indispensable for 
understanding human behaviour.87 It has been argued that culture 
represents those customary beliefs and values that people acquire.88 In 
explaining how the acquisition of these beliefs and values occurs, four 
main streams of research are relevant: 1) Standard Social Science Model 
(SSSM); 2) Evolutionary Psychology (EP); 3) cultural evolution; and 4) 
evolutionary anthropology. 
 
According to the Standard Social Science Model, culture and social 
behaviour is a product of learning with no genetic contribution, while for 
the evolutionary psychologist the brain has a large number of innate 
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modules stimulated by specific social and environmental circumstances, 
which result in human behaviour.89 F. A. Hayek, one of the main 
exponents of cultural evolution, contends that culture is not genetically 
transmitted nor rationally designed but is a process whereby culture and 
human reasoning develop concurrently.90 
 
Successively, evolutionary anthropology’s main contribution has been the 
proposition that there is an ontogenetic relation between biological and 
cultural evolution, where new forms of social cognition trigger new forms 
of cultural learning that in turn bring new cumulative cultural evolution, 
so social learning is the critical part of cultural development.91  
 
This social learning is the result of an imitative process, rather than the 
emulative one used by some animals, that allows individual development 
at a social and cognitive level, in which individuals learn how to act and 
think. This social environment has been referred to as culture, and its 
individual embedment as “enculturation”.92  
 
Regarding the insights of evolutionary anthropology, it appears that 
culture is an intrinsic part of the individual, whose function is to shape 
their behaviour within society from generation to generation, in which the 
society is a reflection of the subject. Hence, as Becker has affirmed 
“…Individuals have less control over their culture than over other social 
capital…culture is largely a ‘given’ to individuals throughout their 
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lifetimes”.93 North has equally stated that: “culture, human evolution and 
economic development are closely interrelated”.94 
 
The analysis of these theoretical insights offers different explanations for 
how culture is generated and diffused. While the explanations are diverse, 
the concurrent theme is that such a process is complex, deep-rooted, 
imposed, and makes individuals distinct. Accordingly, Richerson and 
Boyd have claimed that individuals from different cultures respond to the 
same incentive in different ways.95 In the context of the value of adopting 
a specialised competition tribunal, it follows that the fundamental 
deduction is that culture should not be neglected when envisioning such 
adoption, and is important in terms of aligning the imported formal 
institution with the prevailing informal institutions to avoid rejection. 
After considering culture as a factor of successful transplantation, the 
next section explores the most common designs of institutional 
transplants. 
 
1.1.5. DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANTS  
 
Two contrasting perspectives have been identified in the design of how 
transplantation will occur. The first is known as the “actors pulling in” 
argument, where the main attention is given to the political actors who 
will shape the conditions of the new institutions according to their 
preferences, and where the analysis of compatibility is less important.96 
The second is known as the “goodness of the fit” argument, where the 
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precept is that only institutions compatible with the culture of the country 
to which they are being transferred can be transplanted.97 
 
In addition, an important stream of research has explored three different 
types of transplantation design and has accordingly constructed a 
“stickiness” theory referring to degrees of success. The first type is 
foreign introduced exogenous (FEX), where the design is constructed and 
imposed by outsiders. The second is indigenously introduced endogenous 
(IEN), where the institutions emerge spontaneously grounded in metis. 
The third is the indigenously introduced exogenous (IEX), where the 
institutions are indigenous but externally introduced by a formal‒local 
authority.98 
 
Metis refers to local knowledge, gained through experience and practice, 
which is not written down (locals’ norms or customs).99 According to this 
approach, metis is the glue that gives institutions stickiness, so the highest 
level of success is more likely to be obtained when metis is incorporated 
into the design of the new institutions. In other words, neglecting the 
analysis of metis creates incongruities between new institutions and the 
local conditions.100 
 
Similarly, another distinction has been made between two types of 
design. The “blueprint”, where the design consists of transplanting 
institutions from more advanced economies regardless of the local 
conditions of the receiving country, and the “tacitness”, in which tacit 
local knowledge is fundamental for the development of institutions, being 
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envisioned at a local level only.101 It has been implied that these designs 
are unworkable separately, it being necessary for them to converge via 
harmonisation of local institutions with those from abroad.102 
 
As the previous section has revealed, culture is a unique intrinsic factor of 
human development and social interaction and means that different 
societies respond differently to the same incentive. For this reason, in the 
context of designing courts that review the decisions of competition 
authorities, culture should not be ignored. Instead, designs whose 
consideration of local conditions, regardless of their labelling (metis, 
tacitness or indigenous), should be appraised when evaluating the 
viability of the transference of lessons related to the adoption of 
specialised competition tribunals in order to ensure a well-functioning 
judiciary. 
 
Thus, the possibility to emulate, whether as an internal intention to catch-
up with development or as an external imposition aimed at obtaining 
assistance, deserves meticulous scrutiny to avoid unexpected outcomes 
such as resistance, rejection, or conflicts between prevailing informal 
institutions and transported competition tribunals. The following 
recommendations are essential with a view to avoiding such pitfalls: 
 
‒ The advance analysis of the compatibility between imported 
competition tribunals and local informal institutions.103	
‒ The consideration of multiple court models instead of just one,104 
together with the use of positive symbols.105	
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‒ The involvement of domestic policy actors with the new 
institutional transplant.106 	
‒ The recognition of personal, financial, and physical opportunities 
or limitations, as well as the knowledge of the specific regulations 
of the field.107	
 
In addition, Rose has recommended the following style: i) clear and 
objective purposes; ii) a single goal; and iii) a simple design.108	
  
1.1.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It has been observed that institutions have been created to bring order to 
society. In this way, the judiciary is an important institution designed to 
bring order at a different level, whose acceptance and legitimacy depends 
on its effectiveness. It has also been observed that the transplantation 
phenomenon is a complex one whose advisability and effectiveness 
remains debatable, but that despite the unsettledness, the use of 
transplants is very common, particularly among developing countries. 
The success or failure of transplants is difficult to predict, although it has 
been affirmed that the crux of the problem emerges when there is no 
compatibility between the prevailing informal institutions and the new 
formal transplanted institutions.  
 
Seeking to understand why it is important to make formal and prevailing 
informal institutions compatible, it was necessary to understand how 
institutions change and at what pace. It was found that informal 
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institutions are generators of change, that they constitute an essential 
factor that helps embed formal institutions, and that formal institutions 
may change quickly, while institutional change remains slow. The study 
of the concept of culture was relevant to the underlying thesis by showing 
that if this factor were not included when contemplating the adoption of a 
specialised competition tribunal, the risks of rejection would be higher. 
 
In terms of design of transplants, it has been seen that informal local 
institutions give stickiness to formal institutions, that it is more likely that 
a formal institution compatible with the culture of the recipient can be 
transplanted, and that, if close attention is not paid to local needs and 
efforts are not made to harmonise intended formal institutions with 
prevailing informal ones, the levels of legitimacy and effectiveness will 
be compromised, which could lead to the emergence of what has been 
referred to as “institutional traps”.109 
 
The purpose of this section has been to present the theoretical framework 
of transplants of institutions and so offer an overview of its complexity, 
and to grasp the core components that need to be deliberated to avoid 
rejection of a transplant. Embarking from this theoretical analysis, 
Section 1.2 aims to link the theoretical framework with the 
commonalities among Latin American countries in an attempt to: i) 
illuminate why Mexico constitutes a suitable case; and, ii) set the scene 
for Chapter 5 when a further and more detailed engagement, supported 
with empirical evidence, explores why the lessons offered by Mexico 
may fit the needs of the Latin American countries in search of practical 
solutions to similar issues.  
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1.2. LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND THEIR 
COMMONALITIES 
 
Latin America as a region has shown certain features that help to 
elucidate why the majority of its countries have undeveloped competition 
regimes, why their economies are so challenging, and why it is 
questionable that general tribunals can outperform specialised 
competition tribunals. The first feature refers to the period from the 1930s 
to the 1970s when Latin American countries were characterised as having 
economies highly protected by interventionist governments.110 This 
protectionist-orientated scheme brought as a result low competitive 
economies, so the region witnessed a radical decrease of exports,111 and 
became the most unequal region in the world.112 
 
The second feature is that in order to cover social and government 
expenditures Latin American countries were forced to severely raise the 
levels of foreign debt (it has been shown that as a region foreign debt 
moved from 0.19 in 1975 to 0.46 in 1982).113 To maintain access to 
foreign credit and to sign trade agreements, during the 1990s Latin 
American countries changed their protectionist policies,114 opened their 
markets, and started significant privatisation and deregulation 
processes.115  
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The third feature is that, notwithstanding almost a century of gradual 
proclamation of free trade principles or competition provisions in penal 
codes, civil codes or commercial legislations in Latin America, the 
enforcement levels were weak.116 This situation derived from the 
dominance of vested interests, the capture of the authorities responsible 
for enforcement, lack of enforcement powers, the ineffectiveness of the 
competition provisions,117 the lack of a culture of competition, and the 
underestimation of the consequences of violating competition 
provisions.118 It is during the 1990s that the region witnessed a significant 
growth in enactment or amendment of competition regimes, as well as the 
creation of competition agencies.119 
 
The fourth feature is that, institutionally, Latin American countries have 
been characterised as showing presidential supremacy whereby the 
amount of concentrated power allows the executive to exert dominance 
over the judiciary, so reducing its independence.120 Furnish clearly 
illustrated this institutional weakness in 2000, stating: “…by Mexican 
tradition sitting presidents have dismissed sitting judges whenever it suits 
their purpose to do so…”.121  
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In many Latin American countries the dominance of the executive has 
been so strong that the functioning of the judiciary has been diminished, 
and members have acted cautiously to avoid risks.122 As a result, the 
Latin American judiciaries have been described as weak, ineffective, 
dependent, powerless, and incompetent.123 They have been considered as 
among the most inefficient, ineffective, and corrupt in the world.124 Such 
a judiciary gives weight to the argument for institutional reform where 
independent and knowledgeable judges are required.  
 
The combination of these four main features reveals unique conditions 
that help foresee the difficulty faced by Latin American competition 
agencies and general tribunals when dealing with antitrust cases after 
decades of stagnation, and institutional weakness. The high number of 
Latin American countries with emerging competition agencies and new 
competition regimes aggravates the situation.  
 
Section 1.2 centres the analysis on when Latin American countries 
adopted their competition regimes, when their competition agencies were 
created, which countries have specialised competition tribunals, and their 
levels of enforcement. Similarly, it focuses on the levels of a culture of 
competition by looking at the following indicators: levels of income, 
poverty rates, global competitiveness report, barriers to entry, barriers to 
import competition, extent of the informal economy, and logistics 
infrastructure. 
 
	
122 Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline, Latin American Politics And Development (Westview Press 
2000) 64; Gretchen Helmke and Jeffrey Staton, ‘A Theory of Litigation, Judicial Decisions, and 
Interbranch Conflict’ in G. Helmke and J. Rios-Figueroa (eds), in The Puzzling Judicial Politics Of 
Latin America (Cambridge University Press 2011) 307, 308, 309 
123 Gretchen Helmke and Julio Rios-Figueroa, Courts In Latin America (Cambridge University Press 
2011) 1 
124 Staats, Bowler and Hiskey (n 3) 78 
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As a caveat at this juncture, it is necessary to mention that the number of 
indicators that can be explored to find differences and similarities among 
countries or group of countries is considerable. Therefore, a limited 
number of indicators that may have an impact on the development and 
application of competition regimes has been chosen. Equally, a limited 
number of 17 Latin American countries will be examined, since with 
those 17 most of the information was available. The exclusion of some 
other Latin American countries is due to lack of information. 
Nevertheless, the number of countries under examination is 
representative, so the findings will not be compromised.  
 
1.2.1. COMPETITION REGIMES, COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 
AND ENFORCEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
a. Adoption or modernisation of competition regimes across Latin 
America 
 
Table 1.1 shows that during the 1990s Latin America undertook a 
vigorous process of adoption of competition policies or modernisation of 
obsolete statutes that were rarely enforced.125 A vast percentage (94%) of 
the Latin American countries adopted or modernised their competition 
regimes after 1991.  
 
The countries are listed alphabetically, with an indication of the year in 
which a competition regime was adopted; and the year or years when a 
competition regime was amended. 
* This symbol indicates that statutes were adopted earlier, but they were 
hardly enforced. 
	
125 Petrecolla, Greco, Romero and Vila-Martinez (n 119) 94 
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Table 1.1: Adoption or modernisation of competition regimes across Latin America 
Country 
Year when competition 
regime was enacted 
Year(s) when competition 
regime was amended 
Argentina 1997* 1999, 2001 
Bolivia 2008  
Brazil 1994* 2000, 2007, 2011 
Chile 1959 1999, 2003, 2009 
Colombia 1992*  
Costa Rica 1995 2010, 2012 
Dominican Rep. 2008  
Ecuador 2011  
El Salvador 2006 2007, 2008 
Honduras 2006 2007 
Mexico 1993* 1998, 2011 
Nicaragua 2007  
Panama 1996 1997, 2007, 2008 
Paraguay 2013  
Peru 1991 1996, 2008 
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Uruguay 2007  
Venezuela 
1991 1993, 1996, 1997, 1999, 
2000, 2006 
 
The data indicates that Argentina in 1997, Brazil in 1994, Colombia in 
1992, and Mexico in 1993 modernised their competition regimes, while 
12 countries adopted them for the first time. Among the countries that 
adopted their competition regimes after 1991, it has been established that 
four were adopted between 1991 and 2000, six between 2001 and 2010, 
and two after 2011.126 
 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that there is a 
common trend among the majority of Latin American countries 
consisting of late adoption and late modernisation processes of their 
competition regimes. Considering that six countries adopted competition 
regimes between 2001 and 2010, and two more after 2011, totalling eight 
Latin American countries, it could be said that the development of 
competition law has recently started in the region. According to a study 
undertaken by the International Competition Network (hereafter ICN),127 
competition culture is perceived as weaker in developing economies 
where competition regulation has only been recently adopted. Therefore, 
the main inference that this data provides is that in the majority of Latin 
American countries the levels of a culture of competition are weak, which 
	
126 <https://developingworldantitrust.com/2015/06/29/the-adoption-of-modern-competition-policies-in-
latin-america-part-i-north-and-central-america-and-the-caribbean/> accessed 16 May 2018; 
<https://developingworldantitrust.com/2015/07/07/the-adoption-of-modern-competition-policies-in-
latin-america-part-ii-south-america/> accessed 16 May 2018 
127 ICN (n 20) 3 
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for the purpose of this research project suggests the need for strong 
institutions to alleviate such issues, among them the judiciary.  
 
b. Creation of competition agencies across Latin America 
 
The analysis of the data relating to the time when competition agencies 
across Latin America were created, contained in Table 1.2, reveals two 
facts. The first is that the majority of the competition agencies in Latin 
America (82.3%) were created after 1991. The information is presented 
as follows: five agencies created between 1991 and 2000, six between 
2001 and 2010, and three after 2011. The rest correspond to the first 
competition agency created in Latin America: Brazil in 1962, followed by 
Chile in 1963, and then Argentina in 1980.128  
 
The second is that in six cases the year in which competition agencies 
were created does not match the year in which their operations started, 
due to issues of resource provision or administrative processes. In 
Argentina the competition agency was created in 1980 but started 
functioning in 1996,129 in Dominican Republic the competition authority 
was created in 2011 but operations started later, in 2017, in El Salvador in 
2005 but functioning in 2006, in Nicaragua in 2006 but operations started 
in 2009, in Panama the agency started operation one year after its 
creation, and in Paraguay its creation was in 2013 but operations started 
in 2016. 
 
	
128 <https://developingworldantitrust.com/2015/06/29/the-adoption-of-modern-competition-policies-in-
latin-america-part-i-north-and-central-america-and-the-caribbean/> accessed 16 May 2018; 
<https://developingworldantitrust.com/2015/07/07/the-adoption-of-modern-competition-policies-in-
latin-america-part-ii-south-america/> accessed 16 May 2018 
129 Petrecolla, Greco, Romero and Vila-Martinez (n 119) 94 
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The main inference from the collected data is that in general, Latin 
America is characterised as having a high number of competition 
agencies created during the 2000s and 2010s. An important feature is that 
the time of their creation does not necessarily correspond with the time of 
functioning, with relevant cases like Argentina where the competition 
agency operated 16 years after being created.  
 
Additionally, it has been established that the majority of the Latin 
American countries investigated, with the exception of Chile and 
Panama, have adopted administrative systems of enforcement that follow 
administrative procedures for the analysis of anticompetitive conducts, 
and which possess both investigative and adjudicative powers.130 De 
Leon argues that infant agencies perform under a learning process 
environment that affects the regular pattern of decision-making by which 
judicial review ensures consistency, and that considering their significant 
powers (as prosecutor and jury), it is essential to preserve effective 
judicial control over them to safeguard general principles of policy 
enforcement.131 
 
Therefore, the findings presented in this section aim to demonstrate that 
the majority of Latin American countries have recently created or 
strengthened their competition agencies, and that their institutional design 
responds to administrative government units with both investigative and 
decision-making powers. This circumstance predicts, on the one hand, 
low levels of a culture of competition considering that the study presented 
by the ICN132 stated that higher levels are expected in countries with 
	
130 Ignacio de Leon, Latin American Competition Law and Policy – A Policy in Search of Identity 
(Kluwer Law International 2001) 206 
131 Ibid. 215 
132	ICN (n 20) 3	
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experienced competition agencies, and on the other, infant agencies with 
significant powers such as selecting the case, investigating, making the 
final decision, and imposing significant sanctions, so necessitating proper 
judicial review. Hence, knowledgeable judges reviewing antitrust cases 
would be desirable to support the functioning of emerging competition 
agencies, to help increase the levels of competition culture, and to ensure 
a proper scrutiny of the decisions adopted by these agencies. Table 1.2 
presents the data.  
 
Table 1.2 contains an alphabetical list of the countries, with an indication 
of the year in which their competition agencies were created. 
 
* This symbol indicates that the competition agency did not start 
functioning the same year it was created. 
 
( ) The year in brackets indicates when functions started. 
 
Table 1.2: Creation of competition agencies across Latin America 
Country Year when competition agency was created 
Argentina 1980* (1996) 
Bolivia 2009 
Brazil 1962 
Chile 1963 
Colombia 2009 
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Costa Rica 1994 
Dominican Rep. 2011* (2017) 
Ecuador 2011 
El Salvador 2005* (2006) 
Honduras 2006 
Mexico 1993 
Nicaragua 2006* (2009) 
Panama 1996* (1997) 
Paraguay 2013* (2016) 
Peru 
1992 
Uruguay 2009 
Venezuela 1992 
 
c. Latin American countries with specialised competition tribunals 
 
The number of Latin American countries that have adopted specialised 
competition tribunals is small. At the moment, just Chile, Peru and 
Mexico possess this type of judiciary. In 2003, a specialised court was 
created in Chile ‒ the Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia 
(TDLC) ‒ whose final decisions are reviewed by a non-specialised 
tribunal within the Supreme Court.133 
 
	
133 OECD, ‘Country Studies. Chile – Accession Report on Competition Law and Policy. 2010’ 11, 34–
35 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/sectors/47950954.pdf> accessed 19 March 2018 
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In 1992, a specialised competition tribunal was created in Peru known as 
INDECOPI. It translates as the National Institute for the Defence of 
Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property, and is responsible 
for solving in the second and last instance the appeals against the 
decisions ending the first instance of competition cases.134 With regard to 
Argentina, the country presents a particular judicial review system where 
all federal appeal courts have jurisdiction, but the Federal Civil and 
Commercial Court of Appeals in Buenos Aires resolves the majority of 
the antitrust cases, which is why it is considered quasi-specialised.135  
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis will present a detailed examination of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, whose adoption aimed to 
alleviate low levels of efficiency and quality in the review process due to 
lack of competition knowledge amid the judiciary ‒ the reason why this 
specialised tribunal has been chosen as a case study. Elsewhere, the 
judicial review in the majority of the Latin American countries has been 
assigned to general jurisdiction tribunals. Figure 1.1 and its 
accompanying table present the data. 
 
Figure 1.1: Existence of a specialised competition tribunal 
	
134 INDECOPI, <https://www.indecopi.gob.pe/web/indecopi_ingles/division-with-jurisdiction-over-
defense-of-competition> accessed 19 March 2018 
135 OECD, ‘Country Studies, Argentina – Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy’ (2006) 34–35 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Argentina-CompetitionLawPolicy.pdf> accessed 19 March 
2018 
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Countries Existence of specialised competition tribunal 
Argentina Quasi 
Bolivia NO 
Brazil NO 
Colombia NO 
Costa Rica NO 
Dominican Rep. NO 
Ecuador NO 
El Salvador NO 
Honduras NO 
Nicaragua NO 
Panama NO 
Paraguay NO 
Uruguay NO 
Venezuela NO 
Chile YES 
Mexico YES 
Peru YES 
 
 
d. Levels of enforcement  
 
NO
76%
YES
18%
QUASI
6%
NO YES QUASI
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The relevant literature has recognised that sanctions have two important 
functions: the first is to serve as compensatory mechanism, and the 
second is to serve as deterrent mechanism.136 It has also been stated that 
the courts facilitate the effectiveness of the sanctions by assessing the 
appropriate penalty, and by imposing high fines, which makes the 
enforcement strict.137 At the same time, De Leon has noted that the 
judiciary enhances competition policy enforcement by effectively 
controlling the enforcement decisions made by the competition 
authorities.138 Additionally, the OECD has recognised that a proper 
judicial review underlines the legitimacy of the authorities’ decisions, as 
well as enhances respect for enforcement efforts.139 
 
Likewise, the competition authorities will align their investigations 
according to the standards of proof set by the courts, whereby the 
possibility to envisage a sanction will dictate the investigative strategy 
and the procedures, which could translate into effectiveness. Having 
established the important role played by the judiciary in the enforcement 
of competition law, we now examine some data with the aim of 
provoking some inferences in relation to the levels of enforcement in 
Latin America.  
 
One of the most striking differences between developed and developing 
countries is that enforcement levels in the latter are lower than in the 
former.140 As noted in the section above, diverse issues such as new or 
	
136 OECD (n 19) 25 
137 Ibid. 26 
138 De Leon (n 130) 215 
139 OECD (n 43) 3 
140 A E Rodriguez and Ashok Menon, ‘The Causes of Competition Agency Ineffectiveness in 
Developing Countries’ (2016) 79 Law And Contemporary Problems 39; Vivek Ghosal, ‘Resource 
Constraints and Competition Law Enforcement’ in D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng and Ioannis 
Llanos (eds), Competition Law and Development (Stanford University Press 2013) 111‒112 
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weak competition agencies implementing new or modified competition 
regimes, scarcity of resources, high levels of informal economy, and low 
levels of a culture of competition affect the implementation of 
competition law in developing countries.141  
 
The literature has identified more challenges affecting the effectiveness 
of competition law, among them the discrepancy in terms of policy goals 
between the competition regime and the policymakers’ aspirations.142 
This situation was recognised by the World Bank when they diagnosed 
that government policies were facilitators of cartels in developing 
countries.143 
 
As illustrated in Section 1.2, although during the 1990s an unprecedented 
number of competition regimes were enacted or modified, as well as a 
significant number of competition agencies created or strengthened,144 the 
levels of enforcement were weak.145 Due to the specific socio-economic 
conditions shown by developing countries, combined with the fact that 
many of their adopted antitrust laws did not capture their local needs, the 
assumption is that developing countries do not enforce their competition 
laws.146 Such an assumption remains valid despite the different attempts 
to provide empirical evidence measuring their effectiveness,147 which 
have been challenged by insufficient and inconsistent data.148  
	
141 About this particular topic see Umut Aydin and Tim Buthe, ‘Competition Law & Policy in 
Developing Countries: Explaining Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits’ (2016) 
79 Law And Contemporary Problems 11‒12. 
142 Rodriguez and Menon (n 140) 41; Eleanor Fox and Deborah Healey, ‘When the State Harms 
Competition: The Role for Competition Law’ (2014) 79 Antitrust Law Journal 769 
143 Graciela Miralles, ‘Cartel Exemptions in Developing Countries: Recent Work from the World Bank 
Group’ 7‒ 8 <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/CartelSeptember2.pdf> 
accessed 19 February 2019 
144 Petrecolla, Greco, Romero and Vila-Martinez (n 119) 94 
145 OECD (n 6) 2–3 
146 Waked (n 6) 1 
147 Rodriguez and Menon (n 140) 64–66; Waked (n 6) 15; On the description of the different studies 
see Serdar Dalkir, ‘A Quantitative Evaluation of Effectiveness and Efficacy of Competition Policy 
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Effectiveness has been measured by looking at, for instance, budgets and 
staffing levels of antitrust authorities. In particular, Dina Waked’s study 
using these proxies has found that most developing countries are 
potentially capable of enforcing their antitrust laws, but factors such as 
economic development, openness to trade, and corruption are significant 
variables that impact their possible levels of enforcement.149  
 
However, the use of these proxies, it has been alleged, is not accurate,150 
as they do not allow comparisons,151 and do not cover a sufficiently large 
set of countries or sufficiently long periods of time.152 As an illustration, 
Ghosal’s study found that advanced economies operate more efficiently 
with much lower numbers of staff than developing countries, which are 
burdened by less efficient bureaucratic processes,153 meaning that high 
numbers of staff do not necessarily signify efficiency.  
 
The use of surveys has also been disregarded, due to the biases that the 
answers may entail, and the subjectivity used to provide enforcement 
rankings, such as the Anti-monopoly performance index published by the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report.154 This 
evaluation reveals the problems inherent in measuring the levels of 
	
Across Countries’ in 2 Politics triumphs Economics? Political Economy and The Implementation of 
Competition Law And Economic Regulation In Developing Countries (CUTS International 2009) 230‒
238. 
148 Ghosal (n 140) 92–93 
149 Waked (n 6) 1.  
150 It has been indicated that good funding and staffing do not guarantee automatic success, see Dalkir 
(n 147) 238‒244. 
151 Rodriguez and Menon (n 140) 66 
152 Frank Kronthaler, ‘Effectiveness of Competition Law: A Panel Data Analysis’ (2007) Institut Fur 
Wirtschaftsforschung Halle 7, 9 
153 Ghosal (n 140) 111–113 
154 Rodriguez and Menon (n 140) 66 
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enforcement of antitrust laws and the scarcity of empirical evidence about 
them.  
 
In any case, the assumption that enforcement activity in developing 
countries is lower than in developed ones seems valid considering the 
specific socio-economic conditions shown by Latin American countries 
described above, and given that the majority of the countries in the region 
have new or weak competition regimes and agencies. This assumption is 
relevant for the purpose of this thesis because it could be suggested that 
the judiciary may be interfering with enforcement activities, as was the 
case in Mexico. Under such circumstances, the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal seems advisable.  
 
1.2.2.  LEVELS OF COMPETITION CULTURE 
 
Competition culture has been defined as a varied set of indicators that 
determine individual and/or group behaviour in the field of market 
competition and competition enforcement, such as knowledge, experience 
and perception.155 Likewise, it has been found that competition culture 
was perceived as stronger in countries with specialist competition 
tribunals.156 Theoretically, it has also been proposed that competition 
creates wealth and reduces poverty,157 and that well-functioning courts 
have a positive impact on the efficient operation of the markets and 
economic growth.158 In this regard, Kovacic has claimed that judges with 
knowledge of the principles of market economics and competition law 
	
155 ICN (n 20) 8 
156 Ibid. 2, 3	
157 OECD, ‘Why is Competition Important for Growth and Poverty Reduction?’ (2008) 3 
158 OECD (n 43) 2 
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enhance the awareness of competition policy of the country in 
question.159 
 
In light of the above theoretical framework, and considering that the 
purpose of this chapter is to find some commonalities among Latin 
American countries, this research project will examine, among a wide 
range of possible indicators, the following seven that can be associated 
with wealth, efficient markets and economic growth: a) income 
classification; b) poverty; c) economic growth and prosperity; d) barriers 
to entry; e) barriers to import; f) informal economy; and g) infrastructure. 
A detailed examination of these indicators and the respective deductions 
in relation to levels of competition culture based on each factor is 
subsequently presented.  
 
The main proposed inference is that low levels of a culture of competition 
afflict countries with low incomes, high levels of poverty, low economic 
growth, high barriers to entry and to import, and poor infrastructures. 
Such inferences emerge from a suggested relationship between these 
indicators and governments not being aware of the ways in which 
competition is being harmed, or perhaps unsure about how to identify 
where barriers to competition exist.160 The analysis is also used to predict 
that poorly functioning judiciaries are impacting the efficiency of the 
markets and economic growth, which in turn is a sign of low levels of a 
culture of competition, and that, in this sense, the adoption of specialised 
competition tribunals might boost them. 
 
	
159 William Kovacic, ‘Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition 
Economies’ (1997) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 32, 440 
160 Ibid. 
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Therefore, if similarities are found in this sense, then some Latin 
American countries afflicted by low levels of a culture of competition 
could replicate the lessons offered by the Mexican case. The deductions 
will also help elaborate on how such weaknesses, combined with delays 
and low levels of competition knowledge amid the judiciary, make it 
difficult to expect competition authorities alone to sufficiently drive 
competition culture.  
 
The assumption, then, is that an efficient and knowledgeable judiciary 
may help boost the levels of competition culture, at least amid the 
judiciary, and eventually will reach consumers, business leaders or 
government officials by ensuring that decisions adopted by competition 
authorities are adequate. In such cases, it is plausible to recommend the 
adoption of a specialised competition tribunal.  
 
a. Income classification  
 
The purpose of analysing the income classification of the Latin American 
countries under examination is to predict their levels of competition 
culture, expecting good levels in high-income economies and weaker 
levels in economies with lower incomes.161 This prediction emerges by 
inferring that in high-income countries the markets are efficient and 
competitive, which could be linked to governments being aware of the 
importance of regulations that facilitate such scenarios and having 
eliminated barriers that were impeding them. Likewise, considering that it 
has been indicated that high-income countries have more efficient 
judiciaries,162 and tend to have relatively strong institutions,163 this 
	
161	ICN (n 20) 3	
162 Dam (n 40) 102–103 
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analysis is used to make indirect inferences in relation to the levels of a 
culture of competition and the existence of specialist competition 
tribunals.164 
 
Income classification is a tool used by the World Bank to group countries 
according to their gross national inputs per capita. For the 2018 fiscal 
year, according to the World Bank Atlas method, low-income economies 
are defined as those with a GNI per capita of $1,005 or less in 2016; 
lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of 
between $1,006 and $3,955; upper middle-income economies are those 
with a GNI per capita of between $3,956 and $12,235; and high-income 
economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,236 or more.165 
 
The examination of the data establishes that Bolivia, El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua (23.5%) have been classified as lower-middle 
income, while the majority of the Latin American countries (64.7%) have 
been classified as upper-middle-income, and, just Chile and Uruguay 
(11.76%) have been classified as high-income. Figure 1.2 shows that the 
majority of the Latin American countries are characterised as having 
upper-middle incomes, and a good number by having lower-middle 
incomes.  
 
As has been indicated, low levels of a culture of competition are expected 
in low-income Latin American countries, which tend to be afflicted by 
weak institutions.166 Chile is one of only two high-income economies in 
	
163 Arthur Denzau, Shereef Ellaboudy and Mahmoud Khalil, ‘Institutions and Economic Development 
in the OECD’ (2007) 12 International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 72 
164	ICN (n 20) 3, 4	
165<https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-income-level-2017-2018> 
accessed 17 May 2018 
166 Peerenboom (n 47) 9 
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Latin America and is one of only three Latin American countries to have 
a specialised competition tribunal, as well as the oldest competition 
agency in Latin America, and the second oldest competition regime in the 
region. The case of Chile reinforces the assumption that the existence of a 
judiciary with specialists in competition law enhances the levels of a 
culture of competition,167 and that well-functioning courts have a positive 
impact on the efficient operation of the markets and economic growth.168 
Figure 1.2 presents the data. 
 
Figure 1.2: Income classification  
 
Source: The World Bank <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-income-
level-2017-2018 > accessed 17 May 2018 
 
b. Poverty  
 
The goal of this section is to demonstrate that poverty is a common issue 
affecting the majority of Latin American countries, being indirectly 
	
167 ICN (n 20) 3, 4 
168 OECD (n 43) 2 
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associated with low levels of a culture of competition. This link emerges 
from the assumption that poverty exists partly because governments do 
not have the ability to recognise the importance of competition principles 
or the need to remove barriers that harm competition. Similarly, under the 
assumption that competition reduces prices,169 it could be argued that if 
citizens use their resources more efficiently then competition is an 
instrument capable of combating poverty. The analysis of this factor is 
relevant for this thesis considering that the combination of scant attention 
to competition rules and weak institutions reveals the need for 
knowledgeable judges who cooperate with the implementation of 
economic policies by properly controlling the decisions adopted by the 
competition agencies and the prices specially paid for basic goods or 
services.170 
 
For this purpose, the first step is to define poverty, then to provide a 
general diagnosis of the poverty picture in the region, and finally to 
provide country statistics from which some inferences will emerge. The 
analysis will be narrow, as a more in-depth study goes beyond the scope 
of this research project. 
 
Poverty is a multidimensional concept. The variety of definitions that can 
be found shows the nuances that the concept itself and its measurement 
may offer.171 Departing from the basic definition given by the World 
	
169	 Michal Gal, ‘The Social Contract at the Basis of Competition Law: Should we Recalibrate 
Competition Law to Limit Inequality?’ in Ioannis Lianos and Damien Gerard (eds), in Competition 
Policy: Between Equity and Efficiency (Cambridge University Press 2017) 4 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3014354> accessed 4 December 2019	
170	OECD (n 19) 25	
171 Caterina Ruggeri, Ruhi Saith, Ruhi and Frances Stewart, ‘Does it Matter that we do not Agree on 
the Definition of Poverty? A Comparison of Four Approaches’ (2010) 31:3 Oxford Development 
Studies, 243-274; David Piachaud, ‘Problems in the Definition and Measurement of Poverty’ (1987) 16 
Journal of Social Policy 2 Cambridge University Press, 147–164  
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Bank, according to which poverty is a deprivation of wellbeing,172 three 
strands are commonly used to understand and measure the concept.173 
 
One strand refers to monetary resources, aiming to establish whether 
individuals can meet their necessities by comparing levels of income. A 
second strand measures specific indicators like health or education whose 
gauge goes beyond monetary considerations, by, for instance, 
establishing levels of literacy. A third strand discusses how capable an 
individual is to function in society, so aspects such as empowerment, 
inclusion, or exercise of rights are measured. 
 
At a regional level, inequality is the most important factor. In terms of 
income distribution, Latin America is the most unequal region in the 
world. Disparities are even deeper when aspects such as gender, age, 
geographic area, ethnicity, etc. are considered. It has been claimed that 
these disparities constitute the biggest difficulty for Latin American 
countries in the fight against poverty.174  
 
Also at a regional level, statistics have shown fluctuating rates of poverty, 
passing from 48.4% in 1990 to 43.9% in 1999, with a major improvement 
in 2008 (33.5%).175 The statistics also indicate that by 2014 Latin 
America registered 167 million poor people, of which 71 million were in 
	
172 World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty’ (2000) Washington, D. C, 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11856> accessed 9 June 2018  
173 Jonathan Haughton and Shahidur Khandker, ‘What Is Poverty and Why Measure It? Handbook on 
Poverty and Inequality’ (2009) The World Bank, 2–3 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPA/Resources/429966-
1259774805724/Poverty_Inequality_Handbook_FrontMatter.pdf > accessed 10 June 2018 
174 United Nations, ECLAC, ‘Inclusive Social Development – The next generation of policies to 
overcome poverty and to reduce inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (2016) 23–32 
<https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/39101/4/S1600098_en.pdf> accessed 22 
February 2018 
175 Ibid. 16 
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extreme poverty.176 The numbers suggest that even though poverty levels 
have been reduced in the region, the amount of people living in poverty is 
still significant, meaning that considerable efforts are required to tackle 
this issue. 
 
Figure 1.3 presents an examination of country statistics, with the 
following findings: 1) The countries with the lowest poverty levels are 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay (less than 10%). 2) The levels shown by 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama and Peru do not exceed 30%. 3) Almost half 
of the Latin American countries have reached poverty levels above 30%. 
4) Honduras reached the highest level (poverty rate 74.3%, extreme 
poverty rate 50.5%), followed by Nicaragua (58.3%) and El Salvador 
(41.5%). This data corroborates that poverty constitutes one of the 
biggest challenges faced by the region, and reveals low levels of a culture 
of competition. Therefore, the adoption of a specialised competition 
tribunal may contribute to the reduction of such unawareness of 
competition rules and potentially alleviate levels of poverty at least to a 
small degree by contributing to the development of financial and credit 
markets and facilitating firm growth.177  
 
	
176 Ibid. 
177	OECD (n 43) 2	
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Figure 1.3: Levels of poverty 
 
 
Source: CEPAL (the variables measured included housing, basic services, education, employment and 
social protection, and life standards) 
<https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/39101/4/S1600098_en.pdf> accessed 22 
February 2018 
 
c. Economic growth and prosperity 
 
The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index is a useful 
tool that assesses 137 economies around the world. It identifies the levels 
of economic growth and prosperity of the evaluated countries, a factor 
that could also be used to envision their levels of competition culture.178 
Table 1.3 presents the final ranking obtained by the listed countries in an 
attempt to show at a glance how these economies performed, with a score 
of 1 indicating the best and 137 the worst. Countries with good scores are 
expected to have high levels of a culture of competition, while those with 
poor scores are expected to have low levels.  
 
	
178 World Economic Forum, ‘Global Competitiveness Index 2017 – 2018’ 
<http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/countryeconomy-
profiles/#economy=VEN> accessed 19 February 2018 
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The first pillar is “Institutions”. This pillar evaluates the following 
indicators: A. Public Institutions (1 Property rights, 2 Ethics and 
corruption, 3 Undue influence, 4 Public sector performance, 5 Security), 
and B. Private Institutions (1 Corporate ethics, 2 Accountability). As 
institutions are a key factor for economic development, given that 
efficient and credible bodies attract and attain investment, this ranking is 
presented in an attempt to explore how institutions are perceived in the 
Latin American countries listed.  
 
The table also shows the “most problematic factor for doing business”, 
with the aim of finding possible commonalities among the Latin 
American countries under scrutiny.  
 
Finally, the table contains information about the 6th pillar, “Goods 
market efficiency”, where the following topics are evaluated: A. 
Competition (1 Domestic competition, 2 Foreign competition), and B. 
Quality of demand conditions. This pillar is being evaluated as it is 
strongly related to the scope of this research project. 
 
Table 1.3: Economic growth and prosperity 
 
Country 
 
Ranking 
 
1st Pillar: 
Institutions 
 
Most problematic factor 
for doing business 
6th Pillar: Goods 
market efficiency 
 
Argentina 
 
92 
 
113 
 
Inflation 
 
133 
Bolivia N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Brazil 
 
80 109 Tax rates 122 
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Chile 33 35 Restrictive labour 
regulations 
39 
 
Colombia 66 117 Corruption 102 
Costa Rica 47 48 Inefficient government 
bureaucracy 
63 
Dominican Rep. 104 129 Corruption 115 
Ecuador 97 128 Policy Instability 128 
El Salvador 109 133 Crime and theft * 109 
Honduras 96 120 Tax rates 98 
Mexico 51 123 Corruption 70 
Nicaragua 93 115 Inefficient government 
bureaucracy * 
117 
Panama 50 74 Inefficient government 
bureaucracy * 
41 
Paraguay 112 131 Corruption 86 
Peru 72 116 Corruption 75 
Uruguay 76 34 Tax rates 77 
Venezuela 127 137 Inflation 137 
 
Source: Global Competitiveness Index 2017. 
*Indicates that corruption is the second most problematic factor for doing business. 
N/A: Due to lack of information, the ranking does not assess Bolivia. 
 
In relation to the final scores, the evaluation of the data leads to the 
following inferences. The first is that just three Latin American countries 
‒ Chile, Costa Rica, and Panama were ranked between 1 and 50. The 
second is that nine Latin American countries occupy the places between 
51 and 100. And the last inference is that four Latin American countries 
are positioned at the bottom of the ranking, between 101 and 137. 
 
As a region, the majority of the Latin American countries are ranked 
between 51 and 137, Mexico at rank 51, denoting a modest economic 
growth or prosperity and thereby modest levels of competition culture. 
The best-positioned country is Chile, at 33, and the worst is Venezuela, at 
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127. None of the Latin American countries are in the top ten. One Latin 
American country, Venezuela, is in the bottom ten. 
 
In terms of 1st Pillar “Institutions” scores, once again just three Latin 
American countries were ranked between 1 and 50. Just one was placed 
51 to 100. And the rest were ranked between 100 and 137. The best 
placed was Chile (35/137), and the worst Venezuela (137/137).  
 
Regarding the most problematic factor for doing business, the data 
indicates that the following five Latin American countries: Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru are most affected by 
corruption, followed by tax rates and inefficient government bureaucracy, 
and inflation. 
 
Finally, the 6th pillar, “Goods market efficiency”, presents the following 
deductions. Two Latin American countries: Chile and Panama are 
positioned between places 1 and 50, six: Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay between places 51 and 10, and, eight: 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Venezuela between places 101 and 137. Overall, half of 
the Latin American countries under examination are characterised as 
having inefficient markets.  
 
To conclude, Chile is the Latin American country best positioned in 
terms of economic growth and prosperity, including institutions and 
goods market efficiency pillars. Apart from this country, the majority of 
the Latin American countries under examination had poor scores. Mexico 
in particular was placed 51 in the final score, but 70 for goods market 
efficiency, 123 for institutions, and with corruption as the most 
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problematic factor for doing business, suggesting low levels of a culture 
of competition.  
 
The lack of credible institutions requires special attention, as 12 out of 17 
Latin American countries were ranked from 101 to 137 for this pillar. 
Also, half of the Latin American countries need to work on improving the 
efficiency of their markets, as at the moment they are ranked towards the 
bottom of the list. Finally, corruption seems to be a common hurdle 
among Latin American countries, given that in five Latin American 
countries it constitutes the most problematic factor for doing business, 
and in three others it is the second-most (it has been indicated that 
corruption is ineffectively combated in three-quarters of the middle-
income countries around the world).179  
 
It could be argued that the adoption of specialised competition tribunals 
might serve as an antidote to corruption by making the judiciary more 
credible,180 and more efficient. This argument is in line with a previous 
study whose findings have suggested that well-functioning judicial 
systems serve as a deterrent to corruption or, in other words, that 
inefficient judicial systems serve as an incentive to corrupt deals.181 
Considering the significant levels of corruption in Latin America, it may 
be illusory to expect that the adoption of a specialised competition 
tribunal could alleviate systemic corruption. Nonetheless, it could be 
proposed that the expertise of knowledgeable judges may reduce 
opportunities for corruption if the control of the decisions adopted by 
competition agencies, whose powers are significant, is in-depth.  
	
179 Peerenboom (n 47) 10 
180 Randall Peerenboom has informed that judicial corruption has damaged public trust in the courts; 
see (n 47) 10. 
181 Giuseppe Albanese and Marco Sorge, ‘The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision-Making 
Process’ (2012) 24 Economics & Politics 3 
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d. Barriers to entry 
 
The ease or difficulty of entering markets is an important indicator of 
levels of competition culture. It determines the incentives that potential 
competitors may have to invest in in order to participate or expand in 
such markets.182 It has been asserted that for markets to remain 
competitive there should be no unnecessary barriers, and that these 
barriers are often the result of government regulations, which may 
disincentive business.183 In this sense, it could be proposed that policy-
based barriers to entry or to import are a reflection of a weak culture of 
competition. This circumstance supports the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal, since the courts through their review decisions 
facilitate the efficient operation of the markets184 and boost competition 
culture within the judiciary185. If judges lack specialist competition 
knowledge and are overworked then they may not be in the best position 
to fulfil such tasks. 
 
The “ease of doing business” index provided by the World Bank is used 
to analyse this indicator. This ranking evaluates 190 countries, where 
rank number 1 is the best, and rank number 190 is the worst. The ranking 
is based on an evaluation of ten topics, taking the average score to give a 
final ranking.186  
 
	
182 Gal (n 169) 3 
183 OECD (n 157) 4, 6, 7 
184	OECD (n 43) 2	
185 ICN (n 20) 14 
186 The World Bank, Doing Business <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings?region=oecd-high-
income> accessed 27 February 2018 
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Table 1.4 presents the “ease of doing business” rank that the country has 
achieved, and gives details about two of the ten sub-indices: 1) the 
number of days required to start and operate a local firm; and, 2) the 
number or days required to obtain construction permits. As was indicated 
earlier, the ranking evaluates ten topics, but considering that the purpose 
of this analysis is to provide a general picture, the eight remaining topics 
are unobserved on this occasion. 
 
The evaluation of the data suggests that doing business in Latin America 
is not easy. A detailed consideration of the rankings occupied by the 
Latin American countries under examination indicates that just one 
country has been ranked 1 to 50, while eight have been ranked 51 to 100, 
and the other eight have been ranked 101 to 190.  
 
Table 1.4: Barriers to entry 
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Country “Ease of Doing 
Business” rank 
Starting a 
business (days 
required) 
Obtaining a 
construction 
permit (days 
required) 
Argentina 117 25 30 
Bolivia 152 29 26 
Brazil 125 28 29 
Colombia 59 13 9 
Chile 55 22 7 
Costa Rica 61 19 6 
Dominican Rep. 99 17 5 
Ecuador 118 27 16 
El Salvador 73 22 23 
Honduras 115 24 17 
Mexico 49 10 11 
Nicaragua 131 20 31 
Panama 
79 2 12 
Paraguay 
108 
23 7 
Peru 58 
16 
4 
Uruguay 94 4 27 
Venezuela 188 32 24 
 
Source: The World Bank, Doing Business reports. 
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e. Barriers to import 
 
One more important area that provides evidence about the functioning 
and characteristics of markets is the import of goods, which reveals the 
likelihood of market penetration and rivalry, in other words, levels of a 
culture of competition. This indicator is examined using the information 
contained in the World Bank’s “Doing Business: Trading across Borders” 
rank. This ranking evaluates 190 countries (number 1 being the best, and 
number 190 the worst). For the purpose of this study, four indicators have 
been included: 1) time to import (hours); 2) cost to import (USD); 3) time 
to import: documentary compliance (hours); and, 4) cost to import: 
documentary compliance (USD).187 
 
A broad examination of the collected data allows the following 
observations. In relation to ranking: 1) just El Salvador is ranked between 
1 and 50; 2) eight countries are ranked between 51 and 100; 3) eight other 
countries are ranked between 101 and 190; 4) El Salvador has the best 
ranking (43) and Venezuela the worst (187).  
 
In relation to the hours required to import, the inferences are: 1) 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, and Uruguay register up to 24 
hours; 2) El Salvador, Mexico, and Paraguay register up to 48 hours; and 
3) ten countries register more than 48 hours. The country with the 
quickest process is Uruguay, with up to six hours, while Venezuela is the 
slowest, with 240 hours. 
 
	
187 The World Bank, Doing Business <http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Trading-Across-
Borders> accessed 28 February 2018 
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In terms of cost to import (USD), the variance is significant across the 
countries. For instance, while Ecuador shows the lowest cost ($128), 
Venezuela shows the highest ($1500). Regarding the time to import: 
documentary compliance (hours), the readings are: 1) in six countries up 
to 24 hours are required to comply with import documentation; 2) in four 
countries up to 48 hours; and, 3) in seven countries more than 48 hours 
are required. The country that presents the quickest process is Panama, 
with up to six hours, while the slowest process is seen in Venezuela, with 
up to 1090 hours.  
 
To sum up, a good percentage of the countries have much work to do. El 
Salvador shows the best ranking (number 43), and Venezuela the worst 
(number 187). In terms of hours to import, the majority of the countries 
require more than 48 hours to complete the process. In general, the 
import of goods process in Latin American countries could be easier if 
the number of hours required and the cost were reduced.  
 
Such limited awareness of the importance of having smooth import 
transactions may be an indication of low levels of a culture of 
competition that can be interpreted as conscious barriers to avoid 
competition or unfamiliarity with how efficient import transactions can 
improve it. Table 1.5 presents the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
92	
Table 1.5: Barriers to import 
Country “Trading 
across 
Borders” 
rank 
Time to 
import 
(hours) 
Cost to 
import (USD) 
Time to 
import: 
Documentary 
compliance 
(hours) 
Cost to 
import: 
Documentary 
compliance 
(USD) 
Argentina 116 60 1200 192 
120 
Bolivia 89 114 315 72 30 
Brazil 139 63.1 969.6 
48 
106.9 
Chile 68 54 290 36 50 
Colombia 125 112 545 64 50 
Costa Rica 73 80 420 26 75 
Dominican 
Rep. 
59 24 579 14 40 
Ecuador 102 24 140 24 250 
El Salvador 43 36 128 13 67 
Honduras 115 96 483 72 70 
Mexico 63 44 450 
17.6 
100 
Nicaragua 74 72 400 16 86 
Panama 54 24 
490 
6 50 
Paraguay 120 48 500 36 135 
Peru 92 
72 
583 72 80 
Uruguay 151 6 375 72 285 
Venezuela 
187 
240 1500 1090 400 
 
Source: The World Bank, Doing Business reports. 
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f. Informal economy 
 
It has been predicted that large businesses are expected to have higher 
levels of a culture of competition, and that there is a direct link between a 
good understanding of competition law and company size.188 The 
argument goes that high levels of informality denote low levels of a 
culture of competition, and depicts challengeable markets where disputes 
perhaps become more difficult to resolve if the judiciary lacks knowledge 
of competition and small enterprises do not have the resources to consult 
competition law specialists.189 It has also been indicated that when 
onerous regulations or anticompetitive behaviour are present, a large 
informal sector emerges, creating barriers to entry to formal markets as a 
result.190  
 
Street transactions are an illustration of this informality, where market 
players are possibly uninformed about competition law but rather guided 
by informal institutions like culture, moral norms or local traditions. 
These may not be aligned with formal institutions like competition 
agencies or courts applying a competition regime. This scenario becomes 
worse if such formal institutions are weak. The example of street 
transactions shows why informal economies represent a challenge to the 
implementation of competition law and illustrates their significance in 
terms of levels of a culture of competition. 
 
It is essential to point out that due to the elusiveness of the informality 
that characterises these economies, data collection is complex. For this 
	
188 ICN (n 20) 19 
189 Ibid. 22 
190 Daniel Sokol, Thomas Cheng, and Ioannis Llanos, ‘The Experience in Developing Countries’ in 
Competition and Development: The Power of Competitive Markets (International Development 
Research Centre 2008) 37  
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reason, this research project uses the figures from 2013 as the most 
recent, where information from some countries is missing. Despite the 
challenges, the gathered data is sufficient to enable some inferences to be 
made. 
 
Before the collected data is analysed, an explanation of the meaning of 
informal economy is provided. The definition of informal economy has 
progressed over recent decades, and with it its measurement.191 During 
the 1970s and 1980s the concept referred to economic activities 
characterised by: 1) small-scale operation; 2) use of out-dated 
technology; 3) family ownership; and 4) low capacity for 
accumulation.192  
 
Then, in 1993, a new definition gave prominence to aspects such as 
organisation, administration, and technology used to produce units 
(employment in the informal sector).193 Ten years later a new criterion 
was added: the characteristics of the jobs of workers without social and 
labour rights became part of the definition (employment part of the 
informal sector).194 The next part will examine the statistics. 
 
By 2013, the Latin American country with the lowest percentage of 
informal economy was Costa Rica with 30.7%, followed by Uruguay 
(33.1%), Brazil (36.4%) and Panama (40.4%). Argentina and Ecuador 
reached percentages close to 50%. By contrast, in the following countries 
	
191 ILO, Latin American and the Caribbean, ‘Thematic Labor Overview, Transition to Formality in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Evolution and Characteristics of Informal Employment’ (2014) 9 
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-
lima/documents/publication/wcms_314469.pdf> accessed 1 March 2018 
192 William Haller and Alejandro Portes, ‘The Informal Economy’ in Neil J. Smelser and Richard 
Swedberg (eds), in The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton University Press 2005) 404 
193 ILO (n 191)10 
194 Ibid. 
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the percentage of informal economy exceeds 50% of market size: 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
and Honduras.195  
 
The most important conclusion to draw here is that the majority of Latin 
American countries, Mexico included, greatly depend on the incomes 
generated by informal economies. The situation is critical even in the 
Latin American countries where the informal economy represents only 
around 30% of the market, not to mention the case of Honduras whose 
percentage is almost three times the size of the market (72.8%), a 
significant indicator of low levels of a culture of competition. These 
findings generate insights about how specialised competition tribunals 
may be in a better position to deal with such critical markets, partly 
facilitating enforcement by presenting the imposition of strict sanctions to 
market players, partly establishing when competition rules should apply 
within such informality. Table 1.6 below presents the data. 
 
Table 1.6: Informal economy  
Country Informal 
employment in 
the informal 
sector (2013) 
Informal 
employment in 
the formal sector 
(2013) 
Informal 
employment in 
domestic work 
(2013) 
Total (2013) 
Argentina 30.2% 10.8% 5.7% 46.7% 
Bolivia N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Brazil 21.6% 9.6% 5.2% 36.4% 
Chile N/A N/A N/A N/A 
	
195 ILO (n 191) 53–54 
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Colombia 45.3% 5.7% 3.4% 54.4% 
Costa Rica 20.0% 4.6% 6.1% 30.7% 
Dominican 
Rep. 
33.0% 11.5% 6.7% 51.2% 
Ecuador 32.8% 
13.7% 
2.8% 49.3% 
El Salvador 51.3% 9.1% 
5.2% 
65.6% 
Honduras 
58.0% 
11.1% 3.7% 72.8% 
Mexico 34.5% 14.2% 5.0% 53.7% 
Nicaragua N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Panama 25.8% 10.8% 3.8% 40.4% 
Paraguay 32.9% 21.8% 9.1% 63.8% 
Peru 40.1% 20.9% 3.1% 64.1% 
Uruguay 27.4% 2.5% 3.2% 33.1% 
Venezuela N/A N/A N/A 
N/A 
 
Source: International Labor Organization, Thematic Labor Overview, Transition to Formality in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  
 
g. Infrastructure 
 
In countries with good transport, electricity, and telephony infrastructure 
economies are competitive and markets are efficient. This was illustrated 
by an OECD study, which showed that the price and quality of transport 
services can have a significant impact on the competitiveness of 
markets.196 Thus, poor infrastructures might indicate that policymakers 
lack sufficient competition knowledge, and are therefore failing to 
	
196 OECD (n 157) 7 
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identify barriers that should be removed to induce more effective 
competition.197 Besides attracting more investors, logistics based on good 
infrastructures also provide lower prices as a result of lower costs. This is 
not the common situation in the majority of the Latin American countries, 
though, which is a clear indication of low levels of a culture of 
competition. For this reason, this factor is examined. 
 
To provide some evidence, the Global Competitiveness Index is reviewed 
again, this time focusing on the second pillar “Infrastructure”. This pillar 
evaluates the following indicators: 1 Transport infrastructure; and 2 
Electricity and telephony infrastructure. Table 1.7 presents the overall 
score, and the scores given to the respective indicators.  
 
To be able to understand the data it is important to bear in mind that the 
Global Competitiveness Index assesses 137 economies around the world, 
number 1 being the best and number 137 the worst. So, the study of the 
data provides the following deductions: in relation to infrastructure final 
score, just Chile, Panama, and Uruguay are ranked from 1 to 50, the 
majority are ranked from 51 to 100, and four countries are ranked from 
101 to 137. The best-positioned country is Panama, ranked 37, and the 
worst is Venezuela, ranked 127.198 
 
Regarding transport infrastructure scores, the data indicates that four 
countries are ranked from 1 to 50, a good percentage is located from 
places 51 to 100, and three countries are positioned from places 101 to 
137. The country with the best score is Panama in rank 32, and the worst 
is Venezuela in rank 129. 
	
197 Ibid. 8. 
198 World Economic Forum (n 178) 
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In terms of electricity and telephony infrastructure, the data shows that 
three countries are positioned from 1 to 50, nine countries are located 
from 51 to 100, and four countries are ranked from 101 to 137. The best-
located country is Uruguay in place 16, and the worst is Dominican 
Republic in place 117. 
 
The main inferences that can be made after examining the data in more 
detail are: 1) the majority of the Latin American countries have modest 
infrastructure scores, being positioned from 51 to 100. 2) At the bottom 
of the ranking Latin American countries are always present. 3) Not even 
one Latin American country has been placed in the top ten of the list. 4) 
One Latin American country is in the bottom ten of the list. 5) Big efforts 
are required to move positions within the ranking.  
 
The above analytical framework contributes to this research by providing 
an understanding of how important it is that countries recognise the 
importance of enjoying competitive markets, since such awareness is 
reflected in good infrastructures that facilitate the trade. For this reason 
the conclusion that derives from this analysis is that the presence of poor 
infrastructures reveals modest levels of a culture of competition in the 
majority of Latin American countries.  
 
Table 1.7: Infrastructure 
Country 2nd pillar: 
Infrastructure 
Transport 
Infrastructure 
Electricity and 
telephony 
infrastructure 
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Argentina 81 78 79 
Bolivia N/A N/A N/A 
Brazil 73 65 72 
Chile 
41 
47 43 
Colombia 87 98 76 
Costa Rica 65 103 37 
Dominican Rep. 101 53 117 
Ecuador 
72 48 88 
El Salvador 77 93 65 
Honduras 104 80 105 
Mexico 62 38 84 
Nicaragua 92 95 89 
Panama 37 32 53 
Paraguay 118 124 113 
Peru 86 97 75 
Uruguay 45 84 16 
Venezuela 127 129 109 
 
Source: Global Competitiveness Index 2017 
N/A: Information about Bolivia is not available 
 
1.2.3.  THE JUDICIARIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
This section is dedicated to presenting statistics about the confidence 
shown by Latin American citizens towards their judiciaries. The main 
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finding is that there is sense of distrust,199 which could be due to delays, 
levels of corruption or poor-quality decisions. If this is the case in the 
judicial review process of antitrust cases, and if the final arbiters in 
antitrust cases are not credible, it could be the result of ineffective judicial 
control of the decisions adopted by competition authorities, leading to a 
weakness in the implementation of competition law. 
 
Such weakness emerges from the interplay between the functioning of the 
competition authorities and the courts. In this regard, it has been 
recognised that the role played by the judiciary in the implementation of 
competition law through the judicial review is significant due to the 
knock-on effects on the competition authorities’ decisions.200 As an 
illustration, it could be mentioned that a credible judicial review provides 
an opportunity to challenge and correct erroneous decisions, ensures the 
protection of the parties’ individual and procedural rights, underpins the 
legitimacy of authority decisions, and enhances the overall standing of 
and respect for enforcement efforts.201  
 
De Leon has also asserted that there is a correlation between competition 
authorities and the judiciary in the enforcement activities, and that such 
enforcement is strengthened by a capable, technical and proper judicial 
review of the decisions adopted by competition authorities.202 Thus, in 
light of the significant impact that the review process has over the 
decisions of the authority, a review that does not operate quickly, that 
does not fully assess the correctness of decisions (including all facts and 
evidence), that prefers solving the case based on the procedural issues 
	
199	De Leon (n 130) 219 	
200	OECD (n 43) 2, 3	
201	Ibid. 2–5	
202 De Leon (n 130) 219–220 
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rather than on the merits of the case, or that does not assess rigorously the 
economic theories involved or the application of the competition 
principles, may interfere with the functioning of the competition authority 
and broadly with the checks and balances task exercised through judicial 
review. 
 
In relation to the statistics, Latinobarometro revealed that 34.9% of 
people interviewed indicated that they did not have confidence at all in 
the judiciary, while just 5.7% had a lot. The countries with the most 
precarious levels of confidence in the judiciary were Venezuela (55.5%) 
and Honduras (48.7%). The Latin American country with the highest 
level of confidence was Brazil with 10.9%.203 
 
In terms of institutions, Latinobarometro revealed that in 2016 the 
institution with the highest levels of credibility in Latin America was the 
church, with 38.7%, whereas the institution with lowest level of 
credibility was the political parties, with 49.7%, followed by the judiciary 
with 34.9%.204 Figures 1.4 and 1.5 summarise the information. 
 
	
203 Latinobarometro (2016) <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp> accessed 14 October 2018  
204 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.4: Confidence in the judiciary 
 
 
Source: Latinobarometro 2016 
 
Figure 1.5: Overall confidence in the Latin American judiciaries 
 
Source: Latinobarometro 2016 
 
One further source of information that tracks the levels of satisfaction 
with the services provided by the Latin American court system is the 
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World Bank’s “Doing Business” indicator of contract enforcement. This 
measures the time and cost needed to resolve a commercial dispute before 
first-instance courts. According to the 2018 report, while it takes 767 
days on average to enforce a standard commercial contract in Latin 
America, in Europe and Central Asia it takes 489. The Latin American 
country with the best ranking (41) and the lowest number of days to 
enforce is Mexico (341).205  
 
The majority of Latin American countries are far from well placed, with 
rankings are follows: Argentina (102), Bolivia (109), Colombia (177), 
Costa Rica (129), Dominican Republic (136), El Salvador (105), 
Guatemala (176), Honduras (152), Panama (148), Uruguay (112), and 
Venezuela (147). Such positions reveal high levels of dissatisfaction with 
the performance of the court system in the region. Figure 1.6 summarises 
the data. 
	
205 The World Bank, Doing Business report 2018 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings?region=latin-america-and-caribbean> accessed 23 October 
2018 
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Figure 1.6: Doing Business 2018 ‒ contract enforcement 
 
 
This section has elaborated on the lack of reliability afflicting the 
judiciaries in Latin America. This is a common theme in the region where 
dissatisfaction may be related to issues such as delays, quality of 
decisions, or corruption. The presence of these pitfalls suggests that 
potentially the competition regimes in Latin American countries are 
facing enforcement issues, and that their judiciaries may be impeding a 
better development of competition law, as well as improved functioning 
of the competition agencies. If this is the case, then the adoption of a 
specialised competition tribunal could offer a good solution.   
 
One more important feature that needs to be outlined is that Mexico 
shows the best ranking among the Latin American countries under 
examination. The adoption of a specialised competition tribunal may 
have positively influenced how the courts are perceived. In this sense, if 
some Latin American countries are searching for a practical solution to 
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this common issue then they should consider the lessons offered by 
Mexico.  
  
1.2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Section 1.2 has aimed to explore whether Latin American countries have 
commonalities that would enable the outcomes of this research project to 
be applicable to some of them. The overview of different indicators offers 
good evidence for a wide range of similarities. It should be stressed that 
the analysis has been primarily concerned with aspects that impact the 
functioning and the development of competition regimes, as well as some 
factors indicative of levels of a culture of competition.  
 
Likewise, bearing in mind time limitations, the scope of the analysis of 
these aspects has been broad and restricted, so the findings presented here 
do not imply that more commonalities are present, or that there are areas 
of difference. A summary of the findings is presented next. 
 
The first finding that emerges from the analysis is that the adoption or 
modernisation of competition regimes, as well as the creation of 
competition agencies, accompanied the privatisation and deregulation 
process begun in Latin America during the 1990s. The data shows that 12 
out of 17 Latin American countries under scrutiny adopted or modernised 
their competition regimes after 1991, and 14 of them created their 
competition agencies after 1991. This gives a picture of a region 
characterised as having emerging competition agencies, and competition 
regimes recently adopted or modernised.  
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The second finding in the light of this research project is that, if the 
judiciaries are inefficient, and judicial reviews are based mainly on 
procedural issues or the sanctions imposed by the competition agencies 
are revoked without a proper scrutiny, then the development of their 
competition regimes and the attainment of good levels of enforcement 
will be even more challenging. In this sense, the role of the review courts 
is relevant whether reinforcing or impeding the good functioning of the 
competition field. 
 
The third finding is that just a minority of Latin American countries 
(Chile, Peru, and Mexico) have specialised competition tribunals, while 
the majority count on general jurisdiction tribunals responsible for the 
judicial review of antitrust cases.  
 
The fourth finding is that the majority of Latin American countries 
belong to the group of upper-middle income countries, while four of them 
belong to the group of lower-middle income, and just two have high 
levels of income (Chile and Uruguay). It could be inferred that there is a 
possible connection between the existence of a specialised competition 
tribunal in Chile since 2003 and the high levels of income presented by 
this country. One more inference that could be drawn is that in the upper-
middle income and lower-income countries inefficient judiciaries, weak 
institutions, and low levels of competition culture are expected. 
 
The fifth finding is that the majority of Latin American countries are 
characterised as having high levels of poverty, which translates into low 
levels of a culture of competition. According to the analysed data, just 
three countries have low levels of poverty (below 10%), while the rest 
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show significantly high levels. This situation constitutes one of the 
biggest challenges faced by the region.  
 
The sixth finding relates to economic growth and development. Using the 
Global Competitiveness Index as a gauge, the results indicate that the 
majority of the Latin American countries held modest positions, which 
signifies modest levels of competition culture. The Latin American 
country in the best position is Chile (place 33), and in the worst is 
Venezuela (place 127). None of the Latin American countries are in the 
top ten of the ranking.  
 
The same situation is observed when analysing the specific pillars 
“institutions” and “goods market efficiency”, where the rankings 
occupied by the majority of the Latin American countries under 
examination are far from good. Likewise, corruption constitutes the most 
problematic factor for doing business in Latin American countries. 
 
The seventh finding refers to the “ease of doing business” rank, whose 
analysis shows that it is not easy to do business in the majority of Latin 
American countries. This situation suggests that there is not a solid 
culture of competition, and that probably the judiciaries do not function 
properly. Another relevant finding is that the majority of Latin American 
countries critically depend on the incomes generated by informal 
economies, denoting low levels of a culture of competition. The Latin 
American country with the lowest percentage of informal economy was 
still over 30%, with some cases where the percentage reached almost 
75% of total size of the economy. 
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The final finding is that in terms of infrastructure the situation is similar 
to that of economic growth and development, that is, the majority of the 
Latin American countries ranked poorly, with transport, electricity and 
telephony infrastructures needing improvement, depicting once again low 
levels of a culture of competition. The findings of low levels of a culture 
of competition assist in the thesis narrative by illustrating that the 
existence of such factors predicts governmental policies introduced with 
an unawareness of the importance of competition, perhaps being also 
impacted by poorly functioning judiciaries. This circumstance, combined 
with new competition regimes and weak competition authorities 
embedded with strong powers, suggests that credible and effective courts 
will help boost the levels of competition culture through proper judicial 
review. 
 
Section 1.2.3 has also established that the judiciaries in Latin America are 
perceived as not trustworthy. The fact that this institution lacks credibility 
indicates that one of the elements that compose the competition landscape 
is lacking. Such deficiency implies that the final authority in antitrust 
cases, instead of being the most knowledgeable and the most credible, 
may represent an impediment to the implementation of competition law. 
If this is the case, then the lessons offered by Mexico may help address 
such a common issue.  
 
To summarise, the most relevant commonalities between Mexico and 
some other Latin American countries are the existence of weak or 
emerging competition agencies, the application of new or modernised 
competition regimes in countries with low levels of a culture of 
competition, and judiciaries lacking credibility, making of Mexico a 
relevant case study.  
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1.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The first purpose of this chapter (Section 1.1) was to provide a conceptual 
framework of the transplants phenomenon, an analysis that was required 
to understand the complexity of the process, to anticipate possible 
difficulties, and to establish some recommendations that would allow the 
best outcomes when emulating lessons. 
 
The second purpose of this chapter (Section 1.2) was to present some 
commonalities among Latin American countries with a view to 
establishing why Mexico is a relevant case, and to link the theoretical 
framework provided in Section 1.1 with the established commonalities 
detailed in Section 1.2. So, if a Latin American country has similar issues 
and is searching for practical solutions from outside, then the lessons 
provided by the Mexican case suitably adapted may offer a practical 
example. 
 
Among the illustrated similarities, is has been established that the 
majority of the Latin American countries have weak or emerging 
competition agencies, newly adopted or modernised competition regimes, 
low levels of enforcement, and unreliable judiciaries, aspects also shown 
by the Mexican case, which makes the appraisal appropriate. 
 
Under such circumstances, it seems that the adoption of specialised 
competition tribunals in some Latin American countries is advisable. 
Nevertheless, if these countries do intend to emulate the type of judiciary 
adopted in Mexico, it is indispensable to evaluate thoroughly local needs, 
prevailing informal institutions, and local opportunities as well as local 
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limitations, in order to encourage participation from local political actors 
and to ensure good levels of acceptance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Specialisation: scarcity of evidence, competition law, developing 
countries, and international organisations  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis placed the emphasis on the analysis of the 
phenomenon of transplant of institutions by deconstructing the guiding 
principles of institutions, transplants, institutional change, culture, and 
design of institutional transplants from different theoretical perspectives. 
At the same time, it focused on establishing some commonalities among 
Latin American countries, as a way to link the theoretical framework with 
the aim of establishing why Mexico is a relevant case, and with a view to 
informing broader implications of the findings (Chapter 5).  
 
The emphasis of this thesis now shifts from an exclusive focus on the 
transplant of institutions phenomenon, and commonalities among Latin 
American countries, to a narrower focus on judicial specialisation. The 
first part of the chapter (Section 2.1) describes the scarcity of empirical 
evidence about the benefits (efficiency, quality, uniformity) and 
drawbacks (loss of independence) that are prominently assigned to 
specialised tribunals. The purpose of surveying such scarcity of empirical 
evidence is to endorse the pertinence of this research project, since the 
latter aims to contribute to the research area by providing some empirical 
evidence.  
 
Considering that this research project assesses the performance of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico as a way to provide some 
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empirical evidence about the benefits and drawbacks that this type of 
judiciary provides, Section 2.2 focuses the analysis on the following five 
indicators identified by Stephen Legomsky for the purpose of establishing 
whether specialisation is suitable for competition law: i) complexity; ii) 
room for discretion; iii) dynamism; iv) high volume of cases; and v) 
speed. The key finding here is the significant number of arguments both 
in favour and against specialisation in competition law particularly 
reference the complexity factor, which i) illustrates the unsettledness of 
the topic, and ii) reveals the necessity of offering some progress on such 
analysis. These two points respond to the second goal of this chapter. 
 
Section 2.3 examines the arguments in favour and against the adoption of 
specialised competition courts in developing countries. The examination 
of the theoretical perspectives that scholars have offered in this regard 
will inform the analysis about the appropriateness of these types of 
tribunals for Latin American countries in Chapter 5. Subsequently, 
Section 2.4 explores the role played by international organisations in 
persuading Latin American countries to adopt specialised competition 
tribunals. This will allow us to evaluate the performance of the Mexican 
tribunal in a wider context, and to establish whether its adoption 
responded to international pressure, which might have compromised the 
success of the transplantation process, as was previously explored in the 
theoretical framework of transplant of institutions in Chapter 1. 
 
The structure of the chapter is designed as follows. The analysis starts 
with the stated benefits and drawbacks of specialised tribunals with a 
view to demonstrating how divided the scholars upon this matter (Section 
2.1). Section 2.2 then continues with an examination aimed at 
determining whether competition law is suitable for specialisation 
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according to the model created by Stephen Legomsky. Following this 
analysis, Section 2.3 explores different scholarly opinions about the 
suitability of specialised competition tribunals in developing countries.  
 
Finally, Section 2.4 focuses on the role of international organisations in 
the implementation of specialised competition tribunals in Latin America. 
Ultimately, this chapter aims to piece together the various theoretical 
accounts of the suitability of specialised competition tribunals for 
developing countries. Various international organisations appear to 
advocate for such transplants, yet often without offering empirical 
evidence to support their suitability for developing countries.  
 
2.1.  SPECIALISATION: BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS  
 
For the purposes of this research project, specialisation of the judiciary 
should be understood as when a judge is focused on a narrow case area, 
with limited and exclusive jurisdiction on a regular basis. Such 
specialisation operates at the trial or appellate level, and is assigned to 
generalist judges or to experts, or a mixture of both.206 
 
It has been claimed that specialisation increases productivity. Adam 
Smith emphasised how the division of labour and the repetition of the 
same activity increased the productivity of the person, of the machinery, 
and of the factories.207 This division of labour has been applied in 
different areas or professions,208 including the judiciary, where the 
popularity of specialised tribunals has led to the creation of more courts 
	
206 Richard Revesz, ‘Specialized Courts and the Administrative Law Making System’ (1990) 138 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 4, 1125‒1130 
207 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Cosimo Classics 
1901) 6–19  
208 Deborah Rhode, ‘The Profession and Its Discontents’ (2000) 61 Ohio State Law Journal 2 
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of this type in the last few decades.209 The inference stemming from 
Smith’s theory is that if a judge deals with the same type of disputes 
regularly, the time and quality of the decision-making process improves.  
 
Yet despite this increase in specialised tribunals, and their expected 
continued increase, there is no evidence for their benefits. As Lawrence 
Baum expresses, it seems that the growth of specialised tribunals “…has 
been a product of inadvertence rather than design…”210. Likewise, 
different studies attempting to establish whether specialised tribunals out-
perform generalist ones have failed to give conclusive answers, with the 
explicit recognition of how difficult the matter is.211  
 
Such weakness supports the pertinence of this research project and its 
examination of whether the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico 
has been beneficial. This section offers an in-depth analysis of the 
theoretical framework surrounding the following apparent benefits of 
specialised tribunals, namely efficiency, quality, and uniformity. It also 
covers the main identified drawback assigned to this type of judiciary, 
namely the loss of independence.  
 
2.1.1.  BENEFITS  
 
The most common benefits attributed to specialisation are: efficiency, 
quality, and uniformity. Lawrence Baum has identified these as the three 
	
209 Heike Gramckow and Barry Walsh, ‘Developing Specialized Court Services, International 
Experiences and Lessons Learned’ (2013) The World Bank, Legal Vice Presidency, Justice & 
Development, Working Paper Series, 24, 2; Alan Uzelac, ‘Mixed Blessing of Judicial Specialisation: 
The Devil Is in the Detail’ (2014) II Russian Law Journal 4, 147  
210 Baum (n 7) 146 
211 Chad Oldfather, ‘Judging, Expertise and the Rule of Law’ (2012) 89 Washington University Law 
Review 892, 899‒900; Ellen Jordan, ‘Specialized Courts: A Choice?’ (1981) 76 Northwestern 
University Law Review 5, 784 
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common virtues of specialisation, and at the same time has also 
recognised the need for empirical evidence validating them, which is why 
this research project focuses on testing the veracity of these apparent 
benefits.212 This section offers an analysis of each one, and presents the 
debates that have emerged in relation to them.  
 
a. Efficiency 
 
It has been indicated that when a judge deals with the same types of cases 
over a considerable period of time, s/he is able to make quicker decisions. 
Some scholars have also recognised that especially when hearing 
complex cases, such a judge would have the advantage of better and more 
quickly understanding complex matters or technical debates, which 
would avoid the lengthy process that this would otherwise entail.213  
 
It is assumed also that a good understanding of the matter provides judges 
with the advantage of formulating different methods of settlement at an 
earlier stage.214 Unah has affirmed that specialised judges develop the 
ability to predict problems and formulate solutions with greater 
alacrity.215 Such ability translates into cost savings for the parties and for 
the countries, as a specialised judge will not need so long to grasp the 
legal framework.216 
 
	
212 Baum (n 7) 33 
213 Douglas Ginsburg and Joshua Wright, ‘Antitrust Courts: Specialists vs Generalists’ (2013) 36 
Fordham International Law Journal 4, 793–795; Baum (n 7) 32‒33; Jessica Vapnek, ‘Cost-Saving 
Measures For The Judiciary’ (2013) International Journal For Court Administration, 6  
214 Daniel Savrin, ‘Specialized Antitrust Courts: A Practitioner’s Observations’ in Annual Proceedings 
of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: international antitrust law & policy: 2012 (Juris Publishing 
2013) 117–118 
215 Isaac Unah, ‘Specialized Courts of Appeals’ Review of Bureaucratic Actions and the Politics of 
Protectionism’ (1997) 50 Political Research Quarterly 4, 858 
216 Markus Zimmer, ‘Overview of Specialized Courts’ (2009) International Journal for Court 
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In relation to competition law, Roth has asserted that specialisation is 
likely to make the hearings more efficient as the judges are familiar with 
the field, giving the example of private antitrust actions in England, 
where the hearings conducted by ordinary courts unfamiliar with 
competition law are expected to take longer and be more expensive in 
consequence.217 Likewise, a study on judges’ training needs in the field of 
European Competition Law reported a strong connection between the 
degree of specialisation of courts and the level of knowledge of their 
judges.218 
 
In this regard, the World Bank assessed the performance of the 
specialised commercial tribunal in Tanzania by investigating whether 
such a tribunal was more efficient than the general division of the high 
court. The results showed that the commercial court was more efficient, 
but the report is not representative; while the specialised court attended 
231 new cases per year, the general division of the high court received 
almost 400 new cases per year, plus the 1,100 pending.219 The previous 
results reinforce the claim that more categorical studies comparing 
generalists with specialised judges in terms of efficiency are needed,220 
and justify one of the purposes of this research project, that is, measuring 
the efficiency of the recently adopted Mexican specialised competition 
tribunal against the previous generalist one.  
 
b.  Quality 
 
	
217 Sir Peter Roth, ‘Specialized Antitrust Courts’ (2013) Fordham Competition Law Institute, 105 
218 European Commission, ‘Study on Judges’ Training Needs in the Field of European Competition 
Law – Final Report’ (2016) 59 
219 David Finnegan, ‘Judicial Reform and Commercial Justice: The Experience of Tanzania’s 
Commercial Court’ (2005) Background Paper Prepared for the World Bank Development Report, 6. 
220 Ginsburg and Wright (n 213) 794. 
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A judge who is familiar with a particular field is expected to improve the 
quality of the decision-making. This improvement derives from being 
able to more easily identify the matter of the issue, and distinguish more 
quickly the assertiveness of the arguments presented by the parties or the 
witnesses. Such a judge will also produce a decision that correctly applies 
the law through use of all the information that has been collected with 
his/her expertise.  
 
Such expertise will lead to more accurate decisions, particularly in 
complex cases where a good understanding of the unique difficulties of 
the case is required.221 Similarly, the Competition Authority of the United 
Kingdom has reported, after the adoption of a specialised competition 
tribunal in that country, that one of the main advantages of judicial 
specialisation in competition law is that expertise and experience enable 
judges to understand expert evidence and argument, so reaching 
authoritative conclusions.222 
 
To measure the quality of decision-making is difficult. So difficult that it 
has been stated that this task is simply not possible.223 For those who have 
decided to embark upon this mission, the evaluation of factors such as 
appeals, reversal, and citation rates have been their most common tools. 
However, the use of these factors is questionable, mainly because the idea 
of what represents a good judge is very disputable, but most importantly, 
because key concepts such as what represents a good decision remain 
undefined.224 
	
221 Edward Cheng, ‘The Myth of the Generalist Judge: An Empirical Study of Opinion Specialization 
in the Federal Courts of Appeals’ (2007) Brooklyn Law Legal Studies, Research Papers, Working 
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Psychologists have also made great efforts to understand the decision-
making process of judges. A variety of experiments have been carried out 
in an attempt to analyse how a judge comes to a decision. The goal of this 
research is not to evaluate these outcomes. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that there are different schools of thought, and that a 
particular study has indicated that judges, like other human beings, make 
mistakes when making decisions, that intuitive decisions are common and 
should not be reproachable, and that expertise does not add much to the 
improvement of the quality of decisions.225 
    
There have also been a limited number of studies aimed at establishing 
whether specialised tribunals improve the quality of decisions compared 
to courts of general jurisdiction, but again, without decisive results.226 
One such study focused on establishing whether expert agencies 
produced better decisions than general judges by examining reversal and 
appeal rates. The results suggested that the Federal Trade Commission in 
the US does not outperform generalist judges, with the express 
recognition that more research is needed.227 
 
In relation to the parties, it has been seen that their perception varies 
according to whether the decision has been made by a generalist or by a 
specialised judge. Hence, in the US one research study examined to what 
extent the training of judges in economics had any impact on the appeal 
rate. The results suggested that in relation to basic antitrust cases where 
	
225 Linda Berger, ‘A Revised View of the Judicial Hunch’ (2013) 10 Legal Communication & 
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the decision had been made by a judge with basic economic training, the 
appeal rate was lower.228 This result indicates that parties tend to find 
judges with good knowledge in the field to be more reliable, at least in 
simple cases.  
 
To sum up, it is clear that to measure the superiority of a decision made 
by a judge is a challenging task. It is also clear that there have been 
studies trying to evaluate the quality of judicial decisions, but that they 
are not conclusive. The complexity of the task, combined with the time 
and skills limitations of this researcher, meant that the purpose of this 
project in terms of assessing the quality of the review decisions made by 
the Mexican specialised competition tribunal was restricted to evaluating 
the perceptions that the members of the competition authority (COFECE) 
and the practitioners had about these decisions. Surely future research 
which looks at the review process and specific decisions will shed more 
light on this matter, with the inclusion of the views of third parties such 
as appellants, infringing companies or complainants.  
 
c.  Uniformity 
 
Uniformity is generally described as the application of the same 
reasoning to cases under similar circumstances. After a certain period of 
time, it is expected an even application of the same reasoning when small 
groups of judges hear the same types of cases.229 Then, the parties in an 
investigation are provided with the possibility to predict the outcomes, 
which signifies certainty about the law.230 This uniformity avoids 
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conflicts in the interpretation of the law, avoids “forum shopping”, and 
allows consistency in the application of the law.231 
 
Such predictability is beneficial because citizens will ensure their conduct 
conforms to the standards of law deduced by the judges when interpreting 
it, being able to anticipate the consequences of their actions. If 
predictability is not possible, then adverse “forum shopping” will appear, 
consisting in similar cases being treated differently depending merely on 
the subjective reading of the law by multiple judges.232 
 
The patent law in the US witnessed the undesirable effects of forum 
shopping when litigants used to place their cases in their preferred federal 
courts. Such a situation forced the creation in 1982 of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), after a report was given by the 
Hruska Commission responsible for investigating the matter, according to 
which patent advocates found that the differences in the application of the 
law were seen as the major problem, and that forum shopping was 
widespread across the circuits. However, an assessment of the impact of 
the CAFC in terms of lack of uniformity showed that the issue was 
mitigated but not eliminated, and that forum shopping continued long 
after the CAFC was created.233  
    
Uniformity has also been linked with legitimacy. Legitimacy is 
understood as legal, sociological and moral. Legal legitimacy refers to 
judicial decisions that accord with the law, sociological refers to the 
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perception that the public has about the appropriateness of a judicial 
interpretation, which could undermine or enhance the legitimacy of the 
law and the judges who interpret it, and moral legitimacy refers to an 
equal application of the law to all citizens.234 
 
In conclusion, as has been the case with efficiency and quality, it is 
unclear whether specialisation provides real benefits in terms of 
uniformity. For this reason, the aim of this research is to offer some 
empirical evidence to the debate by examining whether the creation of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico has enhanced this apparent 
virtue. 
 
2.1.2.  DRAWBACKS  
 
As well as establishing the veracity of the alleged virtues of specialised 
tribunals ‒ efficiency, quality, and uniformity ‒ this research project also 
aims to determine the validity of the constant criticism that specialisation 
has received: loss of independence (or capture). It does so by assessing 
whether the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico has been 
captured. For this purpose, this section will describe the literature 
produced around this suspected disadvantage. Isolation has also been 
referred to as a possible drawback, but due to time restrictions it will not 
be included as part of the analysis.  
 
a. Loss of independence (or capture) 
 
It is often argued that by having a small number of judges hearing the 
same types of cases it might be easier for different members of the 
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government, or members of parliament, or even lawyers who litigate in 
that field constantly, to monitor and influence the decisions of these 
judges.235 Such influence, it has been indicated, is more likely when the 
sides that come to the judges are disproportionately represented, such as 
strong and well-organised law firms on one side, and poorly represented 
groups on the other, and unlikely when both sides are balanced.236   
 
A particular study has shown that specialised tribunals tend to be inclined 
to make decisions which protect American industries. This finding 
suggests that companies with highly concentrated markets and political 
authority may hold great influence over specialised judges, pressing them 
to implement policies that favour them.237  
 
Another study tried to prove whether the specialised judges were prone to 
capture. In this case, the decisions made by the bankruptcy appellate 
panel were compared to those made by the district court judges in the US. 
The result of the study did not show evidence of capture, instead showing 
that the decisions of both institutions are influenced by their ideological 
preferences.238  
 
Yet a further study showed that the Federal Circuit granted patents easily; 
in other words, became pro-patent. This study was based on the 
assumption that the patent bar in the US used high levels of influence 
during the appointing process of the judges of the new US Court of 
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit, expecting them to favour their interest. 
The results, as was anticipated, confirmed that such influence also 
impacted the percentage of patent applications and patent litigation.239  
 
The above analysis suggests that specialised tribunals are subject to 
external pressures. However, it would be naive to assume that generalist 
courts are immune from such pressures, or at least we cannot say that 
there is conclusive evidence that specialised judges are more inclined to 
succumb to them. So, by analysing the reasons why a specialised 
competition tribunal was created in Mexico, how its members have been 
selected, and the perceptions of the interviewees, this research may shed 
some light on whether capture has been in evidence. 
 
2.1.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This section has outlined the scarcity of empirical evidence about the 
advantages and disadvantages that scholars have assigned to specialised 
tribunals. Accordingly, this research aspires to contribute some 
experiential evidence with a view to establishing whether the specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico has proven to be beneficial in terms of 
efficiency, quality, and uniformity.  
 
Moving on from the general theory of the benefits and drawbacks of 
specialised courts, Section 2.2 aims to investigate whether specialisation 
is suitable in competition law, according to the factors established by 
Stephen Legomsky. 
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2.2.  SPECIALISATION IN COMPETITION LAW 
 
Stephen Legomsky240 has established the following indicators that should 
be considered as a framework when contemplating the creation of 
specialised tribunals: i) complexity; ii) room for discretion; iii) 
dynamism; iv) high volume of cases;241 and v) speed. It should be noted 
that, in terms of the viability of the creation of specialised tribunals, 
Legomsky has emphasised that the unique properties of every country 
will dictate the convenience of this model of judiciary. This argument is 
in line with the theoretical insights about transplants analysed in Chapter 
1 (Section 1.1.2). Variables such as the legal system, the type of 
governance, the population, and the geography have to be considered 
when discussing specialisation as an option.242  
 
As for the purpose of this research project, such indicators are exhaustive 
and relevant; the aim of this section is to discuss whether competition law 
calls for specialised tribunals, given the indicators in Legomsky’s 
framework. Next, we examine each indicator in turn.  
 
a.  Complexity 
 
Roth claims that competition law involves a form of conceptual analysis 
and approach that is very different from the traditional legal view, 
making the existence of specialist judges justifiable.243 At the same time, 
it has been asserted that the examination of the terms of competition law, 
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guidelines in competition law, decisions made by competition authorities, 
and judicial decisions when reviewing antitrust cases, evidences the 
constant use of and analysis of economic and econometric theories in 
antitrust cases.244  
 
Law firms are so conscious of the importance of economics in antitrust 
cases that they count on expert economists to help them with the 
understanding and construction of robust mechanisms for the defence.245 
Competition agencies also invest considerable resources in hiring expert 
economists, for instance, the European Commission created the position 
of Chief Competition Economist in 2003, a role supported by a team of 
ten economists.246 This trend reflects the complexity of the discipline, 
where, according to Komesa, generalist courts tend to lack training and 
experience.247 
 
The application of economics in antitrust is not new. Evidence about the 
influence of economic theories in the resolution of antitrust cases dates 
back to the early 1940s.248 In fact, as Professor Kaplow has stated, the use 
of economic analysis in antitrust cases has been significant for many 
decades, and it is wrong to claim that its use has increased only 
recently.249 In some cases its use is crucial to ascertain whether a conduct 
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has been anticompetitive, to establish the causality between the conduct 
or operation and past, present or future outcomes, to establish the 
occurrence and extent of damages, the selection of the most suitable 
remedies, or, in short, the success of the case.250 It has even been stated 
that economics is the science that provides the rationality required to 
interpret any substantive antitrust rule.251 
 
Neven measured the influence of economics in antitrust policy and 
practice in Europe. After assessing the involvement of economists in 
competition investigations, as well as the use of economic reasoning in 
legal frameworks, policymaking, and case decisions, his main finding 
was that the influence has been notorious.252 One particular finding was 
that the resources invested by the parties in economic consultancy 
compared to those invested by the European Union are 
disproportionate.253 Another important finding was that the Commission 
has increased the use of economic insights and economic theories, but 
most importantly that the European Court of Justice on different 
occasions has overturned the decisions made by the Commission due to a 
lack of appropriate economic reasoning behind a finding.254  
 
The outcomes of Neven’s study lead to the following inferences: i) the 
parties invest good resources in acquiring economic expertise in order to 
be well-prepared to defend a case, but how well-prepared is a judge to 
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discern, and evaluate such expertise? ii) if the European Court of Justice 
has found that the economic analysis and evidence presented by the 
Commission in Airtours, Tetra Laval/Sidel, GE/Honeywell and 
Schneider/Legrand were wrongly conducted,255 would a generalist court 
in Latin America have the same capacity to detect whether the economic 
evaluation presented by the competition agency was adequate? 
 
The same concern has been expressed by the United Kingdom 
Competition Authority – the Competition and Markets Authority ‒ when 
contributing to the OECD’s Global Forum on Competition. The UK’s 
contribution, entitled “Judicial Perspectives on Competition Law”, 
examined the privileged position of specialised competition agencies in 
evaluating the evidence in competition cases in comparison to generalist 
courts, which have difficulties dealing with complex economic matters, 
but whose decisions nevertheless prevail over those of the specialised 
agency.256 It is important to mention that this position was presented by a 
country that has a specialised competition tribunal – CAT, the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal. In relation to Latin America, De Leon 
asserts that when reviewing antitrust cases judges do not have the cross-
disciplinary training required to understand the technical concepts used 
by economists.257 
  
Given the importance of economics in competition law analysis, it is 
clearly important for judges to understand the underlying economic 
theories. Even Judge Posner stated that “econometrics is such a difficult 
subject that it is unrealistic to expect the average judge or juror to be 
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able to understand all the criticisms of an econometric study, no matter 
how skilful the econometrician is in explaining the study to a lay 
audience.”258 France and the UK acted accordingly by concentrating the 
antitrust cases in the hands of few judges who had attained a better 
understanding of economic issues.259  
 
A limited understanding of economics and competition law in reviewing 
process undermines the goals of antitrust law if generalist courts wrongly 
overturn antitrust cases or solve them based purely on procedural issues. 
Competition agencies in developing countries responding to the 
International Competition Network (ICN) survey in 2003 firmly 
sustained that the judiciary was an obstacle to effective competition 
enforcement because “judges do not understand competition law and are 
content to avoid the necessity to learn through diverting competition 
issues into a maze of esoteric administrative and procedural side-streets 
out of which the substantive matters at issue rarely emerge”.260 
 
In 2006, in response to another ICN survey, some competition authorities, 
particularly in developing countries, when asked why competition 
authorities’ decisions are overturned, answered that one of the most 
persistent reasons for decisions being wrongly overturned was that judges 
did not possess sufficient understanding of economic concepts.261 
Equally, it has been reported that the lack of knowledge of basic 
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economic concepts and competition law has negatively impacted the 
development of the competition regimes in Jamaica, Russia,262 and the 
levels of enforcement in Mexico.263 In turn, the OECD reported that after 
surveying some young competition agencies with regard to the judicial 
appeals procedure, it was found that in El Salvador, for example, delays 
were the rule, and the review process its main issue.264 
 
Recently, in 2015, the ICN undertook another project led by the 
Advocacy Working Group named “Competition Culture Project”, which, 
among other findings, reported that from the 50 competition agencies 
around the world surveyed as part of the project, only a minority 
indicated that their judges had a good understanding of economic 
evidence.265 This consensus about the poor handling of economic 
arguments amid the judiciary has led Easterbrook to affirm that “antitrust 
is an imperfect tool for the regulation of competition”.266 In line with this 
claim, Ezrachi has also identified the capacity of the judiciary to 
understand the complexity of evolving economic theories in competition 
law as a significant challenge. Ezrachi affirms that, as a result, some 
courts have substituted the analysis of complex econometric analysis for 
the analysis of procedural issues.267 
 
Another example that reinforces the role of economics is the task force 
created by the American Bar Association – Antitrust Section ‒ that is 
comprised of antitrust economists, lawyers and academics, with the 
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purpose of examining the role of economic evidence in the federal courts. 
The results showed that there was a consensus around the importance of 
the use of economics in modern antitrust law, and around the importance 
of judges understanding economic concepts in order to avoid wrong 
decisions that increase costs of litigation. But, more importantly, it was 
revealed that 38% of the economists interviewed believed that judges 
only sometimes understand economic issues.268 Thus, it has been claimed 
that it is very unlikely that a judge without an economic training could 
come to a correct decision in antitrust cases based purely on precedents, 
untrained intuition or by interpreting the law.269  
 
In January 2016 the European Commission presented the findings of their 
final report “The study on judges’ training needs in the field of European 
competition law”, whose most important recognition was that in relation 
to private enforcement generally judges have little knowledge and 
understanding of economic processes, which are rarely covered during 
their academic studies or initial training.270 Such a finding signified the 
acknowledgment of the need for judges to be trained as a high priority. 
This finding advances the following proposition: if the lack of 
competition knowledge amid the judiciary is still an issue in Europe in 
2016, a region with long historical experience of the implementation of a 
competition policy and good levels of competition culture, then what is 
expected in Latin American countries? 
 
Institutionally, in the context of antitrust, Komesar affirms that generalist 
courts underperform agency-employed specialists due to the complexity 
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of the field, and the lack of training and experience. As part of his 
institutional analysis, Komesar identifies a trade-off between expertise 
and bias, where the risk of bias increases with specialisation. 
Nonetheless, after considering the general claim of inexpert reviewers 
often substituting procedural focus for substantive focus, in a field 
characterised by complexity, his suggestion is that the cost of inexpert 
decision-makers exceeds the correction of bias.271  
 
Critics of specialisation in competition law have stated that reviewing 
tribunals just need a good understanding of the meaning of fairness, in 
which they are experts,272 adding that lawyers should be compelled to 
explain the matters using simple language.273 They also point out that not 
all matters in antitrust cases are related to economic issues, rather, they 
sometimes reside in procedural issues, and that any generalist judge 
would be expected to be well-placed to protect procedural rights in any 
field.274 
 
In relation to the argument according to which fairness should be enough 
to solve any type of case, it is important to highlight that the use of 
“fairness” in competition law is debatable. Among the reasons given to 
disregard such use is that rigorous evidence and thorough economic 
analysis cannot be replaced by a sense of fairness, which is not an 
operational concept.275 It has been claimed also that certainly a fair 
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society must apply the competition rules strictly without a disregard for 
economics.276 
 
Likewise, during the policy roundtables organised by the OECD in 2008, 
two procedures were suggested to help with presenting complex 
economic theories to the judges: i) the elaboration of a list with practical 
questions that judges should exhaust to verify the credibility of what 
experts assert; and ii) the presentation of economic reasoning in a very 
basic form, using real-life examples, analogies, and visual aids.277  
 
The above analysis offers the following perspectives. First, that it is 
hardly controversial that economics nourishes antitrust law. Second, that 
antitrust appears to be a complex matter because of its use of economics. 
Third, that judges need to understand economics to correctly solve 
antitrust cases. Fourth, that lack of competition knowledge and 
economics amid the judiciary constitutes one of the most common claims 
made by competition authorities as to why their decisions have been 
persistently wrongly overturned. Fifth, the most fundamental question, 
and one which remains unclear, is identifying whether, due to such 
complexity, specialised competition tribunals are in a better position to 
deal with antitrust cases than generalist courts, at least in Latin American 
countries. 
 
b.  Room for discretion 
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The broadness of the law compels judges to interpret it and to indicate 
what lawmakers intended by creating it. This process of converting vague 
words of the law into a well-defined understanding of its terms and scope 
could be understood as a process of discretion. In relation to competition 
law, such broadness is a perceptible characteristic.278 In the US the 
primary federal antitrust laws are imprecisely phrased, with the federal 
courts and antitrust agencies being responsible for the development of 
their interpretation.279  
 
Besides developing the interpretation of broad competition law, it has 
been asserted that judges also act as policymakers when reviewing 
antitrust decisions. Cavinet indicates that this function is undertaken 
when judges ensure the protection of the fundamental rights of the 
investigated parties, confirming that the powers of the regulatory 
authorities are not absolute.280 Likewise, judges need to perform a 
balancing exercise by pondering the issues of the case in the context of 
economic goals, employment, protection of local industries or protection 
of small businesses.281  
 
Similarly, Ariel Ezrachi has examined three aspects that have made of 
competition law an unpredictable and unstable discipline. First, he asserts 
that diverse components like economic development, market realities, 
domestic culture, government, and enforcement structure result in 
differences among jurisdictions about the values, aims, interpretation and 
application of competition law.282 One example used to illustrate such a 
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claim is the appraisal of merger transactions in South Africa, where 
aspects such as employment or the impact on particular sectors or regions 
are included as part of the examination.283 This argument encompasses 
the theoretical framework about informal institutions (values) and 
domestic realities set out in Chapter 1. 
 
A second aspect examined by Ezrachi is the analysis of economics in 
competition law. He informs that the analysis varies according to the 
context and market realities,284 adding that it is possible that economic 
experts analyse the economic theories in such a way that, using similar 
principles, their outcomes underpin the claims of a particular party.285 
One final aspect is the role played by regulation, which sets the scope of 
competition law in diverse sectors. The author uses the case of the Hong 
Kong regime to illustrate the exclusion of airports, broadcasting and 
housing from its application.286  
 
One more indication that there is room for discretion in antitrust cases is 
the fact that scarcity of resources influences the decision whether to open 
investigations or reject claims. It is a common practice that competition 
authorities invest their limited resources in combating the conducts that 
are considered more harmful to their markets or investigating cases that 
may have a bigger impact among the public.287 The discretionary power 
is also exercised when launching sector inquiries to detect 
anticompetitive behaviours in particular markets.288  
	
283 Ibid. (n 267) 58 
284 Ibid. (n 267) 61 
285 Ibid. (n 267) 62 
286 Ibid. (n 267) 64 
287 Aditya Bhattacharjea, ‘Who Needs Antitrust? Or, Is Developing-Country Antitrust Different? A 
Historical-Comparative Analysis’ in D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng and Ioannis Llanos (eds), in 
Competition Law and Development (Stanford University Press 2013) 59, 61, 65 
288 Jose Laguna de Paz, ‘Understanding the Limits of Judicial Review in European Competition Law’ 
(2014) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, 213 
	
135	
 
From the above analysis it can be extracted that in competition law there 
is room for discretion given the following: i) the terms of the competition 
regimes are usually broad, and their interpretation rests on the 
competition agencies or on the judges when reviewing, ii) in antitrust 
cases interpretation and implementation includes an array of mixed goals 
such as economic, social, or industrial, from which a balance needs to be 
found, iii) the scarcity of resources is a factor that in the competition field 
determines which cases are investigated. For all these reasons, it could be 
said that competition law is a field characterised as presenting room for 
discretion, according to Legomsky’s indicators, and therefore a specialist 
treatment is suitable. 
 
c.  Dynamism 
 
Considering that one of the main purposes of competition law is to 
invigilate the functioning of markets,289 the incessant change of the latter 
means that competition law must also adapt or perhaps evolve. The 
markets are subject to drastic and quick changes such as transitioning 
from monopolistic to open, regulated to deregulated, or paternalistic to 
more liberal. In the same way, competition law has shown different 
approaches such as the per se rule to the rule of reason.  
 
Similarly, as technology continually advances, competition rules need to 
advance too. It is imperative, then, that competition principles 
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accommodate the new features of markets by recognising the use of new 
technologies when doing business, as well as the development of certain 
markets, the emergence of new markets or disappearance of others, and 
the evolving needs of consumers too. It has been recognised that 
technology markets are considered dynamic and complex ones due to 
rapid changes in resources, data usage, products, and demand 
characteristics. The challenge derives from the difficulty to accurately 
predict the behaviour of its players.290 
 
To illustrate the challenge offered by technology markets, it is 
appropriate to cite the concern shared by the European Commission 
regarding digital technology as a disruptive global force.291 This 
institution has indicated that dominant platform businesses are in a 
position to manipulate the way the platform works, to give some 
advantage to their own service, or to make it hard for others to compete. 
To support its assertion, the Commission mentioned the fine imposed on 
Google for abusing the power of its search engine, as well as the potential 
risk that Amazon might misuse the data that links sellers and buyers to 
reinforce its position as seller.292 
 
Another market that exemplifies high levels of dynamism is the digital 
economy.293 It has been affirmed that such a dynamic environment 
represents a significant challenge for enforcers. At a policy level, it also 
represents an important hurdle, considering that it is difficult to establish 
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whether new business strategies or new forms of interaction with 
consumers may be a competition problem, or if the application of 
competition law in such cases would be effective.294 In this context, it has 
been asserted that at times the line between research and development 
that promotes the consumer interest and innovation that is used to exploit 
or to exclude becomes blurred.295 
 
One more example of the dynamism that characterises competition law is 
the interplay between digital markets and data protection. In Germany, 
for instance, in the market for social networks, Facebook was 
investigated for apparent abuse of its dominant position by imposing 
onerous conditions with respect to its data collection from users.296 
Although digital markets serve as a good illustration of how innovation 
drives dynamic competition, other activities exemplify very well the daily 
dynamisms observed within these markets, such as product differentiation 
or rapid response to change from new market opportunities, whether 
provoked by changes in taste or other forces of imbalance.297 All the 
reasons highlighted above confirm that competition law is a dynamic 
field and at the same time a challenging one, as competition authorities 
and judges must make their decisions against the backdrop of constant 
new realities offered by the markets.    
 
d. Speed 
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In competition law, especially in relation to mergers, time is crucial. In 
Europe the General Court (previously Court of First Instance ‒ CFI) 
introduced a new expedited procedure, which came into force on 1 
February 2001.298 According to that modification, the General Court has 
the discretion to grant a fast-track procedure to appeals against merger 
decisions grounded in urgency issues, consisting of giving more emphasis 
to the oral procedure and simplifying the written one.299 
 
Under the fast-track procedure it is possible for parties to obtain a review 
decision in less than 12 months, contrary to the 20 months it would have 
taken under the normal procedure (it has been said that even 12 months is 
a long time for parties to wait for a decision).300 The General Court has 
granted the expedited procedure required by the parties in almost every 
single case,301 which denotes that merger cases are regarded as urgent 
matters mainly because market conditions change so rapidly that even an 
overturned refusal decision by the General Court might be unworkable 
because the parties would not be able to pursue the transaction in time.302  
 
When a third party appeals an approval merger decision, time is also 
critical.303 The suspension of a transaction pending adjudication could be 
a very expensive process for the parties, and it might also be that in the 
end, even if the approval is confirmed by the General Court, the deal is 
not feasible because of the time factor. Such is the importance of 
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avoiding delays in merger cases, particularly in the context of multi-
jurisdictional mergers, that the ICN has introduced a practical guide to 
international enforcement cooperation in mergers, aiming to ensure 
efficient procedures.304 
 
Mergers are a good example of how important it is to achieve prompt 
judicial review decisions in the field of competition law. The same speed 
is required in digital markets due to the dynamism shown by these types 
of industries, where the remedies need to be imposed before innovation 
forces their change or disappearance. The same necessity is observed 
pending a final decision adjudicating responsibility in the commission of 
an anticompetitive conduct. These observations underpin the pertinence 
of adopting specialised courts in competition law. 
 
2.2.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The preceding examination has illustrated that there is room for 
discretion when applying competition law, that competition law is a 
dynamic field, and that speed in competition law is essential. Having seen 
that the requirements of speed, room for discretion, and dynamism are 
present in competition law, the deduction is that this discipline fits 
Legomsky’s framework. In relation to the complexity factor, this section 
has underlined the disagreement among scholars with regard to the 
necessity of specialised tribunals in competition law.  
 
Such controversies have arisen over allegations of the complexity of the 
field (mainly derived from the predominant use of economics), on the one 
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side, and on the other, the argument that judges are simply in need of a 
sense of fairness to solve any dispute, that not all the matters in antitrust 
cases are related to economic reasoning, and that if economic matters 
were explained in a simple manner then any judge would be able to solve 
them correctly.   
 
Chapters 4 and 5 will provide empirical insights into how insufficient it is 
to apply merely this “sense of fairness” to accurately review antitrust 
cases. They will also reveal that a complexity factor characterises 
competition law, and that specialised tribunals may be more necessary for 
developing countries. 
 
The aim of Section 2.3 is to provide an overview of the theory of 
specialised competition courts in developing countries, as the main goal 
of this research is to give guidance to Latin American countries that 
might contemplate this type of judiciary. The importance of the review 
rests on the particularities shown by these countries.  
 
2.3.  SPECIALISED COMPETITION TRIBUNALS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
The scarcity of resources is a key issue that provokes divergence among 
scholars when considering the adoption of specialised competition 
tribunals in developing countries. One end of the spectrum argues that 
developing countries should focus their scarce resources on the most 
harmful anticompetitive conducts, while at the other end are those who 
argue that investing in this type of judiciary is a sensible option for these 
countries considering that the expertise of the judges would strengthen 
the levels of competition culture and would enhance the development of 
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their new regimes.305 The next part describes the relevant arguments in 
more detail. 
 
a. Arguments supporting the adoption of specialised 
competition tribunals 
 
Thomas Arthur’s view is that specialised competition tribunals are 
superior to generalist ones thanks to their expertise. His argument is that 
generalist tribunals are suitable only to apply per se rules, and if the goal 
is to develop and enforce competition law then adopting specialised 
competition tribunals is the best option.306  
 
Similarly, Fels and Ng state that specialised competition tribunals are 
preferable in developing countries. Their view finds support in the 
presence in such countries of the three following factors: i) weak 
competition culture; ii) high levels of corruption amid the judicial and 
administrative systems; and iii) lack of resources. Their suggestion is that 
having tribunals with knowledge of competition law strengthens the 
competition advocacy approaches urgently needed in developing 
countries.307 
 
In turn, Savrin indicates that it would be unrealistic to expect generalist 
judges in developing countries to handle properly and efficiently antitrust 
cases considering their low levels of exposure, and the novelty and 
complexity of the field in terms of the economic analysis required. In this 
	
305 Thomas Arthur, ‘Competition Law and Development: Lessons from the U.S. Experience’ in D. 
Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng and Ioannis Llanos (eds), in Competition Law and Development 
(Stanford University Press 2013) 77–78 
306 Ibid. 
307 Allan Fels and Wendy Ng, ‘Rethinking Competition Advocacy in Developing Countries’ in D. 
Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng and Ioannis Llanos (eds), in Competition Law and Development 
(Stanford University Press 2013) 183 
	
142	
context, such an argument could be linked with the preceding theoretical 
insights offered by Legomsky about complexity as a factor determining 
the necessity of adopting specialised tribunals (Section 2.2). Therefore, 
specialised tribunals with a good knowledge of antitrust law and 
economics would are best placed to develop this area of law.308 
 
Similarly, Gal has established that incompetent judiciaries impede the 
effective enforcement of competition law in developing countries. She 
asserts that the main issues amid the judiciary in such countries are the 
low levels of expertise in antitrust matters, lack of experience, and lack of 
understanding of economic concepts. In her view, these shortfalls 
negatively affect the role of the competition agencies and reduce the 
credibility of the antitrust enforcement. For this reason, she claims that 
one alternative to remedy such concerns is the adoption of specialised 
competition tribunals, indicating that the appeal court should be limited in 
its review to significant errors of law or fact, and thereby reduce the 
likelihood that unknowledgeable judges dispose cases based on 
procedural issues rather than on the merits of the case.309  
 
In light of the above discussion, although Mateus does not express clear 
support for the adoption of specialised competition tribunals in 
developing countries, he indicates that the poor performance of the 
judiciary in such an area could have a negative impact.310  
 
The general overview of the considerations that support the adoption of 
specialised competition tribunals in developing countries reveals the 
scarcity of resources to be an important but not exclusive factor. Other 
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aspects such as low levels of exposure, corrupt judiciaries, novelty of the 
field, complexity of the field, and levels of competition knowledge have 
also been noted as relevant to justify the adoption of such a type of 
judiciary.  
 
b. Arguments against the adoption of specialised competition 
tribunals  
 
George Priest’s approach to this issue is that differences in competition 
law policies between developing and developed countries are 
meaningless. His key argument is that every country faces a scarcity of 
resources, and that every country is at a developing stage where 
improvements are always an opportunity for economic progress. There 
are, then, in his view, four universal principles that every country should 
follow: a) prohibition of cartels; b) prohibition of monopolies; c) 
prohibition of exclusionary practices; and, d) free entry to markets. The 
implication of Priest’s argument is that if there is no reason to 
differentiate between developing and developed countries in terms of 
competition law based on their economic or cultural conditions, then any 
discussion about the necessity of specialised competition tribunals in 
developing countries is futile.311 
 
Aditya Bhattacharjea argues that developing countries should focus their 
scarce resources on fighting basic offences which are clear and robust, 
such as hard-core cartels, and on investigating cases that have an 
extensive effect on the poor. She estimates that given the complexity of 
competition law, and the conditions that characterise developing 
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countries such as scarcity of resources, business opposition, lack of 
competition culture, dilatory procedures, and anticompetitive government 
policies, among others, the investigation of complex offences is 
challenging and expensive. So, only once knowledge and experience are 
acquired should infant agencies move progressively from basic to 
complex conducts.312 According to Bhattacharjea’s approach, the 
proposition is that competition agencies in developing countries should 
avoid the encounters of complex analysis, making the existence of 
specialised competition tribunals perhaps unnecessary.  
 
This lack of resources and expertise common to developing countries, as 
claimed by Bhattacharjea, is in line with Cook’s view on the high levels 
of uncertainty that young competition agencies face when investigating 
complex conducts like predation. For Cook, in developing countries the 
collection of sufficient data to study the markets and their structure in 
depth is difficult, which makes the establishment of market dominance or 
strategic behaviour highly challenging.313 The natural deduction from this 
would be to focus scarce resources on uncomplicated conducts, for which 
specialised competition tribunals may not be necessary.  
 
The same reasoning has been shared by Rodriguez and Menon, who after 
considering the common hurdles that developing countries experience, 
stated that a derivative recommendation is to focus, at least in the short-
term, on horizontal practices, since the investigation of more ambiguous 
activities is expensive and increases the likelihood of errors. For them, 
the possible benefits of investigating equivocal behaviours do not 
	
312 Bhattacharjea (n 287) 59, 61, 65 
313 Paul Cook, ‘Competition and its Regulation: Key Issues’ (2002) 73 Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics 4, 551, 554 
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counterbalance the great costs of such tasks.314 The assumption, then, is 
that if only indisputable conducts should be pursued, due to scarcity and 
lack of expertise, then specialised competition tribunals are not essential. 
 
Likewise, Alvaro Santos’s view is that investors care more about tax 
exemptions, skilled labour, political instability or price instability than 
effective tribunals, adding that it is contestable that effective tribunals 
produce economic development.315 Focusing on the needs of users, there 
is empirical evidence to show that in developing countries there is a 
divergence between the perceptions of market agents and policymakers 
with regard to the goals of antitrust policy.316  
 
In this sense, the World Bank has recognised that when contemplating the 
possibility of creating specialised tribunals, it is necessary to analyse 
internal and external needs; internal needs in terms of improving 
decision-making and external needs in terms of users. By considering 
both aspects, it becomes easier to accurately establish whether specialised 
tribunals are necessary and if so which type. If specialised tribunals are 
not required, then different types of settlement or operational tribunal 
changes should be contemplated.317  
 
The analysis of the above literature leads to the following observations. 
In Priest, Bhattacharjea, Cook, and Rodriguez and Menon’s arguments 
the common topic is the scarcity of resources. However, for Priest such 
	
314 Rodriguez and Menon (n 140) 39–42 
315 Alvaro Santos, ‘The World Bank’s Uses Of the ‘Rule of Law’ Promise in Economic Development’ 
in David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), in The New Law and Economic Development. A Critical 
Appraisal (Cambridge University Press 2006) 281–290 
316 Ignacio De Leon, What Features Measure Economic Competition in Developing Countries? – The 
Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions. Their Implications for Competition Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 48–49 
317 Gramckow and Walsh (n 209) 5 
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scarcity is present in every country, by which (in a highly simplistic 
way), the author assumes that universal principles in antitrust are enough, 
disregarding the need for different approaches, as in his view every 
country is developing. This view that socio-economic conditions or 
culture are unimportant does not seem accurate in the light of the analysis 
provided by Sections 1.1.3 (Institutional Change) and 1.1.4. (Culture). 
Aditya, Cook, and Rodriguez and Menon advance the analysis by 
considering that developing countries are affected by scarcity of 
resources, but also by particular conditions which mean that the focus on 
complex antitrust cases seems an inappropriate and expensive choice.  
 
2.3.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Comparing the arguments presented in pro and against specialisation in 
competition law in developing countries, the finding is that both positions 
present good cases based on persuasive opinions. Therefore, both 
perspectives should be considered when contemplating the introduction 
of specialised competition tribunals. This is particularly the case in the 
context of this research project which aims to establish whether: i) Latin 
American countries are afflicted by scarcity of resources; ii) they show 
important economic or cultural endowments that impair the effective 
implementation of competition policies; and, iii) the adoption of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico has been a correct and 
inexpensive institutional reform.  
 
Section 2.4 is concerned with international organisations encouraging 
developing countries to adopt specialised competition tribunals. This 
analysis is vital because the recommendations given by international 
organisations are highly regarded by developing countries, which depend 
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on the assistance provided by such organisations. So, the outcomes of this 
analysis help determine to what extent the Mexican government has been 
persuaded by international organisations to create the specialised 
competition tribunal (Chapter 5).  
 
2.4. SPECIALISATION: INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
The following analysis links to the theoretical framework about transplant 
of institutions examined in Chapter 1.1.2, particularly to the motivation 
typology “Externally Dictated Transplant”, traditionally seen in 
developing countries pursuing trade agreements, financial aid or political 
autonomy.318 So, considering that developing countries often adopt laws, 
policies or institutions because of imposed treaties or international 
pressure,319 the aim of this section is to establish to what extent Mexico 
was persuaded by international organisations to adopt the specialised 
competition tribunal. The understanding of such a role provides this 
thesis with a more comprehensive perspective to evaluate the 
performance of the Mexican competition tribunal.  
 
To answer the above-mentioned inquiry this section focuses the analysis 
on the three main international organisations that offer assistance to 
developing countries, and that in terms of the judiciary have been given 
recommendations about how advisable the adoption of specialised 
tribunals would be. The overview starts with the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), then moves to the 
World Bank (WB), and ends with the international competition network 
(ICN). After introducing the purpose and structure of such organisations, 
	
318 Miller (n 68) 847–849 
319 The author indicates that most developing countries adopted competition rules as a result of 
international pressure or imposed treaties, see Waked (n 110) 69. 
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it reviews the particular recommendations given by them to Latin 
American countries. The data presented following the analysis will 
inform the discussion of the results in Chapter 5. 
 
2.4.1. THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) 
  
The OECD was the result of an agreement between 18 European 
countries, the United States and Canada, interested in attaining economic 
development after the World War II.320 Today the organisation has 34 
members among the most developed economies and some emerging 
economies like Mexico, and its main goal is to fight poverty and promote 
prosperity through economic growth and financial stability.321 
 
The organisation has a council where the representatives of member 
countries take decisions by consensus. There are some committees where 
specific issues are reviewed, and ideas are discussed and implemented. 
There is a an Office of the Secretary-General where the information is 
collected and given to the committees.322 
 
Thus, the performance of individual countries, whether members or not, 
is reviewed by their peers, and the conclusions drawn may lead to the 
signature of agreements, to the design of standards, or may include a set 
of recommendations. Particularly in terms of competition law, the OECD 
has been working with Latin American countries by suggesting the 
	
320 OECD, Convention, 14th December 1960 
<http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-
operationanddevelopment.htm> accessed 21 February 2016 
321 OECD <http://www.oecd.org/about/whodoeswhat/> accessed 26 February 2016 
322 OECD (Ibid.)  
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implementation of competition policies following peer reviews, as the 
next part illustrates.  
 
a. Specialisation: peer reviews in competition law in Latin America  
 
The OECD through a follow-up process revised the peer reviews of 
competition law and policy that in previous years were conducted in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. In general terms, the 
organisation reported that judicial review was a recurring issue 
encountered by some of these countries, recommending the creation of 
specialised competition tribunals. This organisation also recognised that 
such a step would require new legislation that would not be easy to 
obtain, suggesting as an alternative the implementation of a training 
process, which would be easier to deploy.323 Although the focus of this 
research project is Mexico, the next part includes a more detailed analysis 
of the peer reviews conducted in Brazil and Argentina. Such analysis is 
relevant considering that the aim of this section is to examine the role of 
international organisations in the implementation of specialised 
competition tribunals in Latin America, as well as to show that Brazil is a 
good example of a country that may find useful lessons in the Mexican 
experience after the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal was 
recommended by the OECD there.  
 
i. Brazil 
 
‒ In 2005 the competition law and policy of Brazil was reviewed. 
One of the recommendations given by the OECD was the creation 
	
323 OECD, 11 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/39472133.pdf> 
accessed 7 March 2016 
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of specialised judges and appellate panels to resolve competition 
law issues, mainly because the scope of the review undertaken by 
the judiciary at that time was limited to just procedural 
irregularities.324 Although this organisation does not present the 
specific reasons that underpin their recommendation, if we look 
back at the complaints about the lack of knowledge in competition 
law and economics amid the judiciary, as well as its negative 
impact, examined in Section 2.2, it is understandable why the 
OECD provided it.	
 
‒ In 2010, Brazil was the object of another peer review, and this time 
the recommendation consisted of avoiding the first review instance 
and to appellate directly to the second level appeals court. The 
reason for such a recommendation was the small number of 
competition law cases reported, and the disregard shown by the 
Brazilian government when they failed to consider the 
recommendation given in 2005 to adopt specialised competition 
judges.325 	
 
ii. Mexico 
 
‒ In 2004 the competition law and policy of Mexico was reviewed, 
with the conclusion in terms of judicial review that specialised 
judges were required, following the finding that tribunals were 
unfamiliar with economics.326 	
 
	
324 OECD, 112 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/35445196.pdf> accessed 26 February 2016 
325 OECD, 80 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/45154362.pdf> accessed 26 February 2016 
326OECD, 69 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/31430869.pdf> 
accessed 28 February 2016 
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‒ In 2007 the OECD conducted a follow-up process, reporting that a 
training process for judges and magistrates in competition law had 
been undertaken, but results were still pending to prove their 
effectiveness, and that the issues requiring new legislation were 
still unresolved.327 	
 
‒ In 2013 when reviewing the assessment and recommendations 
given to Mexico, the OECD expressed that judicial delays 
remained a significant issue, emphasising the importance of 
implementing the specialised competition tribunal created after the 
Constitutional reform introduced in 2011 but still pending.328 It 
could be deducted that the OECD insisted on such institutional 
reform because one of the benefits attributed to this type of 
judiciary is efficiency, as discussed in Section 2.1.1.	
 
iii. Argentina 
 
‒ In 2006 the competition law and policy of Argentina was reviewed, 
which in terms of judicial review, concluded that the competition 
authority of that country was fortunate to have quasi-specialist 
judges in the tribunal of Buenos Aires.329 This conclusion may 
derive from the alleged benefits attributed to specialised courts as 
described in Section 2.1.1. 	
 
b.  Specialisation: general considerations 
 
	
327 OECD, 31–32 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2007Follow-up-LA-peer-reviews_EN.pdf> 
accessed 28 February 2016 
328 OECD, ‘Economic Surveys, Mexico’ (2013) 22 
329 OECD (n 135) 51 
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In 1996, the OECD organised a seminar on judicial enforcement of 
competition law, where it was said that experience had not demonstrated 
that specialised tribunals were imperative for effective judicial 
enforcement. Nevertheless, it was indicated that specialised competition 
tribunals are more disposed to and capable of dealing with policies within 
the competition field.330  
 
Also in 2013 the OECD, in relation to judicial performance, made the 
following observations: i) that the judicial system is a factor that impacts 
the economic performance of a country; ii) that specialised tribunals 
would be more efficient and their decisions more consistent; and, iii) that 
specialisation would deprive judges from learning and applying different 
areas of law in the decision-making process.331  
 
The analysis of the peer reviews conducted by the OECD in different 
Latin American countries, as well as the studies that in general review 
judicial performance, exposes that: i) this international organisation has 
clearly advocated the adoption of specialised competition tribunals for 
Brazil and Mexico, as an antidote to confront delays, lack of familiarity 
with economics, and preference to solve antitrust cases based on 
procedural irregularities; and ii) that such an organisation has opened 
spaces to debates about the benefits and drawbacks of specialised 
competition tribunals. The relevance of this finding is that, in light of the 
theories of transplants (Section 1.1.2) and design of institutional 
transplants (Section 1.1.5), with any intention to emulate an institutional 
reform, even if the initiative comes from an international organisation, it 
	
330 OECD (n 19) 10‒12 
331 OECD, ‘Judicial Performance And Its Determinants: A Cross-Country Perspective’ 6, 26–27 
<http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/FINAL%20Civil%20Justice%20Policy%20Paper.pdf> accessed 1 
March 2016 
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is indispensable to evaluate thoroughly the local needs, the prevailing 
informal institutions, and to ensure participation from local actors to 
reduce the risks of rejection. 
 
2.4.2. THE WORLD BANK  
 
The World Bank was created in 1944 with the aim of helping with 
reconstruction after the World War II. The main goal of the organisation 
today is to alleviate poverty worldwide. The World Bank acts as a 
cooperative with 188 member countries, which are represented by their 
ministers of finance or development. The organisation dispenses low-
interest loans, zero to low-interest credits, and grants to developing 
countries.332 
 
The World Bank uses the Rule of Law as a measure to grant assistance. 
However, the Bank has recognised that the concept does not have a fixed 
meaning.333 Certainly, the existing literature regarding the definition of 
the rule of law is abundant and varied.334 Nevertheless, a broad overview 
of the concept of the rule of law and of its development is necessary to 
understand the role of the World Bank in the dissemination of policies in 
developing countries. In this regard, the next part provides such an 
overview, with the recognition that a more in-depth analysis goes beyond 
the scope of this research project. 
	
332 World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership> accessed 2 March 2016 
333 World Bank 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:207
63583~menuPK:1989584~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:1974062~isCURL:Y,00.html> 
accessed 14 March 2016 
334 So many definitions of the rule of law can be found that Matthew Stephenson has expressed that 
“Rule of law has no meaning. Everyone uses the phrase because everyone can get behind it and might 
make it easier to get funding”. It has been said also that “The rule of law means whatever one wants it 
to mean. It is an empty vessel that everyone can fill up with their own vision” (in M J Trebilcock and 
Ronald Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2008) 13. 
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The emergence of the concept of the rule of law goes back to the 1960s, 
when the US Agency for International Development, along with some 
private American donors, promulgated a programme to reform the 
judicial systems and substantive laws of developing countries. The 
programme was known as “law and development” and its principle was 
that the law was the foundation for social change.335  
 
Despite the efforts, the programme failed ‒ mainly because the movement 
did not have well-developed theories to explain their choice of 
programmes and projects.336 Also, it has been indicated that part of the 
failure rested on the fact that the reforms were given by foreign 
consultants who ignored the local realities and excluded the ways 
individual countries used to resolve their conflicts as the customary 
law.337 
 
As a result, a new movement emerged to replace the failed law and 
development programme. This new movement, known as the rule of law, 
arose when the world was witnessing a globalisation phenomenon, where 
exports, free markets, privatisation and foreign investment were 
considered the keys to growth. Consequently, the first phase of the rule of 
law responded to this new era in that it considered that legal 
transplantations were appropriate, that reforms at all levels and at once 
were necessary, that one size fit all reforms, and that the top-down 
emphasis was correct.338  
	
335 World Bank (n 333)  
336 David Trubek, ‘The ‘Rule Of Law’ in Development Assistance: Past, Present and Future’ in David 
M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), in The New Law And Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal (Cambridge University Press 2006) 74–82 
337 World Bank (n 333) 
338 Trubek (n 336) 83–94 
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Nevertheless, a new approach emerged after the drastic effects of 
globalisation on the markets of developing economies became apparent. 
Such effects exhibited that transplants have some drawbacks, and that 
local needs are vital when considering changes. Also exposed was that 
the top-down approach was inaccurate, and that legal reforms need time 
and cannot be implemented abruptly.339 
 
In relation to the judicial system, its effectiveness and independence has 
been considered as one of the pillars of the rule of law, in the belief that 
there is a correlation between economic development and institutional 
quality. The claim is that effective tribunals foster economic and social 
development.340  
 
Regarding specialisation, the World Bank has produced a document that 
refers to specialised tribunal services, in which there is an analysis of the 
topic, and its origins and evolution. The text refers to indicators of when 
specialisation is recommended and the models that could be adopted. The 
conclusion of the document is that specialisation is not always the 
solution, and it offers an example of how this type of judiciary has been 
adopted by some jurisdictions simply to meet the requirements 
established by international organisations, rather than because it is 
appropriate.341  
 
	
339 Ibid. 
340 United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law 
Activities’ (2013) A/68/213/Add.1, 5 ‒ 6, numbers 27, 28, 29, 
<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/10471_SG%20Report%20-
%20Rule%20of%20Law%20Activities%202013%20-%20A_68_213.pdf> accessed 20 March 2016; 
Palumbo, Giupponi, Nunziata and Mora-Sanguinetti (n 41) 5 
341 Gramckow and Walsh (n 209) 25 
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The example in question is the programme “Doing Business”, designed 
by the World Bank, which produces annual reports that measure the 
business regulations of 189 countries. A total of 11 indicators are used to 
measure the performance, and one of those is how effectively contracts 
are enforced. Points are rewarded when the indicators are met and the 
totality of the points is used to rank the countries under examination.342 
Regarding the enforcement of contracts, the methodology of the 
programme has expressly established that when a country proves that a 
specialised commercial tribunal or a section solely for the hearing of 
commercial cases is in place, a score of 1.5 is dispensed.343  
 
From the above analysis we can infer the following: i) that recipient 
jurisdictions are willing to adopt the policies suggested by donors; ii) that 
recipients make big efforts to accomplish the advocated policies; iii) that 
the imposed policies or programmes such as “Doing Business” remain 
debatable mainly because of the lack of empirical evidence proving their 
benefits; and iv) that one-size-fits-all transplants are still prevalent. In this 
sense, the possibility that the creation and institutional setting of the 
competition tribunal in Mexico has been the result of a transplant will 
provide a good opportunity to analyse how the transplantation has been 
carried out and to evaluate the reasons for its success or failure. 
 
2.4.3. THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK (ICN)  
 
The ICN was launched in October 2001, with a mission to adopt superior 
standards and procedures in competition policy around the world by 
providing scenarios where the competition authorities discuss practical 
	
342 World Bank <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2016> accessed 
14 March 2016 
343 Ibid.  
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competition concerns, address them, and reach consensus on 
recommendations or best practices.344  
 
In 2003, during the ICN annual conference, a report was provided in 
which one of the issues identified as a hurdle to implement competition 
law in developing countries was the judiciary. As a result, a project was 
designed to analyse the relationship between competition authorities and 
the judiciary; the Competition Policy Implementation Working Group: 
Sub group 3 was delegated to lead the project. A report was presented in 
April 2006 whose conclusions were taken mainly from a survey of 18 
competition authorities around the world. The main findings of the report 
were that one of the reasons why injunctions are granted is because 
judges are not sufficiently familiar with economic concepts.345 
 
Also, it was indicated that the most common reason as to why decisions 
are overturned is the divergences between the competition authorities and 
the judiciary when interpreting the competition rules. A constant concern 
among the 18 was the lack of economic knowledge amid the judiciary, 
which was stronger in developing countries. In that sense, the 
recommendation given by the ICN was to bring judges closer to the 
technical analysis made by the competition authorities, and to improve 
their mutual understanding.346  
 
The project had a second phase, which reported during the 6th ICN 
annual conference in Moscow in 2007.347 The purpose of this second 
phase was to improve the scope and quality of the interaction between 
	
344 <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/member-directory.aspx> accessed 15 
March 2016 
345 ICN (n 261) 
346 Ibid. 16 
347 Ibid. 1, 2, 17 
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competition agencies and the judiciary using the data and findings 
collected during the first phase and condensed in the report presented in 
2006. This drew on the experiences of seven competition authorities. 
 
One of the main findings was that the lack of economic knowledge 
among the judges remains as a strong concern among developing 
countries. At the same time, Brazil reported that the training provided by 
the competition authority to judges was not effective. Based on the 
findings, one of the conclusions of the report was that the initiative to 
train judges should come from developing countries, and that regardless 
of the existence of specialised tribunals or the institutional setting, the 
keys to success rest on the interaction between the competition authorities 
and the judiciary.348  
  
In June 2011, the ICN started a project working with tribunals and 
judges, after considering how vital the review process is. One of the goals 
of the project was to examine the issues of cooperation and identify 
realistic ways in which agencies can improve their cooperation with the 
judiciary, by, for instance, giving some tips to the competition authorities 
about how to make their decisions easier to understand, particularly to 
non-specialised judges.349  
 
Finally, the Advocacy Working Group during the 14th ICN annual 
conference in Sydney in 2015 offered a report about the competition 
culture project. The report began by referencing a report prepared by the 
Advocacy Group in 2002, which showed that competition culture was 
	
348 Ibid. 17, 19 
349 ICN, ‘Project on Working with Courts and Judges’ (2011) 1, 2, 3 
<https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc796.pdf> accessed 20 March 
2016 
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seen as weaker where tribunals were inexperienced with competition 
matters and strong where there were specialist competition tribunals. In 
relation to the judiciary, the report stated that poor understanding of 
competition law leads to incorrect decisions and that when parties 
intentionally use complicated economic evidence, judges do not feel 
confident and are then hesitant to dismiss appeals. The report also 
indicated that specialist tribunals are perceived as better placed to deal 
with competition law and economics, as well as to be an instrument that 
may improve the competition culture among judges.350   
 
The work that the ICN has undertaken to improve the interaction between 
the judiciary and the competition agencies is valuable. At the same time, 
even if there is no evidence that the adoption of specialised tribunals in 
competition cases has been recommended by the ICN as an organisation, 
its reports and surveys have contributed to demonstrate that competition 
agencies in developing countries perceive the lack of competition 
knowledge and economics amid the judiciary as a hurdle. Courts are 
perceived as an obstacle because they have wrongly granted injunctions 
or wrongly (and often) overturned the decisions made by the competition 
authorities. This circumstance explains why under the presumption that 
specialists have a good understanding of competition rules and economic 
principles, competition authorities consider that specialisation may 
mitigate such a hurdle by lowering the number of decisions wrongly 
overturned or injunctions wrongly granted. 
 
 
	
350 A survey was undertaken to examine the conclusions of the report. A total of 49 competition 
agencies took part in it. Regarding the existence of specialist judges or specialist courts for competition 
cases, 25 countries indicated that they have this type of judiciary and all of them reported that they 
believed that specialist tribunals improve the speed and the quality of judicial decision in competition 
cases. ICN (n 260) 3, 4, 14, 15. 
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2.4.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It is evident that international organisations such as the OECD, World 
Bank and the ICN have made efforts to both analyse and give 
recommendations to improve the judiciary system. In relation to 
specialised judges in competition law, the recommendations given by the 
OECD to developing countries in Latin America have been clear and 
regular.  
 
We have observed that competition agencies in developing countries feel 
that specialised tribunals improve the speed and quality of the judicial 
review process, and therefore outcomes of this research could be used as 
a benchmark and framework by Latin American countries facing 
implementation issues derived from the judiciary being an obstacle.  
 
2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis presented in Section 2.1 outlined the uncertainty 
surrounding the benefits and drawbacks of specialised tribunals, namely 
efficiency, quality, uniformity and loss of independence, mainly because 
of the insufficiency of conclusive studies. At the same time, it described 
the existing disparity among scholars regarding the advisability of this 
type of judiciary, which has been reinforced by the scarcity of empirical 
evidence. 
 
Section 2.2 concluded that, according to Legomsky’s theoretical 
framework, specialisation is appropriate in competition law considering 
that this discipline is characterised by speed, dynamism and room for 
discretion. In relation to the complexity factor, this section advanced the 
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topic by establishing that among scholars the matters is still debatable. It 
has been seen that some scholars and competition agencies consider that 
the complexity of the field mainly derives from the predominant use of 
economics, a circumstance that worsens the performance of the judiciary 
due to a lack of knowledge, and which has been translated into a 
preference to solve antitrust cases based on procedural issues.  
 
Regarding the appropriateness of adopting specialised competition 
tribunals in developing countries, Section 2.3 exposed how disputable the 
topic is. The divergence resides in the claim that it would be prudent for 
developing countries to invest their scarce resources in combating 
unequivocal anticompetitive conducts such as cartels, which have a 
bigger impact on their citizens, and avoiding the investigation of complex 
and expensive behaviours. Conversely, the argument is that specialised 
competition tribunals are necessary in developing countries to help 
establish their new regimes, to strengthen a culture of competition, and to 
make these regimes more enforceable.  
 
In relation to international organisations, Section 2.4 has revealed that 
such organisations have influenced the adoption of this type of judiciary, 
either by giving specific recommendations or by allowing spaces where 
competition authorities express their concerns and thoughts about this 
topic. Section 2.4 has also underlined that developing countries are 
willing to adopt the recommendations given by these international 
organisations, especially when there is a donor–recipient relationship. 
The next chapter will focus on the specific conditions of Mexico. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Mexico: markets, judiciary, and competition regime  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis reviewed the theoretical framework of 
“transplants of institutions”, aiming to explore whether the adoption of 
specialised competition tribunals in Latin American countries is advisable 
using Mexico as a case study. It revealed the complexity of such a 
phenomenon, and the importance of having a good understanding of it. 
Chapter 1 also focused on the commonalities among Latin American 
countries, setting the scene for further deliberation about the 
appropriateness of Mexico as a case study, and the suitability of 
mirroring the introduction of such an institutional reform.   
 
Chapter 2 progressed the analysis by focusing on the scarcity of empirical 
evidence about the benefits and drawbacks of specialised tribunals, as 
well as by outlining the theoretical insights into the necessity of 
specialised tribunals in competition law, specifically in developing 
countries. In light of the groundwork presented in Chapters 1 and 2, we 
now turn to the empirical component of this research and explore Mexico 
as a case study.  
 
The purposes of this chapter are first to explore why Mexico is a 
comprehensive case by analysing in detail certain aspects that are also 
experienced by some other Latin American countries, and which imply 
that the findings of this research project could be applicable to them; 
second to understand the reasons why a specialised competition tribunal 
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was adopted in Mexico, and third to provide sufficient background to 
assess more accurately the performance of such a tribunal.  
 
This chapter therefore highlights the most important domestic legal and 
economic conditions that make of Mexico a representative example for 
other Latin American countries considering the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal. It also evaluates the functioning of the judiciary, a 
branch depicted as inefficient, untrustworthy, and incapable of dealing 
with an excessive volume of cases, and explains why a specialised 
competition tribunal was in a position to address such problems. And 
finally, seeking to set the context and highlight why the adoption of such 
an institution was imperative, it presents the trajectory of the Mexican 
competition regime, discusses the obstacles to its implementation, and 
gives a brief overview of the process that led to the adoption of this 
tribunal.  
 
With a view to demonstrating why such institutional reform was required 
in Mexico, the structure of this chapter starts with a macro-level analysis 
which offers a historical overview of the Mexican markets in an attempt 
to visualise how challenging these markets are, and to show how the 
dominance of the executive and its involvement in the functioning of the 
markets impeded the development of competition principles. It is argued 
herein that the adoption of a specialised court would progressively aid in 
the development of such principles through effectively controlling the 
decisions adopted by nascent administrative agencies entrusted with 
strong powers, and improving the competition culture by providing 
judicial review decisions that gave the public a sense that the rules 
affecting market transactions were being applied efficiently and 
transparently.  
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Departing from the complex network of relations in the application of 
competition principles between competition agencies and the courts, the 
focus then moves to the judiciary. Given the interplay between agencies 
and courts, the argument is that judicial review may affect the 
effectiveness of the agencies if their decisions are wrongly overturned or 
if the decisions are not consistent; and deterrence goals are negatively 
impacted if sanctions are diminished without justification.351  
 
In this sense, the analysis focuses on the Mexican judiciary, starting with 
a description of its structure, examining the different selection processes 
used to choose its members, and exploring the severe challenges that the 
judiciary faces such as lack of independence, corruption, and workload. 
The purpose of this analysis is to show how the judiciary in Mexico 
interfered with enforcement activities, and how challenging it was for a 
generalist judge in Mexico to deal appropriately with antitrust cases.  
 
The next goal is to explore at a micro-level the circumstances that 
surrounded the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal. This 
narrow analysis aims to offer a comprehensive view to better understand 
the introduction of such institutional reform. This analysis begins by 
examining the development of the competition law regime in Mexico, 
and the development of its competition authorities. Then, it explores the 
features of the old review process of antitrust cases, and its challenges. 
Next it moves on to investigate the initiative of adopting a specialised 
competition tribunal, and the debates that such an initiative generated 
inside the parliament. Finally, it describes the design of the specialised 
	
351 Ioannis Lianos, Frederic Jenny, Florian Wagner von Papp, Evgenia Motchenkova, and Eric David, 
‘Judicial Scrutiny of Financial Penalties in Competition Law: A Comparative Perspective’ (2014) 
CLES Research paper series 4, UCL Faculty of Laws: London, 10	
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competition tribunal, and concludes by giving an overview of the new 
review process under the institutional reform.  
 
This micro-level analysis suggests that the judiciary in Mexico was an 
impediment in the implementation of competition law. The fact that 
almost every intermediate and final decision made by the competition 
authority was challenged using an amparo action (see Section 3.2.2 for an 
explanation of this term), that almost all the challenged actions were 
suspended, that the majority of the judicial decisions were grounded on 
procedural failures, and that the competition authority had to conform 
their decisions to the judicial verdicts, contradictory in some cases, turned 
the competition authority into a weak body, and the competition law into 
an ineffective statute.  
 
At the same time, the analysis highlights the lack of scrutiny of such 
institutional reform inside the Mexican parliament, outlines the 
importance of having constitutionally reformed the review process of 
antitrust cases, and the description of the institutional design, and offers a 
perspective on the advantages and shortcomings of this specialised 
tribunal, which will inform its assessment.  
 
The present chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 explores the 
most important events in the history of the Mexican markets related to the 
scope of this research. Section 3.2 covers aspects related to the judiciary 
‒ such as structure, selection process, the amparo action ‒ and examines 
the main problems that the judiciary in Mexico experiences. Section 3.3 
studies the Mexican competition regime. Section 3.3 has two sub-
sections. The first studies the competition law regime in Mexico and its 
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development. The second examines the development of the competition 
authorities in Mexico.  
 
Section 3.4 presents the obstacles that impeded the implementation of 
competition law in Mexico, and ascertains the reasons why a new review 
process under a specialised competition tribunal was sought as a solution. 
Section 3.4 adopts the following structure: a) overuse of amparo actions, 
b) the tax court that became another review instance; c) confirmation of 
fines; d) quality of the review decisions. It examines why a specialised 
competition tribunal was created, how the specialised competition 
tribunal was designed, and presents an overview of the review process 
before the specialised competition tribunal. Concluding remarks are 
provided at the end of every section. 
 
3.1. THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 
THAT SHAPED THE MEXICAN MARKETS 
 
As Douglass C. North has asserted: “history matters”.352 Considering that 
the main purpose of this research project is to assess the performance of 
the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, such evaluation will not 
be accurate without an overview of the evolution of Mexican economic 
policies. For this reason, this first section broadly explores the 
background required to understand the reasons that provoked the slow 
development of the competition regime in Mexico, the low levels of 
enforcement, the difficulties that made necessary the adoption of a 
specialised competition tribunal, and the significance of having adopted 
such an institutional reform.  
 
	
352 North (n 23) 100–104 
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An understanding of the historical background also sheds light on the 
nature of the hurdle, in this case, the conflict between the goals of 
governments and competition principles. Such analysis also helps to 
determine the magnitude of the issue ‒ this is a judiciary subordinated to 
the executive, overloaded, unreliable and untrained in competition law. 
This brief overview also explains why a specialised competition tribunal 
was required in Mexico, and offers other Latin American countries 
afflicted by the same issues the opportunity to learn from the Mexican 
experience and to use it to try to remedy them.  
 
In particular, this section highlights key historical events that impacted 
the development of the Mexican markets. First, the “Porfiriato”, when 
Mexico joined the international markets, developed its infrastructures, but 
also increased its levels of inequality. Second, the “Revolution of 1910”, 
when Mexico closed its borders, adopted an import substitution model, 
and the government became the ruler of the markets. This market 
structure led to “the crisis of the 1980s”, as it was impossible to sustain 
the adopted import substitution model.  
 
The 1980s crisis was followed by the “globalisation” era, when Mexico 
opened its borders, joined the international markets, privatised an 
significant number of governmental enterprises, and where the 
government played a less important role. This open market structure was 
envisaged as a way to overcome the crisis of the 1980s, but as Mexico 
was not prepared to compete at an international level in a global market, 
linked with an unprecedented and poorly analysed privatisation process, 
another crisis arose in 1994 (“the 1944 crisis”). 
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At none of these stages was the implementation of the Mexican 
competition regime a substantial part of the governmental programmes. 
On the contrary, the encouragement and protection given by the 
government to monopolised enterprises was predominant. Also, the role 
played by the government in controlling prices and barriers was seen as 
normal. It is only when Mexico joins NAFTA that the globalisation 
process starts and Mexico is compelled to adopt a competition regime. 
Until this moment, the lack of competition culture was evident, as was 
the lack of government interest in maximising the efficiency of 
competition principles. Next, each stage is examined in turn. 
 
a. The “Porfiriato” 
 
In 1876 General Porfirio Díaz came to power. His ideal was to protect the 
country’s few rich people, expecting that their progress would impact 
positively on everyone.353 The Porfiriato provided Mexico’s first and 
longest period of economic development and reinserted it into the 
international market. During his governance a law regime gave certainty 
to investors,354 and strengthened infrastructures.355 There was economic 
development during this time, but it did not reach everyone,356 and this 
circumstance led to the Revolution of 1910.357 
 
	
353 Arnaldo Cordova, La ideología de la Revolución Mexicana. La Formación del Nuevo Régimen 
(Ediciones Era S A de C V 1973) 16–18 
354 During this period the Civil, Criminal, and Commerce statutes were created. See Luis Rubio and 
others, A la Puerta de la Ley. El Estado de Derecho en México (1st edn Cal y Arena 1994) 166.  
355 Rolando Cordera and Leonardo Lomeli, La Modernización de la Economía Política Mexicana: Las 
Aventuras de la Globalización Neoliberal (UNAM 2009) 7, 8 
356 Ibid. 
357 Maria del Refugio Gonzalez explains how the exclusion of a significant number of the population 
from the “National Project”; the extended power of the Executive; the development of the economy 
benefiting just the small wealthy groups; and the sacrifice of the individual rights in favour of the 
progress, were the elements that inspired the revolution. See Maria del Refugio González, ‘Las 
transiciones jurídicas en México del Siglo XIX a la revolución’ in Transiciones y diseños 
institucionales (UNAM 2000) 127–128. 
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b. The Revolution of 1910 
 
Although in 1910 there was a revolution, there was no consensus within it 
about the reforms that were needed, where the needs of the industry were 
strengthened and those of farmers forgotten.358 At the same time, Mexico 
was feeling threatened by the big economies, particularly the US, and for 
that reason a protectionism period started where a model of import 
substitution was pursued. Thus, Mexico became centralised, and a 
significant process of nationalisation and expropriation was initiated.359  
 
During this protectionism period, Mexico closed its borders, and 
government played a very active role in the economy by controlling 
prices,360 controlling distribution, exempting local business from paying 
taxes, or subsidising them.361 This over-protection created markets where 
it was not necessary to compete, with the result that at an international 
level Mexican industry was unable to participate.362  
 
The level of intervention included the use of resources to buy local 
industries near to bankruptcy, the funds for which were taken from the 
profits left by the oil market. But once the price of the oil fell, the period 
of the Mexican Miracle came to an end leaving Mexico confronted with 
the crisis of the 1980s.363 Until then, it had been almost impossible to 
	
358 Cordera (n 355) 9; Jazmin Monroy, ‘Plan Puebla-Panamá como estrategia ante el atraso en el 
sureste Mexicano’ (Thesis, Universidad de las Américas Puebla 2003) 2 
359 Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, ‘Mexico’s Decades of Statist Economy Policy’ (1995) 44 Depaul Law 
Review, 1151 
360 In 1950 a law was enacted concerning the attributions of the Executive, according to which the 
government was allowed to fix the prices of an important range of goods and services. 
361 Francisco Gil and Arturo Fernández, El Efecto de la regulación en algunos sectores de la economía 
Mexicana. Capítulo 3. La regulación y la política de competencia (ITAM 1991) 3; Cristina Puga and 
David Torres, México La Modernización Contradictoria (1st edn Editorial Alhambra Mexicana 1995) 
24–25 
362 Cordera and Lomeli (n 355) 3‒5; Puga and Torres (n 361) 27–28 
363 Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1154; Puga and Torres (n 361) 30‒31 
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envisage the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal, but some new 
circumstances were about to shape a transformation process, as the next 
part shows. 
 
c. The crisis of the 1980s 
 
Since the 1970s the Mexican economy had been in slump, and therefore 
some small measures were taken to remedy this, such as a reduction of 
the amount spent on protecting local business, and some timid attempts to 
open the market.364 Nonetheless, such measures were insufficient, and the 
devastating effects of this economic protectionism were seen in 1982, 
when the country could not depend on oil revenues anymore and 
officially had to declare its inability to pay its external debt for three 
months.365 Mexico had to leave the exchange market366 and face its 
toughest economic depression, characterised by uncontrollable inflation, 
capital flight, and uncontainable foreign debt.367 
 
The main goal of the government was to pay the foreign debt, offering 
citizens two years of severe adjustment, two years of macroeconomic 
stability, and finally two years of speedy development.368 However, 
Mexico only went through the first stage of the plan.369 A new policy was 
then required to stimulate the economy. Mexico moved from an import 
	
364 Sergio López-Ayllón and Héctor Fix-Fierro, Tan Cerca, Tan Lejos! Estado de Derecho y Cambio 
Jurídico en México (1970‒1999) (UNAM 2000) 509 
365 Rolando Cordera and Leonardo Lomelí, ‘El papel de las ideas en el cambio estructural en México 
(1982‒2005): un balance preliminar’ (2006) XXIX Economía 57‒58, 197; Gustavo Vega, ‘La Política 
Comercial de México en el Sexenio 1994‒2000: Crisis Financiera y Recuperación Económica’ en 
Entre la Globalización y la Dependencia (1st edn Tecnológico de Monterrey 2002) 103  
366 Cordera and Lomeli (n 355) 14 
367 Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1154 
368 This programme was named “PIRE” (Immediate Program of Economic Reorganisation), shaped by 
the conditions that the FMI imposed to renegotiate the foreign debt, such as bureaucratic cuts, gradual 
reprivatisation of the banks, and the reduction of public spending among others. See Monroy (n 358) 7; 
Puga and Torres (n 361) 32–33. 
369 Cordera and Lomeli (n 365) 199. 
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substitution to a free market model, where a process of privatisation of 
enterprises owned by the government and the deregulation of the market 
was imposed. Statistically, Mexico in a period of eight years divested 
almost 900 of the 1,155 entities owned by the government, reduced the 
import fees by almost eliminating the authorisation to import, and signed 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).370 This change 
shows how the Mexican government progressively contemplated a 
different approach towards competition principles.  
 
d. Globalisation 
 
During the 1980s the most advanced global ideology took place across 
the world. It was known as the “Washington Consensus”.371 This 
ideology was grounded, among other things, on premises such as external 
investment, openness, privatisation and liberal economic policies.372 In 
Mexico, the privatisation process was adopted by President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari with a “strange sense of ownership”,373 translated into 
the enactment of a foreign investment law which allowed overseas 
companies to acquire 100% ownership of Mexican companies,374 as well 
as a national economic plan aimed at enhancing the role of the private 
	
370 Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1154‒1155; Cordera and Lomeli (n 365) 204 
371 The Washington consensus was the result of the core views of the US congress, senior members of 
the US administration, senior members of the international financial institutions, members of the 
economic agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and the think-tanks. See J Williamson, ‘The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin 
America, Policy Analysis in International Economics’ (1990) 28 Institute for International Economics, 
9.  
372 Burki Javed and Guillermo Perry, ‘Mas allá del consenso de Washington. La Hora de la Reforma 
Institucional’ (1998) Washington ‒ Banco Mundial, 8 
373 Cordera and Lomeli (n 355) 2; Cordera and Lomeli (n 365) 207 
374 Foreign Investment Law (Ley de Inversión Extranjera), D. O., Dec., 27, 1993 
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sector.375 Hence, economic areas that were the province of the public 
sector were transferred for the first time to the private.376  
 
The globalisation era brought devastating consequences to the Latin 
American countries, and Mexico was not the exception.377 In terms of 
investment, the private sector did not occupy the place left by the public 
sector either. Mexico became dependent on commodity exports; its 
exports increased378 as well as its levels of poverty379 and inequality.380 
This globalisation era was a cornerstone step towards free markets, with 
less intervention from the Mexican government. At the same time, such 
change seems to have been overwhelmingly responsible for the situation 
that led to the next crisis.  
 
e. The 1994 crisis 
 
The 1994 crisis was a combination of different factors. One was the 
signing in November 1993 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) by the governments of the United States, Mexico and Canada. 
	
375 National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1989‒1994), D. O. May 31, 1989  
376 By 1993 just 213 enterprises were owned by the government compared to the 1,155 owned in 1982. 
See Monroy (n 358) 11. The magnitude of the privatisation process was so significant during the 
presidency of Salinas that the New York Times reported it as ‘The Overselling of Carlos Salinas’ (New 
York Times, 24 February 1996, 20). 
377 Some authors have referred to this globalisation era in Latin America as “The Lost Decade” or 
“The Perfect Crime”. See William Robinson, ‘Global Crisis and Latin America’ (2004) 23 Bulletin of 
Latin American Research 2, 137, 138; James Galbraith, A Perfect Crime: Global Inequality (Daedalus 
Cambridge 2002) 25. 
378 In Mexico the levels of exports increased from $3 billion in 1975 to $34.5 billion in 1994. In 
particular, the vehicle industry has become an important export sector. Aaron Tornell and Gerardo 
Esquivel, ‘The Political Economy of Mexico’s Entry into NAFTA’ (1997) 6 University of Chicago 
Press, 31, 36. 
379 The percentage of population in Mexico in 1998 living below $2 Per Day (Poverty) increased by 
40%, and $1 Per Day (Indigence) increased by 14.9%. See World Bank, ‘World Development 
Indicators’ (1998) Washington D. C., table 2. 7. 
380 The richest 10% of the urban population in Mexico increased its share of income from 26% to 34% 
(1984‒1996). Statistics given by the ECLAC, ‘Social Panorama of Latin America’ (1998) Santiago, 
Chile, United Nations, table II.1, 64. 
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NAFTA’s focus was on financial liberalisation,381 which created great 
expectations among investors, representing for Mexico an increase of 
external credit inflows from $193 million in 1988 to $23.2 billion in 
1993.382 The recently privatised banks in Mexico used this capital 
primarily to confer consumer credit and mortgage loans, with a consumer 
credit increase of 457.7% between 1987 and 1994, and of 966.4% on 
mortgage loans during the same period.383 
 
Two more elements triggered the crisis: the decision made by the 
Mexican government to keep a semi-fixed exchange rate,384 and increased 
US interest rates. These two economic policies, combined with 
unregulated banks conferring venturous and numerous credits, and the 
army insurrection in Chiapas following the assassination of the Secretary 
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) ‒ the party that had ruled 
for more than 70 years ‒ created serious concerns among the investors 
who finally left the market.385 Mexico then faced one of the worst 
financial crises in its history.386 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, and given the typical development of the 
markets through history, two important things could be highlighted. 
Firstly, it is remarkable that Mexico ended up adopting a specialised 
	
381 Robin Broad, ‘The Washington Consensus Meets the Global Backlash: Shifting Debates and 
Policies’ (2004) 1 American University, Washington D. C. 2, 133, 138 
382 Gil and Fernandez (n 361) 307 
383 Roberto Orro, ‘La Crisis Financiera en México: Lecciones Para Cuba’ (1998) 8 Cuba in Transition, 
Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 307 
384 The goal of the policy was to control inflation by pegging the peso to the dollar, and to offer 
credibility to investors and citizens. The measure apparently succeeded, when in September 1994 
Mexico achieved an inflation of 6.7% after showing a peak of 180% in February 1988. But this short-
term control relief was unsustainable and at some point the peso was allowed to float resulting in high 
exchange and interest rates, as James Meigs has explained, ‘Mexico Monetary Lessons’ (1997) 17 Cato 
Journal 1, 38, 66, 67.  
385 William Lovett, ‘Lessons from the Recent Peso Crisis in Mexico’ (1996) 4 Tulane J. of 
International and Comparative Law, 153; Puga and Torres (n 361) 40–41 
386 Gil and Fernandez (n 361) 311–312 
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competition tribunal after going through decades of governmental 
policies which disregarded competition principles. This suggests that any 
other Latin American country with a similar background could also made 
important efforts in an attempt to embrace competition as Mexico did. 
Secondly, as explored in Chapter 1, the introduction of reforms or 
policies should be a thorough and progressive process where local needs 
must be carefully scrutinised and implemented, including the lessons 
provided by this research project, to avoid the levels of rejection shown 
earlier. 
 
3.1.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The events described in Section 3.1 had a significant impact on the 
delineation and functioning of the Mexican markets. First, the geographic 
closeness with the US has in some periods has generated an incentive to 
strengthen the trade between them, as it was the case during the 
Porfiriato or the globalisation era, and in others has constituted a threat 
resulting in closed markets, as was the case during protectionism. 
 
Second, the rule of the PRI for more than six decades has signified for 
this party a concentration of power in the hands of the president who 
represents it, with subsequent wide market control. Third, the active role 
that the government has played in the Mexican economy, derived mainly 
from the concentration of power in the hands of the executive branch, has 
meant a high state involvement in the economy via the control of prices, 
subsidising local business, nationalising and privatising enterprises, as 
well as regulating or deregulating markets. Such involvement represented 
a poor advancement of the Mexican competition regime because the 
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goals of the government were not aligned with the objectives of 
competition policy.   
 
Fourth, the adoption of policies without considering the specific needs 
and conditions of the Mexican markets, as was the case in the 
globalisation era with measures such as privatisation of entities, trade 
liberalisation or financial liberalisation, resulted in socio-economic crises 
whose effects have been difficult to reverse. Fifth, the implementation of 
economic policies to alleviate the immediate effects of the different crises 
that for decades Mexico has faced has not been consistent or thought 
through in the long-term. 
 
The combination of all these factors reveals a government unwilling to 
maximise the efficiency of competition policy, and face the challenges 
that the Mexican markets offer. At this point in Mexico’s history, it was 
difficult to envisage significant reforms to enhance the competition 
regime, such as the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal, and yet 
it happened; therefore, this example could be used as a benchmark by 
some other Latin American countries willing to make efforts in the same 
direction. Section 3.2 explores how the judiciary in Mexico is structured, 
and how it operates, with a view to providing the necessary background 
for an appreciation of the impact of having adopted a specialised 
competition tribunal, and to comprehensively assess its performance. 
 
3.2.  THE MEXICAN JUDICIARY  
 
The first goal of this section is to present the structure of the judiciary in 
Mexico, and the functions that are assumed by this branch. The general 
presentation of the structure of the judiciary facilitates the development 
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of further analysis about the obstacles that the judiciary in Mexico faces, 
and why the creation of a specialised competition tribunal was considered 
as a suitable reform to overcome some of them.  
 
The second goal is to examine the selection process to designate the 
members of the tribunals and the judges, and the trajectory of the judicial 
career in Mexico. The examination of these factors highlights the 
transition that the Mexican judicial career experienced, starting with a 
tutorial model (1917‒1982) before moving to a more cooperative model 
(1983‒1994) and finally a more meritorious model (1994‒present).  
 
In the tutorial model new judges or magistrates were selected by the 
Magistrates of the Supreme Court, working closely for them, and learning 
from them. This tutorial model has been criticised for on some occasions 
allowing the perpetuation of a closed mentality among the members of 
the judiciary. 
 
Then a cooperative model took place when a high number of vacancies 
had to be fulfilled. The main distinction from the tutorial model was that 
the Magistrates of the Supreme Court exchanged their votes to support 
their own candidates.  Finally, in 1994 the Federal Judicature Council 
(Consejo de la Judicatura Federal – hereinafter CJF) was created to 
administer the career of the members of the judiciary through a more 
detailed meritorious process. 
 
The examination of the development of the judicial career establishes that 
the different training models had benefits and shortfalls. The fact that 
under the tutorial and cooperative models learners had to shadow and 
copy their mentors meant that important skills and vast areas of 
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knowledge were passed from generation to generation, and this represents 
an important benefit. Nonetheless, features such as closed minds or 
unwillingness to assume new challenges were eventually passed on too, 
and this has been identified as a major shortfall. 
 
Given that the competition regime was a novelty in Mexico, and 
considering that amid the judiciary knowledge was passed from 
generation to generation, the value of discussing the selection process is 
to provoke some inferences about a possible resistance to acquire 
knowledge from sources other than the mentor. Additionally, it helps 
appreciate why this situation perhaps reinforced a lack of competition 
culture within the judiciary, which, in turn, could have impacted the 
quality of the review decisions.  
 
The above analysis fits within the narrative of this thesis in its attempt to 
identify the nature of the issues and their magnitude, and to explain why 
the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal was necessary. Section 
3.2.1 offers a specific analysis about the selection process of the members 
of the Mexican specialised competition tribunal.  
 
The third goal of this section is to explore the main problems that the 
Mexican judiciary experiences, particularly, the dominance of the 
executive branch, which has diminished the independence of the 
judiciary. This dominance has also been reflected in the legislative 
branch, by the constant creation or reform of the Constitution and the 
laws at its convenience, making it difficult for judges to apply the law, 
which on some occasions has been contradictory or difficult to track.  
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Corruption has also affected the credibility of the judiciary. Finally, the 
heavy workload has compromised the quality of the decisions. The aim of 
presenting these issues is to offer a background that helps to understand 
why the review process of antitrust cases might not have been an easy 
task for the judiciary. Section 3.3 advances the analysis of how the 
adoption of a specialised competition tribunal was envisaged to tackle 
such issues. 
 
3.2.1. STRUCTURE 
 
According to Chapter IV of the Constitución Política de los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, hereafter the Constitution, the judiciary or Poder 
Judicial de la Federación is responsible for preserving the supremacy of 
the Constitution over the rest of the legal system. Different actions have 
been created for this purpose, such as the unconstitutional action, the 
constitutional controversies action, the amparo action, and the 
jurisdictional controversies in electoral matters.387 
 
The judiciary is also responsible for solving controversies between 
private parties, or between private parties and the federal authorities; for 
solving controversies created by acts or laws that violate individual 
rights; for protecting persons against the abuse of the authorities; and for 
solving competence conflicts among the executive, the legislative, and 
the judiciary powers. 
 
The judiciary or Poder Judicial de la Federación is composed as 
follows:388  
	
387 See articles 105, 103, 107, 97, 99 of the Constitution, respectively 
388 See article 94 of the Constitution 
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‒ Supreme Court: seven members	
‒ Electoral Tribunal: seven members	
‒ Unitary Tribunals: one member per tribunal	
‒ Collegiate Circuit Courts: three members per court	
‒ District Judges: one judge	
‒ Federal Judicature Council (CJF): administrates the career of the 
members of the judicial federation power, excluding the Supreme 
Court and the electoral tribunal	
 
The next part of this section studies the designation of the collective 
circuit tribunals and the district judges. It also examines the methods that 
have been used to select them, and how this selection has impacted the 
performance of the judiciary in Mexico. 
 
a. Selection process 
 
For many decades, the designation and promotion of judges and members 
of tribunals in Mexico was the responsibility of the plenary of the 
Supreme Court.389 Different rules have been applied since the 
Constitution of 1917, during which tenure has varied from four to six 
years, or been for indefinite periods. The rules have also allowed the 
demotion of judges by the President of the Republic under different 
procedures, until in 1982 the referred-to faculty was abolished.390  
 
It was in 1994 that a judicial career was formally established in Mexico 
with the creation of the CJF. Until then, two models of selection process 
	
389 See article 97 of the Constitution, and the organic law of 2nd November 1917  
390 Jose Cossio, ‘Jurisdicción Federal y Carrera Judicial en México’ in Cuadernos Para La Reforma de 
la Justicia 4 (UNAM 1996) 46 
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were used: i) the “tutorial model” from 1917 to 1982, and, ii) the 
“cooperative model”, from 1983 to 1994. Under the tutorial model, the 
respective member of the Supreme Court proposed a candidate, who 
worked closely for them, usually as a secretary. The time during which 
the candidate and the minister worked together was seen as a training 
process, where the minister became a tutor. For that reason this model is 
known as “tutorial”.391 
 
In 1983 the tutorial model had to be replaced due to the significant 
number of judicial places that were created that year, a trend that 
continued until the 2000s. It has been indicated that on average 35 new 
places were occupied per year. The cooperative model consisted of every 
minister of the Supreme Court having a candidate, by which alliances 
among the rest of the plenary were necessary to make the candidacies 
successful. This selection process based on an interchange of votes was 
known as the “cooperative” model.392 
 
The significant number of new judicial places to be occupied forced the 
consideration of a proper career system. It has been indicated that 
between the 1980s and the 2000s around 1,700 places were created, 
exceeding the number of places created between 1825, the year when the 
judiciary system was established, and 1983.393 Thus, in December 1994 
the CJF was created.394 The objective of the legislator when creating the 
above-mentioned body was to ensure a judicial career based on five 
principles: excellence, objectivity, impartiality, professionalism, and 
	
391 Ibid. 52, 53 
392 Ibid. 61, 63 
393 Julio Bustillos, ‘Los Jueces Federales en México: antes y después de la carrera judicial’ (2010) 
Revista del Instituto de la Judicatura Federal, 35 
394 Article 100 of the Constitution was modified. See Diario Oficial de la Federación 31 December 
1994 
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independence. At the same time, the function of administering, 
invigilating and disciplining the judiciary was referred to the new 
body,395 with the aim of allowing the members of the Supreme Court to 
focus purely on making judicial decisions. 
 
The process to select the magisters can be closed or open, and to select 
the judges it is open. When the CJF announces publicly in the newspapers 
that a selection process is open, those interested take a knowledge exam. 
The participants with the best scores are interviewed, and after analysing 
the outcomes of the interviews, together with the candidates’ respective 
publications, legal career, and professional accomplishments, the best 
profiles are selected to perform as judges.396  
 
The creation of the CJF has been received with optimism among scholars, 
as its creation has aimed to mitigate part of the problems that the 
judiciary faces. So far, an improvement has been seen in terms of the 
selection process of the members of the judiciary, as a meritorious 
process has replaced the old-fashioned tutorial and cooperative models. 
The next part studies the amparo action. This is a particular legal tool in 
Mexico, which needs to be understood as its use has negatively impacted 
the performance of the Mexican judiciary, particularly in terms of quality 
and efficiency, and has compromised the development of Mexican 
competition law. Such analysis also serves to understand why the 
adoption of a specialised competition tribunal was envisaged to try to 
remedy the above issues and why a constitutional reform was required to 
limit its use in antitrust cases to final decisions. 
	
395 Cipriano Gomez, Alberto Said and Valeriano Perez, Los Consejos de la Judicatura y la Carrera 
Judicial (Honduras: Graficentro Editores 1999) 57, 58 
396 Article 114 Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de la Federación. Diario Oficial de la Federación 26 
May 1995 
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3.2.2.  THE AMPARO ACTION  
 
The analysis of the amparo action fits within the narrative of this thesis 
because the judicial review of the decisions adopted by the Mexican 
competition authorities is initiated through this legal action. Section 3.4.1 
will describe the use of the amparo action in antitrust cases in more detail 
and highlight how the use of this legal tool negatively impacted the 
functioning of the Mexican competition authority and the judiciary, 
forcing the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal in Mexico. For 
now, this section presents a general description of the amparo action, 
which is necessary to appreciate the implications of its use, discussed 
later in the chapter. 
 
The amparo action is a legal tool proclaimed to safeguard constitutionally 
protected rights from arbitrary acts of government bodies or unfair laws 
in individual cases.397 Its origin was rooted in external and internal factors 
‒ externally, habeas corpus in the US, and the human rights declaration 
in France; internally, the desire to establish a constitutional defence 
aimed at preserving human rights.398 This defence limits the protection to 
the individual case in question, without creating future precedent or 
extending the effects of such a decision to other potential parties,399 and 
without a pronouncement about the unjust act or the unfair law.400  
 
	
397 Michael Taylor, ‘Why No Rule of Law in Mexico? Explaining the Weakness of Mexico’s Judicial 
Branch’ (1997) 27 New Mexico Law Review, 151 
398 Gonzalez (n 357) 111–112 
399 Taylor (n 397) 151  
400 This reform is known as “the Otero formula”, honouring Mariano Otero who inspired the scope of 
the amparo action, which is still applicable these days. See Gonzalez (n 357) 113. 
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Sections VIII and IX of Article 103 of the Constitution of 1917 
introduced an important reform to the amparo action by establishing two 
different categories of amparo action: i) direct; and ii) indirect. The direct 
amparo was decided by the Supreme Court in a single instance,401 and the 
indirect amparo was decided by district courts and subject to review by 
the Supreme Court.402 
 
In 1936 an amparo law was enacted, and reformed several times since 
then.403 This amparo law established two scenarios when the action is 
admissible: first, the amparo against laws that violate guarantees,404 and 
second, the amparo known as cassation consisting of a judicial review405 
in the hands of the Supreme Court and the newly created Collegiate 
Circuit Courts.406  
 
In terms of procedure, in both cases the complaint is presented in writing, 
to concrete cases, by petition of an individual.407 In direct amparo the 
complaint is presented to the responsible authority that sends it to the 
Collegiate Circuit Court.408 In indirect amparo the complaint is presented 
directly to the district courts.409  
 
In general, the stages in the trial of indirect amparo are: 1) the 
examination of admissibility of the plaintiff by the district court; 2) the 
	
401 Richard Baker, ‘Judicial Review in Mexico: A Study of the Amparo Suit’ (1971) Institute of Latin 
American Studies, University of Texas Press, 49 
402 Ibid 49–50, 224. An example of a case when the indirect amparo action is admissible could be the 
violation of a procedural law depriving the complainant of defence.  
403 The last reform has been introduced in April 2013, DOF 2 April 2013. 
404 Section I, article 103 of the 1917 Constitution, and section I, article 1 of the amparo Law 
405 Baker (n 401) 175–176 
406 Baker (n 401), 198. Article 34 of the Amparo Law of 2013 established that the collegial circuit 
tribunals have jurisdiction in direct amparo, while article 40 established that the Supreme Court would 
attract jurisdiction in direct amparo just in relevant cases. 
407 Amparo Law of 2013, articles 108 and 175, respectively. 
408 Amparo Law of 2013, articles 176, 177, 178 
409 Amparo Law of 2013, articles 112, 113 
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submission of preliminary answers by the responsible authorities; and, 3) 
a public hearing.410 The stages of the trial in direct amparo are: 1) the 
admissibility review by the Collegiate Circuit Court, or by the Supreme 
Court; 2) the assignation of the plaintiff to one of the members of the 
Court; and, 3) the presentation of the decision draft which will be 
considered and voted on by all members of the chamber.411 
 
The effects of the amparo decision are to re-establish the enjoyment of 
the impaired constitutional rights of the complainant, by which the 
judgment will refer solely to the terms of the plaintiff, without making 
any general pronouncements about the law or the act complained of.412 
The Supreme Court has also indicated that the amparo judgment cannot 
replace the decisions subject to review.413 
 
There have been a number of objections to the amparo action. First, the 
efficacy of the amparo action has been questioned mainly because of its 
limits. In terms of the most significant restrictions ascribed to the amparo 
action: i) it does not have general effects; ii) it does not declare that the 
violator, act or law is against the Constitution; iii) it does not provide 
erga omnes protection, as the judicial decision is limited to the particular 
case; and, iv) it does not create jurisprudence to be applied subsequently 
to everybody affected by the same constitutional violation.414 It has been 
claimed, also, that it has been difficult to satisfy the orders given by the 
	
410 Amparo Law of 2013, articles 112 - 124. If there is a suspension request the procedure changes 
slightly in both direct and indirect cases. 
411 Amparo Law of 2013, articles 179 - 191 
412 Baker (n 401) 238. 
413 Ibid 240. 
414 Juan Calleros, The Unfinished Transition to Democracy in Latin America (Routledge 2009) 143 
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judiciary under the amparo actions, partly because of the reluctance 
shown by the executive.415 
 
Second, the excess of amparo actions against judicial decisions 
constitutes another objection.416 It has been established that between 1940 
and 1990 there was a workload increase of 349%, moving from an 
average of 495 amparo actions per year to 1386 actions by the end of the 
period.417 The excess of amparo actions has had two main consequences. 
One, the quality of the decisions has been compromised, as the quantity 
of decisions has been prioritised in an attempt to handle the high volumes 
of cases. Two, the use of procedural reasons to dismiss the actions as a 
way to avoid a pronouncement about the substance of the matter ‒ known 
as sobreseimiento ‒ has been disproportionate.418  
 
This sobreseimiento is considered as a formal way to finish with a case. 
Thus, it is understandable that a judge with a high volume of cases 
decides to use this tool. As an example, in 1992 the percentage of cases 
finished with sobreseimiento was 77%. It has been observed that when 
there is an increase in the volume of cases, simultaneously there is an 
increase in the percentage of sobreseimiento decisions.419  
 
3.2.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The study of the amparo action shows that the aim of this legal tool ‒ to 
protect constitutional rights ‒ has been obscured by its ambiguous scope, 
	
415 Rubio (n 354) 61; Hector Fix, ‘Poder Judicial’ in Transiciones y Diseños Institucionales (UNAM 
2000) 182  
416 Fix (n 415) 178 
417 Ibid. 184 
418 Ibid. 181 
419 Ibid 184‒185; Rubio (n 354) 73 
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and abundant limitations. For the purpose of this research project, such 
analysis can be used to diagnose the causes that have provoked the 
existence of an inefficient judicial branch in Mexico. At the same time, it 
helps to appreciate how the excessive use of this legal tool has negatively 
impacted the quality of the judicial decisions, has promoted the culture 
amid the judiciary of using procedural issues to dispose of cases, and has 
encouraged practitioners to use it as a way of obtaining the suspension of 
complained acts or decisions, and to delay cases.  
 
The above issues serve as a background to understand why the adoption 
of a specialised competition tribunal was envisaged in Mexico to remedy 
them, and why a constitutional reform was required to limit the use of the 
amparo action in antitrust cases to the final decisions adopted by the 
Mexican competition authorities (see Section 3.4). The next part 
advances the analysis of the main problems faced by the Mexican 
judiciary. 
 
3.2.4. MAIN PROBLEMS FACED BY THE JUDICIARY IN MEXICO  
 
a. Lack of independence 
 
Mexico is an example of where the judiciary is subjugated to the 
executive. Therefore, the fact that a selection process to become a 
member of the judiciary is now meritorious (Section 3.2.1), combined 
with the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal whose members 
have fixed terms (Section 3.4.3), represents a move in the right direction 
by the Mexican government to gradually strengthen the competition 
regime by ensuring an independent judiciary. This circumstance is even 
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more significant considering that for decades the goals of government 
conflicted with the principles of competition (Section 3.1). 
 
The prevalence of the executive has been reinforced by the hegemony 
enjoyed by the Party of the Institutional Revolution, or PRI.420 Rios-
Figueroa suggests that when the executive or legislative are strong the 
judiciary is weak, but particularly weak when the same party controls the 
presidency and the congress. He tested his hypothesis in Mexico and his 
main finding was that once the PRI lost the presidency in the federal 
election in 2000, after 70 decades of hegemony, and lost the majority in 
the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, the Mexican judiciary became effective 
due to the fragmentation suffered by the executive and the legislative.421 
 
Equally, some authors have indicated that the influence that the executive 
has exerted upon the judiciary in Mexico has been significant,422 to such 
an extent that is has been stated that the Mexican tradition portrays 
presidents dismissing judges to accommodate their purposes.423 While 
some others have indicated that despite the indisputable supremacy of the 
executive, the judiciary in some cases has performed fairly 
independently.424  
 
	
420 Joy Langston, ‘Breaking Out is Hard to do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico’s One-Party 
Hegemonic Regime’ (2002) 44 Latin American Politics and Society 3, 64  
421 Julio Rios-Figueroa, ‘Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in 
Mexico, 1994–2002’ (2007) 49 Latin American Politics and Society 1, 33, 34, 41, 49  
422 Rubio (n 354) 20; Ana Magaloni, ‘Arbitrariedad e ineficiencia de la procuración de justicia: Dos 
caras de la misma moneda’ (2007) 26 CIDE, 14; Hugo Concha and Jose Caballero, Diagnóstico sobre 
la Administración de Justicia en las Entidades Federativas. Un Estudio Institucional Sobre la Justicia 
Local en México. La Función Jurisdiccional (UNAM 2001) 187, 188; Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1177 
423 Furnish (n 121) 239 
424 Lopez-Ayllon and Fix-Fierro (n 364) 506; Fix-Fierro (n 415) 202 
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The executive also plays an active role in the law creation process.425 It 
has been asserted that the Mexican government, beyond presenting law 
initiatives, has had the power to impose, modify or cancel the law at its 
convenience. The Constitution of 1917 has been modified more than 350 
times, responding at times to short-term political interests.426 
 
This frequent changing of the Constitution, the law, and the regulations  
makes the tasks of the judges more difficult, as it has been observed that 
the judges sometimes need to acquire the updated legal publications 
themselves, considering that their distribution is scarce, and the volumes 
available in their offices may be damaged, or out of date.427 It has been 
stated that the high number of regulations are often contradictory and 
difficult to fulfil, and that the proliferation of laws and regulations 
constitutes one of the hurdles in the modernisation of Mexico.428 
Consequently, if judiciaries in other Latin American countries were 
subjugated to the executive then the case of Mexico, where experts who 
review antitrust cases are selected after a meritorious process for fixed 
terms, could be used as reference to try to remedy such a lack of 
independence. 
  
b. Corruption  
 
	
425 Luis Raigosa, ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre la creación de las leyes en México’ (1995) Isonomia 
3, 209. It has been stated that the expertise shown by the executive when creating the law resembles the 
Mexican political parties legislating without experience in policy formulation and debating, see Isabel 
Guerrero, Luis López-Calva and Michale Walton, ‘The Inequality Trap and its Links to Low Growth in 
Mexico’ (2016) World Bank, 1. See also Susana Pedroza de la Llave, Poderes Legislativo y Ejecutivo 
in Transiciones y Diseños Institucionales (2000) UNAM, 132, 142, 144, 158‒160. 
426 Rubio (n 354) 20; Fernando Sanchez, ‘Competencia Económica en México: Capítulo I Análisis 
Económico de la Legislación Federal de Competencia Económica’ (2004), Comisión Federal de 
Competencia, 13, 14 
427 Concha and Caballero (n 422) 168 
428 Rubio (n 354) 176 
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The judiciary in Mexico has been repeatedly perceived as corrupt.429 This 
alleged corruption has instilled in Mexican citizens a lack of confidence 
towards this branch of government, such that citizens have sometimes 
been reluctant to bring their controversies before the judges due to 
uncertainty about the transparency of the decisions.430  
 
An extended evaluation of this topic could cover a good part of this 
research project, and although the topic is important, it is not the main 
focus of the thesis. Suffice, then, to mention that it has been claimed that 
this phenomenon has been inherited from the time of Spanish 
colonisation, and has been present in Mexican culture since that time.431 
 
To what extent corruption was considered in the context of the creation of 
the specialised competition court in Mexico is something that will be 
analysed when reviewing the respective parliamentary debates. At the 
same time, perceptions given by practitioners are used to establish 
whether the judiciary responsible for reviewing antitrust cases in Mexico 
has been afflicted by corruption. It is important to highlight that the 
purpose of this section is simply to present corruption as an issue 
afflicting the judiciary. 
 
In any case, according to the argument whereby knowledgeable judges 
may constitute an antidote to corruption by making the judiciary more 
	
429 Ibid 240; Magaloni (n 422) 11‒12; Guerrero, López-Calva and Walton (n 425) 18; Jorge 
Bustamante, ‘La Justicia Como Variable Dependiente’ (1968) Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Política, 
41, 42; Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1175–1177; Fix (n 415) 206; Volkmar Gessner, ‘Los Conflictos 
Sociales y la Administración de Justicia en México’ (1984) 61 Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 
Serie G: Estudios Doctrinales, UNAM, 1984, 142; Concha and Caballero (n 422) 222‒223; Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Situation of Human Rights in Mexico’ (2015) 44/15 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II, 171 
430 It has been found that just 27% of the Mexican population trusts the judiciary. See Guerrero, Lopez-
Calva and Walton (n 425) 18. 
431 Rubio (n 354) 155–156 
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credible,432 or serve as a deterrent to corruption433, the adoption of a 
specialised competition tribunal suggests a great advancement in the 
implementation of the competition regimen, despite the long trajectory of 
governments opposing it.  
 
c. Workload 
 
As was mentioned Section 3.2.2, the overuse of the amparo action has 
greatly impacted the total volume of cases that the judiciary is responsible 
for. There are two main reasons for the unprecedented number of amparo 
actions. First, the fact that the action lacks erga omnes effects means that 
every person needs to file their own petition, resulting in thousands of 
amparo actions per year. Second, the practitioners have found the use of 
the amparo action to be a suitable tool to delay proceedings by seeking 
their suspension as a precautionary measure.434 This issue has frequently 
prevented judges from performing better in terms of the efficiency and 
quality of their decisions.435  
 
Similarly, it has been established that while the population in Mexico has 
increased, the number of the judges has not increased proportionally. For 
instance, in 1930 the population was over 16 million and the number of 
the judges was 52, whereas by 1970 the population reached almost 50 
million and the number of the judges was 77.436 It has been reported that 
in 2001 Mexico had a ratio of 2.7 judges to every 100,000 inhabitants, the 
lowest in Latin America, when the recommendation given by the United 
	
432 Randall Peerenboom has informed that judicial corruption has deteriorated public trust in the courts; 
see (n 47) 10. 
433 Albanese and Sorge (n 181) 3 
434 Calleros (n 414) 143–144 
435 Concha and Caballero (n 422) 184; Dougherty (n 41) 3  
436 Fix (n 415) 183  
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Nations was 25 judges to every 100,000. Such scarcity forced judges to 
delegate the revision and decision of cases to low-level functionaries 
(called secretarios), a condition that increased the opportunities for 
corruption and reduced the quality of the decision-making.437 
 
The inadequate number of judges is not the only feature that has been 
associated with the high volume of cases. The quality of the law 
programmes in Mexico, and the requirements to become a practitioner or 
a judge, are also relevant. It has been claimed that the performance of 
some not-too-well-prepared practitioners has revealed the overuse of 
legal tools to extend the length of the process unnecessarily, and to make 
it more difficult.438  
 
Regarding the quality of the law programmes, it has been observed that 
new private institutions are increasingly created to offer law programmes, 
without proper controls from the government.439 This increase in the 
number of law schools has also meant an increase in the number of law 
students, which rose from 210,111 in 1970 to 1,482,000 in 1999.440 It is 
important to mention that in Mexico it is enough to have a degree in law 
to be able to perform as a practitioner, and no public exams, private 
exams run by the bar associations, or practices are required. 
 
It has also been established that because of the low salaries that the 
members of the judiciary receive, the best-trained law graduate prefers 
private practice, leaving 93.15% of the judiciary comprising judges and 
magistrates who have graduated from inferior-quality law programmes or 
	
437 Calleros (n 414) 170 
438 Concha and Caballero (n 422) 178, 188, 214 
439 Ibid. 219 
440 Lopez-Ayllon and Fix-Fierro (n 364) 559 
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with uncompetitive institutional pedigrees, according to surveys 
conducted in 1985 and 1993.441 It has been indicated that, as a result, the 
judiciary was stocked with mediocre and less highly qualified students.442 
 
In short, the argument goes that the poor quality of the law programmes 
may have compromised the quality of some review decisions, as the 
members of the judiciary did not receive a proper training in competition 
law or economics. Similarly, such pitfalls may have also impacted the 
performance of some practitioners who due to insufficient knowledge in 
competition law chose to manipulate the use of legal tools to counteract 
the limited existence of proper arguments when challenging the decisions 
adopted by the competition agency.  
 
The combination of these two situations explains (i) why the excessive 
use of amparo actions affected the functioning of the competition 
authorities in Mexico and increased the workload of the judiciary; and (ii) 
the observed trend among some judges to avoid the analysis of 
substantive issues when reviewing antitrust cases as a way to control the 
workload.  
 
Additionally, considering that the interplay between lawyers and judges 
determines the quality of the judicial review process, this analysis will be 
revisited at a later stage to provoke some inferences about the necessity 
of adopting a specialised competition tribunal and to elaborate on the 
argument that merely training generalist judges in competition law may 
not have been an optimal solution. 
 
	
441 Dam (n 40) 116  
442 Taylor (n 397) 165 
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Another concern is that, on average, the methods of teaching law in 
Mexico are very traditional, worsened by the fact that some professors 
frequently do not actualise their knowledge.443 It has been argued that a 
significant number of members of this guild show a dated mentality with 
regard to the practice of the law, and a reluctance to embrace new 
developments. This dated mentality is present in some judges, 
particularly those who were trained under the tutorial model referred to 
earlier. Such mentality has endorsed the indiscriminate use of procedural 
deficiencies as a way to solve the unmanageable volume of cases.444 
 
3.2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has looked at the establishment of the structure of the 
judiciary in Mexico, and the selection process of the judges and ministers. 
It has been indicated that before the creation of the CJF, the judiciary in 
Mexico had a selection process based on a tutorial model, which implied 
the replication of knowledge from tutor to trainee. 
 
This tutorial model has been depicted as positive because of the close 
training provided by the mentor. At the same time, though, it was a 
system that allowed the preservation of a dated mentality among the 
members of the judiciary, which has impeded the development of the 
Mexican legal system. Thus, the creation of the CJF has been received 
with interest, because a meritorious selection process has been 
implemented, accompanied by the provision of continuous training to the 
members of the judiciary.  
 
	
443 Lopez-Ayllon and Fix-Fierro (n 364) 566 
444 Taylor (n 397) 155–156 
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Regarding the amparo action, it has been seen that this is a very 
particular legal tool of the Mexican legal system, created to protect the 
human rights of the Mexican people. Despite its worth, the excessive use 
of the amparo action has also led to an uncontrollable volume of cases, 
forcing the disposure of cases based mainly on procedural issues as a way 
to control the workload. At a later stage this chapter will demonstrate 
how the overuse of this action also impacted the functioning of the 
Mexican competition authority, which was the reason behind its 
discussion here.  
 
The dominance of the executive has affected the independence and the 
effectiveness of the judiciary. Equally, the dominance of the executive 
has generated a ceaseless process of creation and reform of laws and 
statutes, which makes their application by the members of the judiciary 
more difficult. One further issue affecting the judiciary has been 
corruption. It has been shown that a good percentage of Mexicans do not 
trust the judiciary, and avoid bringing their disputes before them. 
 
The modest quality of the law programmes on offer, and the high number 
of institutions offering law programmes without proper supervision with 
regard to their suitability, combined with the absence of previous exams 
or practice to become a practitioner, are externalities that have affected 
the performance of the judiciary. This inadequate training has translated 
into practitioners unscrupulously, excessively and unnecessarily using 
amparo actions, generating a judiciary incapable of performing 
efficiently. At the same time, due to the low salaries offered to members 
of the judiciary, the less competitive law students, graduating from 
inferior quality institutions, have joined the bench. 
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Finally, it is necessary to indicate that, the purpose of this thesis being to 
find some commonalities between Mexico and some other Latin 
American countries, as well as to offer some lessons to some of these 
countries searching for practical solutions to lack of independence, 
workload, quality, or corruption issues amid the judiciary when reviewing 
antitrust cases, the study of such factors was indispensable. Firstly, such a 
study has provided a background necessary for an understanding of the 
nature and magnitude of the issues, and secondly, such analysis will serve 
to help elaborate on the conclusions regarding the most suitable solution 
to overcome them. Section 3.3 studies the evolution of the competition 
law regime in Mexico, and the development of the institutions 
responsible for deciding antitrust cases in Mexico. 
 
3.3. COMPETITION LAW IN MEXICO 
 
This section provides some background about the evolution of the 
competition regime in Mexico, and its competition authorities, which is 
necessary to understand the implications of the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal. The section also explores the obstacles that have 
impeded the implementation of competition law in Mexico, and hindered 
better levels of enforcement. Among the obstacles are the overuse of 
amparo actions against the decisions made by the competition authority, 
and the fact that such decisions were suspended when reviewed, the lack 
of competition culture, the characteristics of the Mexican markets, and 
the novelty of the competition regime. 
 
This section is divided into two parts. Section 3.3.1 studies the 
development of the competition regime in Mexico, while Section 3.3.2 
studies the development of the competition authority. 
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3.3.1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPETITION REGIME 
 
Article 28 of the 1857 Constitution established the first written 
prohibition of monopolies in Mexico.445 Then, Article 28 of the 1917 
Constitution reaffirmed the mentioned prohibition and enlisted some 
economic activities that were solely the preserve of the Estate.446 In 1926, 
1931 and 1934 statutes on competition were issued. The statute issued in 
1934 gave the Executive the right to impose maximum prices, to restrict 
the production of goods considered necessary, as well as to limit entry to 
markets if the existing number of industries was considered enough. In 
1936 the Congress invalidated the referred-to statute.447 
  
Despite the fact that the first written proclamation against monopolies 
dated from 1857, and was confirmed by the 1917 Constitution, and that 
some competition statutes were issued, the levels of enforcement until the 
middle of the 1980s were low.448 As was described in Section 3.1, the 
Mexican economy was characterised until the middle of the 1980s by 
closed markets, where the government controlled prices and market 
	
445 Constitución Federal de los Estados Mexicanos, article 28, 1857. This provision prohibited 
monopolies and any kind of proscriptions to protect the industry, excepting the minting of coins, postal 
services, and the privileges that, for a short period of time, were given to inventors or improvers of an 
invention. 
446 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, DOF, 5 February 1917. The provision 
prohibits monopolies and monopolistic practices, and includes the promotion of free competition. 
Some sectors are excluded, such as postal services, telegraphs, radiotelegraphy, oil and other 
hydrocarbons, basic petrochemicals, radioactive minerals, nuclear energy, electricity, the issuance of 
bank notes, the minting of coins, labour unions and cooperative societies, and patent protection and 
intellectual property rights. 
447 Known as the Organic Law of Monopolies. 
448 It has been indicated that in a period of over 60 years, in Mexico just eight precedent decisions were 
made at the federal courts since the enactment of 1934 Act. See Garcia-Rodriguez (n 310) 1158. 
Likewise, the referred-to Organic Law of Monopolies enacted in 1934 has been depicted as 
“unenforced and impotent”, see James Crawford, ‘The Harmonization of Law and Mexican Antitrust: 
Cooperation or Resistance?’ (1997) 4 Global Legal Studies Journal, 410, 411. 
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entries,449 by having an significant number of monopolised markets, 
whose existence and permanency was encouraged by the government,450 
and by having a significant number of state-owned enterprises, as a result 
of a protectionism policy.  
 
Under these circumstances, even if an anti-monopoly provision was 
endorsed, the Mexican economy was driven by a sense of avoiding 
competition rather than reassuring it. Any effort to enforce a competition 
regime that was incompatible with the objectives that were established 
and perpetuated by the different Mexican governments was in 
consequence futile.451 
 
As was also described in Section 3.1, it was in the middle of the 1980s 
that the globalisation process started. This free global market 
phenomenon compelled Mexico to initiate a privatisation and 
liberalisation process, as well as to properly implement a competition 
regime.452 At the same time, the signature of the earlier-mentioned 
NAFTA agreement also forced the adoption of a renewed competition 
regime. As part of the negotiations to secure the conclusion of the 
NAFTA agreement, Mexico was committed to ensuring the prohibition of 
anticompetitive conducts.453 
 
	
449 Gabriel Castaneda, ‘Mexico’s Competition Regime: Walking the Walk, Slowly’ (2010) Competition 
Law International, 37; James Crawford, ‘The Harmonization of Law and Mexican Antitrust: 
Cooperation or Resistance?’ (1997) 4 Global Legal Studies Journal, 410 
450 Marcos Avalos, Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para America Latina y El Caribe – CEPAL, 
‘Condiciones General de Competencia: El Caso de México’ (2016) LC/MEX/l. 711,5; Garcia-
Rodriguez (n 359) 1158. 
451 Avalos (n 450) 6 
452 OECD, Country Studies, ‘Mexico – The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform’ (1998) 
7; OECD, ‘Competition Law and Policy in Mexico. An OECD Peer Review’ (2004) 11 
453 North American Free Trade Agreement, Art. 1501 (1), see also Mateo Diego-Fernández, ‘Brevísima 
Explicación y Análisis de las Reformas a la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica de Mexico’ 
(2011) 1 Revista de Derecho Económico Internacional 1, 78 
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The combination of the two referred-to situations, on the one hand a 
Mexico exposed to a globalised market, and on the other a Mexico 
aiming to be part of the NAFTA agreement as a potential way to solve 
the severe crisis of the 1980s,454 resulted in the enactment of the Federal 
Law of Economic Competition (LFCE) in 1993.455 The next part of this 
section will offer a brief description of the main features of the LFCE. 
 
a. LFCE 1993 
 
The LFCE contemplated two types of anticompetitive practices: absolute 
(Article 9),456 where monopolistic practices were prohibited per se 
regardless of efficiency claims; and relative (Article 10),457 where aspects 
	
454 Crawford (n 449) 408–409 
455 Gabriel Castaneda, ‘Antitrust Enforcement in Mexico 1993–1995 and Its Prospects’ (1996) 4 U. S. 
– Mexico Law Journal, 21 
456“Article 9. Absolute monopolistic practices are contracts, agreements, arrangements or 
combinations among competing economic agents, the object or effect of which is any of the following: 
I. Fix, raise, arrange or manipulate the price of sale or purchase of goods or services which are 
supplied or demanded in markets, or exchange information with the same object or effect; 
II. Set the obligation to produce, process, distribute, sell or buy only a restricted or limited amount of 
goods or provision or transaction number, volume or frequency of restricted or limited services; 
III. Divide, distribute, assign or impose portions or segments of a current or potential market of goods 
and services by customers, suppliers, time or spaces determined or determinable; or 
IV. Establish, arrange or coordinate positions or abstention in tenders, competitions, auctions or 
public auctions. Acts referred to in this article will not have legal effects, and economic operators who 
engage in them will be subject to penalties set forth in this law, without prejudice to any criminal 
liability that may result.” 
 
457 “Article 10. Subject to the cases referred to in Articles 11, 12 and 13 of this Act are checked and 
considered monopolistic practices acts, contracts, agreements, procedures or combinations whose 
purpose or effect is or may unduly displace other market players; substantially impede their access or 
establish exclusive advantages in favour of one or more persons in the following cases: 
I. Between economic agents that do not compete with each other, setting, imposition or establishment 
of exclusive marketing or distribution of goods or services, by reason of subject, geographical location 
or for specific periods, including the division, distribution or allocation of customers or suppliers; and 
the imposition of an obligation not to manufacture or distribute goods or provide services for a 
specified or determinable time; 
II. The imposition of price or other conditions that a distributor or supplier must observe when 
marketing or distributing goods or providing services; 
III. Conditional sale or purchase, acquire, sell or provide other additional goods or services, normally 
different or distinguishable, or on a reciprocal basis transaction;  
IV. Sale, purchase or transaction subject to the condition not to use, acquire, sell, trade or provide 
goods or services produced, processed, distributed or marketed by a third party;  
V. Unilateral action based on refusing to sell, trade or give people certain goods or services available 
and normally offered to third parties;  
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such as the substantial power of the agent combined with an efficiency 
defence were analysed. 
 
A particular feature of the LFCE was that price fixing was considered an 
absolute conduct; so one of the main goals was to eradicate the deep-
rooted tradition of fixing the prices of goods and services, promoted by 
the industries which were organised in small business chambers, under 
the guidance of the Ministry of Economy.458 Also, the inclusion in the 
LFCE of all governmental entities as economic agents has been seen as a 
	
VI. The agreement between several economic agents or inviting them to exert pressure against an 
operator or to refuse to sell, trade or purchase goods or services to such economic operator, in order 
to dissuade him from a certain behavior, reprisals or force to act in a certain direction; 
VII. The systematic sale of goods or services at prices below their average total cost or their 
occasional sale below average variable cost when there are grounds to assume that these losses will be 
recovered through future price increases in the terms of the Rules of this Law. 
In the case of goods or services produced jointly or divisible for marketing, the average total cost and 
average variable cost will be distributed among all co-products or, in the terms of the regulations of 
this Act;  
VIII. The granting of discounts or incentives from producers or suppliers to buyers with the 
requirement not to use, buy, sell, trade or provide goods or services produced, processed, distributed 
or marketed by a third party, or the purchase or subject transaction the requirement not to sell, trade 
or provide a third party goods or services to the sale or transaction; 
IX. The use of an operator’s profits obtained from the sale, marketing or provision of goods or services 
to fund losses in connection with the sale, marketing or provision of other goods or services;  
X. Setting different prices or conditions of sale or purchase for different buyers or sellers located on an 
equal footing, and  
XI. The action of one or more economic agents, direct or indirect in increasing costs or hindering the 
production process or reducing demand faced by their competitors. 
 
To determine whether the practices referred to in this article should be punished in terms of this Act, 
the Commission will analyse the efficiency gains arising from the conduct evidencing economic agents 
and favorably affecting the process of free competition. These efficiency gains may include the 
following: the introduction of new products; the use balance, defective or perishables; cost reductions 
resulting from the creation of new techniques and methods of production, asset integration of increases 
in the scale of production and production of goods or services with the same input; the introduction of 
technological advances that produce goods or new or improved services; the combination of 
productive assets or investments and recovery to improve the quality or expand the attributes of goods 
and services; improvements in quality, investment and recovery, opportunity and service that have a 
favorable impact on the distribution chain; causing a significant increase in prices or a significant 
reduction in options, or an important degree of innovation in the relevant market inhibition; and others 
showing that the net contributions to consumer welfare arising from these practices outweigh their 
anti-competitive effects.” 
 
458 OECD (n 452) 19; Sanchez (n 426) 96 
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step forward for the Mexican competition regime, considering the active 
role that the state has played in the markets.459  
 
The LFCE provided the Mexican competition authority, the Federal 
Commission of Competition (Comisión Federal de Competencia), 
hereinafter CFC, with exclusive antitrust jurisdiction and with the five 
following powers: (i) to investigate competition law offences (at the 
request of a private party or on its own initiative); (ii) to decide 
administrative cases in the area of competition law, enact administrative 
penalties and refer criminal business practices to the Attorney General; 
(iii) to issue advisory opinions upon request by the Executive Branch 
regarding the competition law implications of draft laws and regulations; 
(iv) to issue legal opinions, on its own initiative regarding competition 
and free markets access issues; and (v) to contribute in the negotiation 
and execution of international competition policy, treaties and 
agreements.460 
 
The CFC was also given the three following enforcement instruments: (i) 
to issue an injunction in any business practice seen to be against the 
LFCE; (ii) to order the partial or total divestiture of a merger or 
acquisition in noncompliance; and (iii) to impose fines for antitrust 
offences.461 As an important feature, the LFCE for the first time 
established the power to: (i) investigate and sanction the existence of 
absolute monopolistic practices (cartels); and (ii) investigate and sanction 
	
459 Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1162; Joshua Newberg, ‘Mexico’s New Economic Competition Law: 
Toward the Development of a Mexican Law of Antitrust’ (1994) 31 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law, 601, 602; Avalos (n 450) 8 
460	 Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1164, Amilcar Peredo, Sara Gutierrez, and Gabriel Gonzalez, 
‘Competition Law in Mexico’ in Julian Pena and Marcelo Calliari (eds), in Competition Law in Latin 
America (Kluwer Law International 2016) 301	
461 Ibid.  
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the existence of relative monopolistic practices (vertical agreements and 
unilateral conduct cases).462  
 
In relation to the decisions made by the CFC, the LFCE established a 
request for reconsideration whereby the CFC itself could revoke, modify 
or affirm its prior decision.463 The LFCE did not specify any statutory 
mechanism for direct judicial review of the decisions made by the CFC, 
therefore the use of amparo actions was an available option for the 
aggrieved party.464 The scope of the review was then restricted to the 
limits of the amparo action described in Section 3.2.2. 
 
Regarding private party litigation, Article 32 of the LFCE established that 
in the case of absolute monopolistic practices, any person could file a 
written complaint against the alleged responsible practice, indicating that 
it had sustained, or may sustain, substantial damage or loss. Garcia-
Rodriguez mentions that the law did not specify how substantial the loss 
must be, neither how the CFC was to measure alleged losses in private 
party actions.465 He also mentions that the remit for private plaintiffs was 
narrow, counting a total of 22 private party complaints alleging unlawful 
monopolistic practice before the CFC during 1993‒1994.466 
 
Although the adoption of the LFCE generated some expectations, it did 
not have the impact that was expected, partly for the following reasons. 
As was mentioned earlier, President Salinas de Gortari sold an 
unprecedented number of state-owned commercial enterprises. At the 
	
462	Carlos Mena Labarthe, ‘New Competition Policy in Mexico’ in Paulo Burnier Da Silveira (ed), in 
Competition Law and Policy in Latin America (Kluwer Law International 2017)	
463 Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1175, OECD (n 452) 39 
464 Ibid. 1176, OECD (n 452) 44 
465 Ibid. 1174 
466 Ibid. 
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same time, the careless financial liberalisation that took place around the 
world at that time, combined with the questionable decisions made by the 
Salinas government in that sector, left Mexico living with a profound 
crisis in 1994.467 As the LFCE was adopted during the time when Salinas 
was governing, this new competition regime was seen as a product of the 
president, being received with some reluctance, particularly because 
some attributed the crisis to him.468 
 
Another element that impeded the desired levels of enforcement was the 
structure still present in the markets at the time the LFCE 1993 was 
enacted. The picture was of highly concentrated markets, where, for 
instance, 90% of the glass market was controlled by a single firm, 60% of 
the cement market was controlled by a single firm, 73.9% of the bank 
sector was controlled by three banks, and 90% of the telecommunications 
market was controlled by a single firm.469 
 
These high levels of market concentration likely had an impact on the 
unwillingness to comply with the new antitrust statute, considering that 
for decades Mexico did not have a proper antitrust policy. The Mexican 
competition commission in its first annual report indicated that the “lack 
of vigorous competition policy in the past” was enabling concentrated 
industries to disregard the competition regime.470 
 
	
467 See ‘globalisation’ in Section 3.1. 
468 OECD (n 452) 12 
469 Newberg (n 459) 603‒604 
470 Comisión Federal de Competencia, Annual Report, 1993–1994, p. 14. It has also been reported that 
it was during the second functioning decade of the FCC that actions were taken against the largest 
provider of telecommunications services in Mexico ‒ Telmex, and its politically influential leader, 
Carlos Slim. See William Kovacic and Marianela Lopez-Galdos, “Life Cycles of Competition Systems: 
Explaining Variation of New Regimes” (2016) 4 Law and Contemporary Problems 79, 96; Allan Van 
Fleet, ‘Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Law: The Dawn of a New Antitrust Era’ (1995) 64 
Antitrust Law Journal, 183 
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But beyond the willingness or not to observe the new antitrust statute, it 
has been stated that not many people were aware of the meaning of the 
statute, nor of its implications. And this has been one of the hurdles that 
have impeded the levels of enforcement expected with the adoption of the 
LFCE.471 
 
Three more elements have been indicated as causing low levels of 
enforcement after ten years of the LFCE being enacted: (i) the public 
perception that the CFC was not a strong body because of the delays 
caused by constant judicial challenges to its decisions through amparo 
actions; (ii) the general idea that its decisions did incorporate non-
competition interests; and (iii) the considerable number of decisions 
wrongly reversed due to lack of competition knowledge or suspended in 
judicial review through amparo actions.472 One may argue that the 
number of reversed decisions was a sign of a strong and effective 
judiciary, but given the above issues such an argument may appear more 
contestable. 
 
Likewise, the CFC reported that after a decade of operations the 
following were the main obstacles encountered by the commission when 
trying to enforce the competition regime: i) low levels of competition 
culture; ii) excessive use of amparo actions (Section 3.4.1 describes this 
hurdle in more detail); iii) low payment of the fines imposed (Section 
3.4.1. describes this hurdle in more detail); iv) some legal barriers such as 
a limited scope of action when the ones affected by the anticompetitive 
	
471 Umut Aydin, ‘Competition Law and Policy in Mexico: Successes and Challenges’ (2016) 4 Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 79, 155; OECD (n 452) 12; Van Fleet (n 470) 204. In 2009 a survey 
showed that just one percent of the Mexicans knew which body promoted competition among firms, 
see Federal Economic Competition Commission, ‘Working Together for a Competition Culture’ (2015) 
9 
472 Aydin (n 471) 155; Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos (n 470) 96‒97; Claudia Brambilla, ‘Mexico’ (2004) 
Competition Regimes in the World – A Civil Society Report, 598; OECD (n 452) 8; Mena (n 462) 6 
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behaviour were consumers; v) impossibility of conducting on-site 
searches by the CFC; and vi) lack of leniency programmes to combat 
cartels.473  
 
With the aim of alleviating some of the issues mentioned above, the 
LFCE was modified in 2006 to increase the merger notification 
thresholds, so allowing the CFC to focus on merger reviews likely to 
raise competitive concerns. This included five conducts that could be 
considered relative monopolistic practices, giving powers to the CFC to 
conduct on-site searches observing some conditions, and to introduce a 
leniency programme.474  
 
In 2011 a new reform was introduced, this time increasing the amount of 
economic sanctions in cases of abuse of market power, increasing the 
scope of criminal prosecution in cases of cartels, and increasing the 
sanctions based on company revenues in such cases. An important 
modification was also introduced in 2011475 consisting of the adoption of 
specialised competition tribunals pursuing to gain efficiency and to 
improve the quality of the judicial review process, although the 
implementation did not take place until after further reform.476 
 
In 2012, under the governance of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), the 
Mexican Congress agreed to undertake significant reforms in different 
areas. This agreement was named “the Pact for Mexico” ‒ Pacto por 
	
473 Sanchez (n 426) 115–124 
474 OECD, ‘The Resolution of Competition Cases by Specialised and Generalist Courts – Stocktaking 
of International Experiences’ (2016) 19‒20 
475 Parliament Gazette, XIV, 14th April 2011, No. 37242-III, regarding the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal it was indicated that: “it would be a guarantee of impartiality, efficiency, 
specialisation, and professionalisation”. 
476 OECD (n 452) 20. Despite article 6 of the Official Gazette 10 May 2011 establishing the creation of 
a specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, this reform did not take place. 
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México ‒ and contained 95 initiatives, divided into five categories, one of 
which related to aspects such as economic growth, employment, and 
competitiveness.477 
 
The Pact for Mexico signified the modernisation of rules and processes, 
and the creation of different institutions in different sectors. Specifically 
in the competition area, in 2013 two competition authorities, the Federal 
Economic Competition Commission (hereinafter COFECE) and the 
Federal Telecommunications Institute (hereinafter IFT), were created, as 
well as a specialised tribunal in these areas. Likewise, a new Federal 
Economic Competition Law (hereinafter LFCE) was enacted in 2014 in 
accordance with the newly created authorities, and for this purpose the 
next part of this section will examine the main changes introduced by the 
LFCE 2014.478 
 
b. LFCE 2014 
 
The new competition regime became effective on 7 July 2014, with the 
aim of improving effective competition by giving more powers to the 
competition authorities, and preventing concentrations and practices that 
might generate anticompetitive effects. Therefore, aspects relating to 
merger control and monopolistic practices were reformed, the 
investigation procedure by the competition authorities was modified, the 
criminal sanctions in cases of absolute monopolistic practices were 
	
477 Pedro Valenzuela, ‘Mexico’s Reforms and the Prospects for Growth’ (2016) Mexico Institute, 11‒ 
12. One of the goals of “The Pact for Mexico” was “…to legislate in the broadcasting and 
telecommunications matters, in order to warranty its social function and to modernize the State and the 
society, throughout the information technologies and the communication, as well as to strengthen the 
faculties of the authority in economic competition matters”, Luis Aziz and Ismael Henestrosa, ‘The 
New Era of the Mexican Antitrust Legal System’ <https://www.expertguides.com/articles/the-new-era-
of-the-mexican-antitrust-legal-system/arocsirx> accessed 23 May 2017 
478 Official Gazette May 2014 
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increased, and more powers to carry out dawn raids were given to the 
competition authorities, among other features.479  
 
Section 3.3.2 examines the development of the competition authorities in 
Mexico. This background shows the efforts made by the Mexican 
government to improve the levels of enforcement, which eventually led to 
the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal. At the same time, it 
shows the obstacles encountered by the competition authorities and aims 
to illustrate why the adoption of this specialised competition tribunal was 
seen as a solution. 
 
3.3.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEXICAN COMPETITION 
AUTHORITIES  
 
As has been mentioned earlier, despite monopolies being prohibited and 
free markets proclaimed since the 1857 Constitution, it was not until 
1993 that a competition regime was enacted and a competition authority 
established. Thus, the enactment of the LFCE in 1993 made necessary the 
creation of the CFC to enforce it. 
 
a. The CFC 
 
The CFC was conceived as an independent body attached to the Ministry 
of Trade and Industrial Promotion (hereinafter SECOFI) for the purposes 
of budgetary administration. Its responsibility was the exclusive 
application of the LFCE. Four factors have been described as motivating 
its creation: (i) the negotiation of NAFTA; (ii) the personal convictions of 
	
479 Luis Garcia, Mauricio Serralde and Jorge Karlg ‘Mexico: New Antitrust Authorities and a New 
Federal Economic Competition Law’ (2015) 6 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 1, 44 
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some liberal public servants; (iii) the influence of international 
organisations; and (iv) the pressure from international firms and corporate 
bodies.480 The CFC comprised five commissioners designated by the 
president of Mexico for a period of ten years, whose decisions were made 
by majority vote.481 In terms of institutional design, the CFC did not show 
a clear separation between the investigative body and the decision-
making one.482 
 
The performance of the CFC has been considered satisfactory 
notwithstanding the presence of the following obstacles that surrounded 
the evolution of the Mexican competition regime: the lack of competition 
culture, the special characteristics of the Mexican markets, and the 
excessive use of amparo actions against its decisions. Overall, the 
experience gained by the CFC, and the increased powers given to this 
body, enhanced its performance.483 
 
Subsequently, the amendment of the Constitution in 2013 reassembled 
the CFC by making it autonomous and by naming it the Federal 
Commission of Economic Competition (Comisión Federal de 
Competencia Económica (hereinafter COFECE).484 The objective of this 
change was to improve the low levels of enforcement shown by the CFC, 
and to change the public perception that the CFC was a weak body.485 
 
b. The COFECE 
 
	
480	Mena (n 462) 5	
481 OECD (n 452) 17‒18 
482	Mena (n 462) 17	
483Aydin (n 471) 156 
484 Official Gazette June 2013; Aydin Umut, op. cit, supra note 102, 156 
485	Aydin (n 471) 155; Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos (n 159) 96‒97; Brambilla (n 472); OECD (n 452) 8	
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The COFECE is an autonomous body, whose main objective is to 
supervise, to promote, and to guarantee free access and competition in the 
markets, except in telecommunications. It is also responsible for the 
enforcement of the Federal Economic Competition Law, and for the 
promotion of competition culture.486 
 
It is comprised of seven commissioners selected after a qualification 
process, nominated by the Head of the Federal Executive and 
subsequently ratified by the Mexican Senate.487 The Commission has a 
Chair who is chosen by the Senate for a period of four years.488 At the 
same time, COFECE has an investigative authority responsible for 
conducting the investigations,489 whose findings are presented to the 
Plenum of the Commission for decision issue490 and whose members 
deliberate in a democratic manner, requiring a voting majority to decide 
cases.491 Such institutional design reform consisting of the separation of 
the investigative body (in charge of the investigation) and the Plenum (in 
charge of deciding the cases), both coexisting within the Commission’s 
structure, was envisaged to ensure a checks and balances scheme.492  
 
The 2013 Constitutional reform strengthened the powers of COFECE by 
adjudicating the possibility to regulate the access to essential inputs and 
to order the divestiture of economic agents’ goods to correct market 
failures.493 Before this Constitutional reform there was an obligation to 
publish the initiation of an investigation, which was eliminated by 
	
486 <https://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/index.php/cofece/que-hacemos> accessed 22 July 2017 
487 <https://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/index.php/cofece/quienes-somos> accessed 3 May 2017 
488 <https://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/index.php/cofece/comission-s-chair> accessed 22 July 2017 
489 <https://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/index.php/cofece/investigation-authority> accessed 22 July 
2017 
490 Official Gazette 8 July 2014; Agreement CFCE-148-2014, article 5, VI. 
491	Mena (n 462) 16 
492 Ibid. 17 
493 Ibid. 21 
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allowing COFECE to wait 120 days to publish such an initiation, a period 
within which it can carry out verification visits without alerting the 
parties.494  
 
In relation to cartels, the reform also included the power to penalise any 
exchange of information between competitors intent on restricting supply, 
allocating markets or rigging bids, or whose actions have those effects.495 
Regarding the window within which COFECE could start an 
investigation of a concentration or monopolistic practices, this was 
extended from five to ten years, calculated from the date of the unlawful 
concentration or from the date of the cessation of the monopolistic 
practice.496  
 
The administrative sanctions were imposed as follows: (i) for absolute 
monopolistic practices (cartels) the Commission could impose fines of up 
to 10% of the economic agent’s income for the previous tax year, with 
criminal sanctions (where the Commission could act only as a 
complainant since the procedure was carried out by a Federal Prosecutor 
and criminal courts); and (ii) for unilateral conduct cases the Commission 
could impose fines up to 8% of the economic agent’s income for the 
previous tax year. In both cases the Commission could double the fine in 
the case of a second violation.497 
 
In terms of judicial review, the 2013 Constitutional reform introduced an 
important reform consisting of the reconfiguration of the appeal 
procedure by affected parties who were aiming to challenge acts or 
	
494	Ibid. 28 
495	Ibid.	27 
496 Peredo, Gutierrez, and Gonzalez (n 460) 303 
497	Ibid. 310, 317	
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omissions of COFECE through an indirect amparo, as Section 3.4.1 
describes in more detail.498 It is important to remember that the LFCE did 
not specify any statutory mechanism for direct judicial review of the 
decisions made by the CFC, which is why the use of amparo action was 
an available option for the aggrieved party.499  
 
At the same time, the 2013 Constitutional reform limited the suspension 
of the challenged acts, except in cases where the COFECE imposed fines 
or the divestiture of assets, rights, partnership interests or stocks.500 
Figure 3.1 presents the appeal review of the decisions adopted by 
COFECE. 
 
Figure 3.1.a: Review of the decisions adopted by COFECE 
 
c. The IFT 
 
The IFT is an independent body with an independent budget. This body 
has exclusive powers to guarantee and promote competition within the 
	
498 Mena (n 462) 17 
499 Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1176 
500 Mena (n 462) 17 
	
211	
broadcasting and telecommunications sector, being also its regulator.501 
Seven commissioners comprise the IFT for a period of nine years. They 
are proposed by the Federal Executive, and ratified by the Congress prior 
to an evaluation process.502 
 
The main challenge faced by the IFT was to regulate and bring 
competition into a highly concentrated sector where a single company 
dominated 80% of the fixed line market and 70% of the mobile phone 
market. This lack of competition resulted in an inefficient sector, leaving 
Mexico as one of the countries with the highest telecommunication fees, 
and lowest levels of market penetration.503 
 
Another particular feature that forced the creation of the IFT was that 
during the privatisation process that the country experienced in the 1990s, 
the government gave just one private entity – Telmex ‒ entire control 
over the sector. The transference occurred with the same structure and 
market power, without previous segmentation of the different services, 
before an adequate competition regime was enacted, and accompanied by 
a long-term and unclear concession.504 This situation impeded the 
achievement of good enforcement levels in the telecommunications 
sector.  
 
	
501 OECD, ‘Competition and Market Studies In Latin America. The Case of Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Panama and Peru’ (2015) 44-45 
502 OECD, Reviews of Regulatory Reform, ‘Regulatory Policy in Mexico – Towards a Whole-of-
Government Perspective to Regulatory Improvement’ (2014) 134 <https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/regulatory-policy-in-mexico_9789264203389-en#page136 > accessed 30 July 
2017 
503 OECD, ‘Review of Telecommunication Policy And Regulation In Mexico’ (2012) 11‒12 
504 Sanchez (n 426) 79–81; OECD (n 503) 118. The dominance that was enjoyed by Telmex did not 
impact just the national markets, as the decision reached by the World Trade Organisation in April 
2004 at the instance of an American complainer showed. See Maher Dabbah, International and 
Comparative Competition Law, Antitrust and Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 
615‒616.  
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3.3.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It has been observed that although the prohibition of monopolies and 
proclamation of free markets dated back to 1857 in Mexico, the levels of 
enforcement until early 1990s were low. Such low levels of enforcement 
were the reflection of a government highly involved in controlling 
markets and whose objectives conflicted with the goals of the 
competition regime. One more reason was the novelty of the competition 
regime, along with a lack of competition culture, and exacerbated by an 
unwillingness to embrace it. The enforcement was also affected by the 
misuse of amparo actions against the decisions made by the competition 
authority, impacting negatively on its levels of efficiency, as well as the 
levels of efficiency of the judiciary. 
 
Measures were taken to address some of these issues, such as the 
enactment of a competition regime, and the creation of a competition 
authority in 1993, whose powers were strengthened through time. An 
attempt was also made to create a specialised competition tribunal in 
2011, but it did not get off the ground. Finally in 2013 a specialised 
competition tribunal was created, as part of an initiative presented by 
President Enrique Pena (elected 2012), under an inclusive programme 
known as “the Pact for Mexico”. 
 
Having provided an overview of the evolution of the competition regime 
in Mexico and its competition authorities, as well as setting out the severe 
obstacles that impeded the implementation of the competition law, we 
now examine in Section 3.4 the reasons why a specialised competition 
tribunal was created in Mexico, how it has been integrated, and how the 
review process has been transformed. 
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3.4.  ADOPTION OF THE SPECIALISED COMPETITION 
TRIBUNAL IN MEXICO  
 
In order to appreciate why in Mexico it was considered necessary to 
adopt a specialised competition tribunal, it is indispensable to explore 
how the review process was undertaken prior to the adoption of such a 
tribunal. For this purpose, Section 3.4.1 is concerned with explaining the 
review process before generalist judges. Section 3.4.2 presents the main 
obstacles that the old review process faced, such as the overuse of 
amparo actions, the admissibility of amparo actions against intermediate 
decisions, the possibility of suspending the challenged decisions, the 
existence of another review instance when appealing the imposed fines 
before the tax court, the difficulty of making the fines effective and the 
preference for solving the review decisions based on procedural issues.  
 
After examining the obstacles that the old review process encountered, 
this section shifts the focus to the analysis of why the government 
proposed such institutional reform, and the discussions of it inside 
parliament. It then moves on to explore how the specialised competition 
tribunal was designed and concludes by summarising the new review 
process.  
 
3.4.1. OVERVIEW OF THE OLD REVIEW PROCESS BEFORE 
GENERALIST JUDGES 
 
Prior to describing the old review process observed in Mexico before the 
adoption of a specialised competition tribunal, it is important to outline 
the most common institutional settings for the review of antitrust 
decisions, with a view to providing a theoretical framework that will 
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serve for further analysis. In some countries’ systems, the competition 
authority brings alleged breaches of competition rules before the court, 
which acts as decision-maker.505 In others, the courts review the 
administrative decisions previously adopted by the competition 
authorities. Equally, in some jurisdictions the competition authority itself 
reconsiders any disputed decision, with the possibility of further appeal to 
the courts.506 
 
The courts may perform under an inquisitorial system, where there is an 
investigative phase for gathering evidence and an examining phase, and 
the analysis of the judges is based on the written narrative documents 
provided by the parties.507 This system differs from the adversarial 
system where there is an open rivalry between the prosecution and the 
party’s defence to make the most convincing argument for their case, and 
where the responsibility for collecting evidence rests with the parties of 
the trial.508  
 
In terms of the design of the competition authorities and the review of 
their decisions, there are two variants. In the administrative enforcement 
regime the same agency investigates and decides a case without any 
internal separation, while in the integrated model one body of the 
competition authority is responsible for the investigation, while another is 
responsible for the first-level adjudication of investigated cases. In each 
	
505 OECD, ‘Institutional and Procedural Aspects of the Relationship Between Competition Authorities 
and Courts, and Update on Developments in Procedural Fairness and Transparency’ (2011) 11 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/ProceduralFairnessCompetition%20AuthoritiesCourtsandRecen
tDevelopments2011.pdf >	accessed 24 October 2019	
506 Ibid. 11  
507 OECD (n 474) 28 
508 Ibid. 
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of these cases, the decision is then subject to judicial review by a court, 
which may be specialised or generalist.509  
 
The standard of review is also different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
In some countries, the review is of the legality of the administrative 
decision. This involves an examination of the facts; the evidence relied 
on, the limits of the authority’s discretion, and an insurance that no error 
of law has been made.510 In others, the review is on the merits of the case 
known as de novo where all the powers conferred to the original decision-
maker are exercised by the courts511 given deference to the agency due to 
the almost inexistent presumption of correctness.512  
 
The literature has identified three levels of intensity of judicial review.513 
Low intervention is when the courts try not to substitute their decision for 
that of the agencies.514 Intermediary is when the courts give some margin 
of appraisal in complex economic and technical issues.515 Unlimited is 
when the courts give a comprehensive revision of the facts leading to a 
judgment that substitutes the decision adopted by the authority.516 
 
The intensity of the judicial review dictates the various types of standards 
of review. Thus, five material errors have been established: (i) material 
	
509 OECD, ‘Australia Pecuniary-Penalties’ (2018), Report. 
<https://www.oecd.org/df/competition/Australia-Pecuniary-Penalties-OECD-Report-2018.pdf> 
accessed 4 August 2019 
510OECD (n 505) 11 
511	Ibid; Daniel Gopenko, ‘Reconsidering De Novo Standard of Review in Patent Claim Construction’ 
(2012) 40 AIPLA Quarterly Journal 2, 317, 330	
512 Kevin Casey, Jade Camara, and Nancy Wright, “Standards of Apellate Review in the Federal 
Circuit. Substance and Semantics” in The Federal Circuit Bar Journal <https://www.stradley.com/-
/media/files/resourceslanding/publications/2001/01/standards-of-appellate-review-in-the-federal-
cir__/files/krc-standards/fileattachment/krc-standards.pdf> accessed 27 November 2019  
513 Lianos, Jenny, Wagner, Motchenkova, and David (n 351) 5 
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error of law, consisting on a wrong interpretation of the law, misapplied 
to the facts in question; (ii) material error of fact, where the decision was 
based on a misinterpretation of the facts; (iii) material procedural 
irregularity, where the decision was biased or unfair; (iv) unreasonable 
exercise of discretion, referring to a situation where such discretion falls 
outside the limits within which a reasonable decision-maker would act; 
and (v) unreasonable evaluative judgments or predictions, referring to a 
critical analysis of the relevant factors following the right logical 
procedures, and prediction being reasonable.517 
 
The above principles lead to two important conclusions for the purpose of 
this research project. First, that the institutional arrangements of the 
competition agencies, as well as the powers enjoyed by it, determine the 
optimal intensity of the judicial review. In other words, the greater the 
power of the agency, the greater the intensity of the supervisory 
jurisdiction. In this sense, the OECD has recommended a full review of 
the decisions adopted by agencies that have implemented an 
administrative enforcement regime, claiming that when an agency enjoys 
both investigative and decision-making powers it tends to lose self-
critique.518 Second, that if intense scrutiny of competition decisions is 
pursued then judges skilled in economics and competition are required to 
offer a rigorous assessment of their correctness, both substantively and 
procedurally.   
 
With this in mind, the next part explores the judicial review in Mexico 
before the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal. In relation to 
the institutional design of the Mexican competition agency, before the 
	
517 Ibid. 9, 10 
518 OECD (n 43) 3 
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Constitutional reform of 2013, the CFC operated under the design known 
as the integrated model, where the same body that investigated cases also 
resolved them. This design received some criticism as it was indicated 
that the same body effectively acted as prosecutor and jury.519 There was 
also an option for the parties to request the reconsideration of the decision 
before the plenum of the competition authority (known as an 
administrative appeal). 
	
With regard to the judiciary, the courts act under the inquisitorial system 
whereby decisions made by the competition authority are challenged.520 
In general, the judicial review of the decisions adopted by the 
competition agencies in Mexico focuses on their legality and 
constitutionality. The supervisory exercise also includes the 
constitutionality of the norms invoked to support the contested 
decision.521	
	
Given that the judicial review is perceived as serving an error-correction 
function,522 the next part presents the two options that were available to 
contest the decisions adopted by the CFC. The first was an amparo action 
on the grounds that an unconstitutional statute was being applied or 
process rights were being infringed.523 As explained in Section 3.2.2, the 
amparo action allowed all citizens to seek protection against 
unconstitutional acts by government.  
 
Particularly in relation to agencies, the amparo action was available 
because Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution demanded that agency 
	
519	Mena (n 462) 17	
520 OECD (n 474) 28 
521	OECD, ‘Procedural Fairness: Competition Authorities, Courts and Recent Developments’ (2011) 81	
522 Lianos, Jenny, Wagner, Motchenkova, and David (n 351) 5–6 
523 OECD (n 452) 19 
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orders comply with legal bases and justify their actions.524 Following this 
reasoning, the Supreme Court in Mexico advanced the matter by 
indicating that agency decisions could be challenged if the party 
estimated that the decisions were arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by 
substantial evidence or founded on reasoning that was illogical or 
contrary to the principles of law.525 Therefore, it could be said that the 
judicial review focused on errors of law, errors of fact, and unreasonable 
exercise of discretion. 
 
Within the judiciary, the District Courts represented the first review 
instance for decisions of the CFC, it being possible for the involved 
parties to request the suspension of the effects of the resolution under 
review.526 Once the Administrative District Court made a decision, a 
Collegiate Circuit Court, hierarchically superior to a district court, could 
review it. If the review involved a claim of statutory constitutionality or 
conflicts between appellate courts, then the review process went before 
the Supreme Court.527 
 
Under this procedure, parties were enabled to challenge final and 
intermediate decisions made by the CFC,528 among them: 1) information 
demands issued at all phases of preliminary investigations and formal 
proceedings; 2) decisions to admit or reject evidentiary submissions; 3) 
preliminary injunctions and other interlocutory orders; 4) fines imposed 
for failure to comply with discovery orders; and 5) final agency 
determinations and orders.  
 
	
524 OECD (n 452) 44 
525	Ibid.	
526	OECD (n 505) 81	
527 Ibid.  
528 OECD (n 452) 19; OECD (n 452) 44 
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The second option was the possibility of appealing the fines imposed by 
the CFC before the Federal Court of Fiscal and Administrative Justice 
(hereinafter TFJFA or tax tribunal). The review procedure started with 
the use of an appellate action by the affected party, involving not just the 
imposition of the fine but the entire decision made by the competition 
authority. If the party was discontented with the decision made by the tax 
tribunal, it had the option to appeal the decision before an appellate 
tribunal.529 As with the review process before an Administrative District 
Court, if the ruling was on the constitutionality of the LFCE or conflicts 
between appellate courts, then the Supreme Court had the jurisdiction.530 
 
In terms of private actions, the procedure was limited to claiming 
damages after the CFC found a violation,531 whereby individuals 
presented a copy of the CFC’s resolution before a civil court responsible 
for identifying the cause of the damage, assessing it, and deciding on an 
economic compensation.532 The fact that dissatisfied parties had the 
possibility to challenge not just final but intermediate decisions made by 
the CFC constituted an important enforcement obstacle, as the next part 
of this section illustrates.  
 
Similarly, the use of the amparo action negatively affected the quality of 
the review decisions, a circumstance that motivated the adoption of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, and a situation that was 
specifically acknowledged by the government when proposing the 
adoption, stating as they did that competition and telecommunications 
	
529 Ibid.  
530 Ibid. 46. An example of this attribution can be seen on the decision made by the Supreme Court, 
amparo on revision 2617/96, when examining the constitutionality of different concepts contained and 
defined by the LFCE, such as relevant market, substantial power, entry barriers, etc.  
531	OECD (n 452)19	
532 OECD (n 505) 82 
	
220	
matters were highly complex and that this tribunal would allow the 
specialisation required to deal with them. Section 3.4.2 will expand on 
this governmental initiative. The following figure describes the review of 
CFC decisions before generalist judges:  
 
Figure 3.1.b: Review of the decisions adopted by the CFC 
 
a. Overuse of amparo actions: the main enforcement obstacle 
 
As was highlighted earlier when examining the judiciary in Mexico, one 
of the main problems that this branch encounters is the uncontrollable 
volume of amparo actions originated by discontented parties whose 
constitutional rights have been presumably violated by an authority. The 
overuse of this legal tool was also present in antitrust cases. 
 
The CFC reported that after ten years of operation, the statistics showed 
that there was one amparo action for every eight cases, giving a total of 
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635 amparo actions to 31st March 2003. It was also established that more 
than 40% of the amparo actions were initiated against intermediate or 
preliminary decisions. Figure 3.2 shows the increase in the number of 
amparo actions against decisions made by the CFC between 1997 and 
2002:533 
 
Figure 3.2: Overuse of amparo actions 
 
 
These numbers illustrate a significant increase of amparo actions, which 
made extra work for the CFC not only in replying to the amparo 
actions,534 but in commencing new procedures when the decisions of the 
district courts were favourable to the discontented parties. This situation 
was exacerbated when a file involved more than one party, as the CFC 
had to respond to multiple amparo actions that over a single file were 
presented in different district courts by different parties, and had to marry 
such decisions that were frequently contradictory to one another.535  
 
	
533 Sanchez (n 426) 118–120 
534 The OECD established that the CFC dedicated 40% of its efforts to dealing with amparo actions; 
see OECD (n 452) 54. 
535 Ibid. 44‒45 
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Another problem with the amparo action for the CFC was that once the 
judge made a decision, usually issued in compliance with mere 
formalities, the CFC had to adjust its intermediate or (occasionally) final 
decisions according to a meagre judicial review.536 Once the CFC made 
the new decision, a new amparo action was presented against it turning 
the cases known by the CFC into endless proceedings.537 It can be argued 
that this situation was a sign of a mature system, however this was not the 
case as the shallow assessment of anticompetitive conducts and the 
inclination to reduce the analysis of the formalities for its issuance 
resulted in an endless cycle of reviews. 
 
Beyond lengthening the review process by using the amparo action 
indiscriminately, the parties also aimed to suspend the challenged 
decision, a feature that characterises the amparo action. As indicated 
earlier in the examination of this action, the judge has the faculty to 
suspend the decision under scrutiny. 
 
The suspension of such CFC decisions has been identified as one of the 
most harmful tools against competition in Mexico. The amparo action 
became a legal instrument used to delay the enforcement of the impugned 
decisions, as it was well known by the parties that during the review 
process the district courts usually suspended the orders of the CFC.538 In 
the telecommunications sector, for instance, it has been indicated that the 
suspension of the decisions resulted in gains for the incumbent and losses 
for the entrants.539  
 
	
536	OECD (n 505) 82	
537 Sanchez (n 426) 120–121  
538 OECD (n 503) 45 
539 Ibid. 118–119 
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b. The Tax Court: another instance of reviewing the decisions made 
by the CFC 
 
When the CFC imposed fines, it was possible for the affected parties to 
challenge that decision before the TFJFA. This tax tribunal did not only 
review the decision about the legality of the imposed fines but also the 
legality of the entire process, including procedural and substantial issues. 
Such processes constituted another way to obtain the review of the whole 
decision made by the CFC.540 
 
The fact that the TFJFA was entitled to review the whole procedure 
signified that the CFC did not have to merely defend its decisions before 
the district courts. Rather, it also had to defend them before the tax court, 
which meant a high workload for the competition authority, extending the 
process unnecessarily.541 It has been reported that the CFC lost a number 
of cases before the Fiscal Court on the grounds that its orders imposing 
fines were not adequately justified.542 
 
c. Confirmation of fines 
 
Ten years after the CFC started its operation, just 9.7% of the imposed 
fines were paid. It was indicated that it was almost impossible to enforce 
payment, mainly because the fined parties had so many legal tools to 
request the review of the decision. Among them, the revision before the 
same CFC, before the TFJFA, or before a district court using the amparo 
	
540 Avalos (n 450) 19 
541 Ibid.  
542 OECD (n 452) 46 
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action, and sometimes even before the Supreme Court.543 Furthermore, it 
was noted that the maximum fines imposed were very low, and so did not 
counterbalance the possible benefit that economic agents might gain from 
the anticompetitive conduct.544 
 
At the same time, the unlikelihood of obtaining a timely review of the 
decision and then the collection of the payment constituted an important 
enforcement obstacle, and the parties were aware that the competition 
regime had a fundamental weakness. This awareness allowed them to 
manipulate the review process of the fines decisions by requesting the 
suspension of the challenged fine or avoiding the payment. In the end, the 
CFC was in a position where the imposition of a fine was not an effective 
deterrent, making of the CFC a powerless competition authority.545  
 
In terms of the collection of payments of the limited number of fines 
decisions that were finally confirmed, the process was in the hands of the 
municipal authorities, which did not have any major incentives to 
undertake the function in question, neglecting it as a result.546 
 
d. Quality of the review decisions 
 
	
543 Sanchez (n 426) 121‒122. A case exemplifies the situation: On 26th April 1996, the CFC opened an 
investigation against Grupo Warner Lambert Mexico (file 10-16-96) for abuse of dominant position, 
declaring it responsible, and imposing a fine on 19th November 1997. Warner requested 
reconsideration of the decision on 16th February 1998 (file RA-04-98). The CFC confirmed the 
reconsideration decision on 14th May 1998. Against this decision Warner presented an amparo action 
(file 350/98), a decision that was appealed by the CFC and Warner, respectively. The Supreme Court 
solved part of the appeal (file 1486/99), leaving jurisdiction to the collective circuit tribunal who on 
22nd February 2002 (file 502/2001) annulled the reconsideration decision made on 16th February 1998 
under the file RA-04-98. Thus, a new decision was made by the CFC on 6th June 2002 conforming its 
terms with the review decision made by the collective circuit tribunal.  
544 Mena (n 462) 11 
545 The CFC reported that between 1993 and 2004, 56% of the imposed fines were pending of review 
decision in amparo action of nullity trial before the TFJFA; 19% were paid; 20% were revoked after a 
review decision in amparo action or nullity trial; and 13% were pending to be paid. Information 
contained in the annual report of the CFC, 2004, 28. 
546Aydin (n 471) 170 
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It has been repeatedly stated that in Mexico the majority of the district 
court judges, the collective circuit tribunals, and the members of the tax 
court – TFJFA ‒ were not familiar with competition matters.547 It has 
been agreed also that this unfamiliarity with competition matters during 
the review process caused the deviation from thoroughly examining the 
conduct’s matter to instead focusing merely on issues of form.548 
 
3.4.2. WHY A SPECIALISED COMPETITION TRIBUNAL WAS 
CREATED IN MEXICO 
 
Earlier, when analysing the development of the competition regime in 
Mexico, it was mentioned that the constitutional reform of 2013 
introduced the creation of a specialised competition tribunal in Mexico. 
This initiative was promoted by President Enrique Peña Nieto, elected in 
2012, and was known as “the Pact for Mexico”. 
 
“The Pact for Mexico” brought together the leaders of the more relevant 
political parties in Mexico. The leaders attended different meetings over a 
period of months where, having established the rules of the meetings, the 
aim was to adopt a series of reforms. These reforms aimed to achieve 
social development, lessening the country’s inequality and abolishing 
extreme poverty.549  
 
By the end of November 2012, the Pact had a draft of what was 
considered the focus of the reform, consisting of more than 80 
	
547 Ibid.; OECD (n 452) 45; Avalos (n 450) 10; Garcia-Rodriguez (n 359) 1176; OECD (n 503) 73; 
OECD (n 474) 20 
548 Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos (n 159) 107; Sanchez (n 426); OECD (n 474) 38; OECD (n 505) 82. 
549 <http://pactopormexico.org/como/> accessed 28 May 2017 
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agreements, divided into five main aspects. One of them was economic 
growth, employment, and competitiveness.550 
 
The Pact established that the best tool to combat poverty was the 
generation of employment. Linked to this purpose, it was indicated that it 
was necessary to create a specialised tribunal in competition and 
telecommunications (made of two district courts, and two Collegiate 
Circuit Courts specialised in Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting 
and Telecommunications), and this was listed as commitment number 38 
of the Pact, with the following precise terms:551 
 
“Creation of specialised courts in economic competition and 
telecommunications.  
 
Reforms will be introduced to create specialised courts to provide more 
certainty to the economic agents by applying more efficiently, and with a 
more technically informed approach, the complexity of the regimes that 
regulate the telecommunications activities and the cases of violations to 
the economic competition regime (Commitment 38)”. 
 
The Pact was finally signed on 2nd December 2012, and then presented 
to the Mexican parliament for consideration on 11th March 2013. The 
initiative presented to the parliament incorporated commitments 37 to 45 
of the Pact, highlighting the importance of legislating about information 
technologies and communications, as well as the powers that competition 
	
550 <http://pactopormexico.org/como/> accessed 28 May 2017 
551 <http://pactopormexico.org/como/> accessed 28 May 2017 
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authorities should have, so pursuing the modernisation of both state and 
society.552 
 
The introduction of the initiative focused on reinforcing how a good 
telecommunications and radio-diffusion service impacts a country’s 
development, highlighting what the current situation of the 
telecommunications sector in Mexico was like and how negatively it 
impacted on the advancement of the country. The initiative indicated that 
by giving more powers to the competition authorities the development of 
the telecommunications sector would be enhanced.553 
 
Regarding the creation of the specialised competition and 
telecommunications tribunal, the initiative remarked that the parties 
aiming to gain time and to avoid the observance of the regulation as a 
path to obtain economic benefits had been requesting the review and 
suspension of the decisions.554  
 
The initiative also indicated that the high number of cases had impeded 
the development of more competitive markets. Thus, the purpose of the 
creation of this tribunal was to avoid private parties participating in vital 
markets like telecommunications and radio-diffusion, and to stop abusing 
the judiciary system, so that decisions could be upheld.555 
 
Equally, the purpose of creating a specialised competition and 
telecommunications tribunal was to avoid having contradictory decisions 
from diverse judges, which generated legal uncertainty by concentrating 
	
552 Parliament Gazette, XVI, 12 March 2013, 3726-II, 1 
553 Parliament Gazette, XVI, 12 March 2013, 3726-II, 4–20 
554 Parliament Gazette, XVI, 12 March 2013, 3726-II, 20 
555 Parliament Gazette, XVI, 12 March 2013, 3726-II, 20 
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the jurisdiction on solely this body. It was stated as well that competition 
and telecommunications matters were highly complex, so the creation of 
this tribunal would allow the specialisation required to deal with them.556 
 
Examining the debates of this initiative inside the parliament, it has been 
noticed that aspects such as the suspension of the review decisions, and 
the implementation of indirect amparo against final decisions, were 
discussed. The debates about the amparo action were confined solely to 
the implications of the broad use of this legal tool against the decisions 
adopted by the Mexican competition authority. In this sense, some 
members of the parliament supported the proposal of admitting the 
amparo action only against its final decisions, while some others 
considered that it was against the constitution to limit the use of this 
significant tool.557 
  
It was mentioned once as part of the debates inside parliament that the 
adoption of the specialised competition tribunal would mean the country 
would enjoy more competition, of better quality, and involving fewer 
costs.558 However, even if these benefits were indicated, there was a lack 
of explanation and discussion around how the adoption of this type of 
judiciary would help to achieve them. 
 
During the debates on 25th April 2013, aspects such as the amparo action 
and the suspension of the reviewed decisions were the topic of discussion 
	
556 Parliament Gazette, XVI, 12 March 2013, 3726-II, 22. It is worth mentioning that during the 
debates that occurred previous to the reform of the LFCE of 2011, when for the first time specialised 
competition tribunals were created, although not implemented, it was said that this jurisdiction 
“...would be a guarantee of impartiality, efficiency, specialisation, and professionalisation…”, see 
Parliament Gazette, XIV, 14 April 2011, 3242-III   
557 Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, Ano I, Primer Periodo, 21 de marzo de 2013, 406, 
409, 415 
558 Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, Ano I, Primer Periodo, 21 de marzo de 2013, 421 
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again. There was no discussion about the adoption of the specialised 
tribunal.559 Instead, the topic that was dominant during the debates on 21st 
March 2013 was the telecommunications sector, and the regulations that 
were introduced to it. In fact, the creation of the specialised competition 
and telecommunications tribunal was an initiative contained in a law 
project named the “Telecommunications and Radio-diffusion Law”.560  
 
The OECD has indicated that the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico was created to diminish the time required to obtain a review 
decision, and to improve the quality of such decisions.561 To facilitate the 
performance of the recently adopted tribunal two vital constitutional 
reforms were also introduced.  
 
The first was that through an amparo action it is only possible to suspend 
the effects of decisions made by the competition authorities with regard to 
imposition of fines, or disincorporation of rights, or shares.562 Second, 
that parties are entitled to challenge only the final decisions made by the 
competition authorities using an indirect amparo,563 such that an amparo 
action against intra-procedural acts or competition authorities’ 
proceedings is not admissible.564 
	
559 This is to the best of the author’s knowledge, having reviewed all related parliamentary discussions, 
and the parliamentary activities around it such as those taken place on 25 March 2014, 26 March 2014, 
22 April 2014, 25 April 2014, 29 April 2014, 9 February 2014, 20 February 2014, 11 March 2014, and 
20 March 2014. 
560 Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, Ano I, Primer Periodo, 21 de Marzo de 2013, 349 
561 OECD (n 474) 20 
562 Official Gazette June 2013, article 28 of the constitution. 
563 This indirect amparo has a first instance before a district court, and a second one before a collective 
district court or even before the Supreme Court, whose aim it is to review the constitutionality of the 
decision under scrutiny. 
564 Official Gazette June 2013. Also, the jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed, “…The amparo action 
is inadmissible against intra-procedural acts or final decision, except when the acts are impossible of 
reparation, because of the physical impairment – real and present- of substantive rights. It is also 
argued that the scope of an “intra-procedural act,” used by the Legislative, is general, and hence, 
refers to any occurred within the progressive sequence of acts aimed towards the legal resolution of 
the matter, not only to those occurred during the trial-type procedure”. See Gaceta del Semanario 
Judicial de la Federación, Libro 29, Tomo III, April 2016, jurisprudence I.1o.A.E.24 J/4 (10a) 
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To sum up, the initiative to adopt a specialised competition tribunal was 
grounded on issues of workload, quality, uniformity, and efficiency. 
Having questioned earlier, when analysing the main problems that the 
judiciary in Mexico experiences, whether aspects such as lack of 
independence, corruption, or capture were considered when adopting the 
specialised competition tribunal, now it is possible to affirm that these 
aspects were not mentioned to support the initiative, neither were they an 
object of debate inside parliament.  
 
While the main focus of the discussions inside parliament was the 
telecommunications sector, the deliberations about the adoption of this 
type of judiciary were limited. Having explored the reasons that 
supported the creation of the specialised competition tribunal, Section 
3.4.3 examines how the tribunal was designed. 
 
3.4.3. DESIGN OF THE SPECIALISED COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
IN MEXICO 
 
As was mentioned earlier, a constitutional reform introduced in 2013 led 
to the adoption of a specialised tribunal in Economic Competition, 
Radiobroadcasting and Telecommunications.565 This institutional reform 
reinstalled the appeal procedure by the affected parties aiming to 
challenge acts or omissions of COFECE through an indirect amparo.566 
Therefore, the decisions made by the competition authorities in Mexico, 
that is, the COFECE and the IFT, are now reviewed through indirect 
amparo by a specialised tribunal made of two specialised district courts at 
	
565 Official Gazette June 2013 
566 Mena (n 462) 17 
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first instance, and by two specialised Collegiate Circuit Courts at second 
instance. The final instance could be before the relevant Collegiate 
Circuit Court, unless the Supreme Court decides to assume jurisdiction. 
 
For the establishment of the specialised district courts, and the specialised 
Collegiate Circuit Courts in Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting 
and Telecommunications, the CJF was given 60 calendar days following 
the promulgation of the LFCE on 11th June 2013.567 Accordingly, in 
August 2013 the CJF decided to terminate the duties of two 
administrative district courts, the fourth and the fifth, which were 
transformed into the first and second district courts on administrative 
matters specialising in Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting and 
Telecommunications, respectively.568  
 
Similarly, the termination of the duties of the second and third 
administrative Collegiate Circuit Courts was decided, transforming them 
into the first and second Collegiate Circuit Courts specialised in 
Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting and Telecommunications, 
respectively.569 
 
Nevertheless, the adoption of this specialised competition tribunal merely 
signified the transformation of two pre-established administrative district 
courts and two pre-established administrative Collegiate Circuit Courts, 
rather than a change in their composition. Thus, the administrative 
jurisdiction of existing members of the judiciary was transformed, 
whereby two district courts (each comprising one judge), and two 
administrative Collegiate Circuit Courts (each comprising a three-
	
567 Official Gazette June 2013, article 12 transitory 
568 General Agreement 22/2013 
569 General Agreement 22/2013 
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member panel) became specialised in Economic Competition, 
Radiobroadcasting and Telecommunications. Figure 3.3 shows the 
composition of the tribunal: 
 
Figure 3.3: The Specialised Tribunal in Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting 
and Telecommunications 
 
 
It was also established that the newly specialised bodies would be based 
at the Federal District, having territorial jurisdiction across the 
Republic.570 Similarly, it was stated that the members of the newly 
specialised tribunal would receive future training in Economic 
Competition, Telecommunications and Radio-diffusion to consolidate 
their specialisation.571 
 
On 17th September 2013 the CJF established the following requirements 
for aspiring members of the specialised tribunal: i) to become a 
specialised judge, at least 10 years of experience as an administrative 
	
570 Articles 6 and 7 of the General Agreement 22/2013 
571 Article 7 of the General Agreement 22/2013 
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judge; ii) to become a magistrate, at least 15 years.572 The tenure of the 
members was established as follows: i) three, a tenure of three years, ii) 
three, a tenure of two years and six months, and, iii) two, a tenure of two 
years.573  
 
3.4.4. OVERVIEW OF THE REVIEW PROCESS BEFORE THE 
MEXICAN SPECIALISED COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
 
To properly understand the functioning of the new review process before 
the specialised competition tribunal, it is important to recall the main 
changes that were introduced. Firstly, in line with the LFCE of 1993, the 
parties of an investigation had the option to file reconsideration against 
the decisions made by the plenary of the CFC, which would be decided 
by the Plenum itself. This reconsideration had as an effect the suspension 
of the challenged decision until the reconsideration was issued.574 The 
2013 Constitutional Amendment eliminated the reconsideration before 
the plenum of the competition authority (known as an administrative 
appeal), and as a result the only way to challenge a decision issued by 
COFECE is through an amparo action.  
 
Secondly, the constitutional reform of 2013 eliminated the possibility for 
the affected parties to request the review of the fines decisions before the 
TFJFA. Instead, the jurisdiction to revise these types of decisions was 
given exclusively to the newly created specialised competition tribunal. 
 
	
572 Article 4 of the General Agreement of 7 August 2013, established as requirements to be elected, the 
years of experience in the judicial career, the outcomes of the inspections that as judges received 
during the last five years, and studies on administrative matters, or on economic competition, 
radiodiffusion, or telecommunications. 
573 Communication No. 23 of 27 September 2013, Federal Judicature Council 
574 Article 39 LFCE 1993 
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Thirdly, district courts and Collegiate Circuit Courts specialised in 
Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting and Telecommunications 
were given exclusive nationwide jurisdiction to review the decisions 
made by the COFECE and the IFT. Similarly, the use of indirect amparo 
action was made available only against final decisions, and the 
suspension of the decision was therefore made less likely.  
 
Having determined the main changes that were introduced to the review 
process, what remains is a general description of that process as it stands 
today. Thus, once the competition authorities have made their final 
decision, the dissatisfied party can challenge it in indirect amparo before 
the district courts on administrative matters specialised in Economic 
Competition, Radiobroadcasting, and Telecommunications, who have 
jurisdiction at first instance. 
 
Then, if the parties disagree with the decision issued at first instance, 
there is a second instance before the Collegiate Circuit Courts specialised 
in Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting and Telecommunications. 
This instance before the collective circuit courts may constitute the end of 
the review process, unless the Supreme Court claims jurisdiction.  
 
If the plaintiff is successful, the specialised competition tribunal will 
annul the decision that violates the specific right, and COFECE will issue 
a new one, without repeating the infringement,575 meaning that there is no 
transference of competence from the authority to the court. In the case of 
the review decision concluding that the source of the violation is the law 
or a regulation being challenged, then COFECE will not be able to apply 
	
575 Peredo, Gutierrez, and Gonzalez (n 460) 314. 
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it again.576 At this point it is important to remember that under the 
amparo action procedure the effects are limited to the plaintiff in question 
(as described in Section 3.2.2), it being necessary for anyone else seeking 
the same remedy to present a separate amparo action.577 Finally, the 
reform clarified that civil actions filed to recover compensatory damages 
arising from anticompetitive conduct would be solved by the specialised 
competition tribunal.578 
 
3.4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Before the constitutional reform of 2013, the levels of enforcement of the 
competition regime in Mexico were very low, for various reasons. First, 
the numerous possibilities that the involved parties had to request the 
revision of the different decisions made by the CFC throughout the 
process, including not just final but also intra-procedural stages.  
 
Second, the fact that a significant number of the decisions made by the 
CFC were subject to being revised, and their implementation suspended, 
making of the CFC a weak competition authority. Third, the length of the 
process and the impossibility of implementing the decisions combined 
with an unwillingness to observe the competition law, and against a 
backdrop of fines that never represented a sufficient deterrent 
mechanism. 
 
Fourth, the compromised quality of the review process. The novelty of 
the regime, added to the fact that the judiciary faced a high workload, 
meant that in some cases the review decisions neglected the analysis of 
	
576 Ibid. 
577 Taylor (n 397) 151 
578	Peredo, Gutierrez, and Gonzalez (n 460) 314	
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substantive issues, and cases were therefore disposed based on pure 
procedural failures.  
 
In March 2013 the government, pursuing economic growth and 
competitiveness, presented a packet of proposals known as the “the Pact 
for Mexico”. Among them, the creation of autonomous and more 
powerful competition authorities, and the creation of a specialised 
competition tribunal seeking to improve the levels of efficiency, quality, 
and uniformity of the review process.  
 
The initiative was studied by the parliament, whose debates did not show 
great attentiveness to the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal. 
As was indicated, the adoption of this type of judiciary was introduced as 
part of a telecommunications reform, and a large part of the discussions 
were focused on this sector.  
 
Moreover, the initiative was supported and the constitution reformed by 
introducing a tribunal specialising in Economic Competition, 
Radiobroadcasting, and Telecommunications. The reform was 
implemented by transforming existing administrative district courts and 
Collegiate Circuit Courts into this new specialised field, by which future 
training was contemplated as a part of the specialisation process. The 
institutional reform was also accompanied by a constitutional reform 
limiting the admissibility of an indirect amparo action to final decisions 
made by the competition authorities, and making its suspension 
exceptional.  
 
In spite of the institutional reform that internally separates the 
investigative body from decision-making within COFECE, the institution 
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still possesses the capacity to decide cases and allocate rights. Given the 
executive’s interference in COFECE’s enforcement activities, combined 
with the absence of a tradition of analytical rigour from the judiciary 
through judicial review, it seems that the delegation of the judicial review 
to a specialised judiciary was necessary to ensure that the enforcement 
activities were correctly exercised. 
 
3.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has shown that the executive and the judiciary interfered in 
the enforcement activities in Mexico, perhaps producing a historically 
weak competition culture that was both damaging and difficult to 
overcome. Similarly, a legal tool that was devised to protect 
constitutional rights in Mexico turned out to be a very successful 
instrument used by astute practitioners to reduce the performance of the 
Mexican competition authority, and the effectiveness of the competition 
regime. It appears that the combination of these circumstances reinforced 
the lack of competition culture embedded in Mexico. Or perhaps these 
circumstances were just a reflection of the deep lack of competition 
culture afflicting this country. 
 
Hence, the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal was relevant 
given the circumstances. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see the 
deficiency of the deliberations inside the Mexican parliament about the 
necessity or suitability of adopting a specialised competition tribunal, and 
the scarcity of evidence aiming to persuade its approval. The 
parliamentary deliberations show that the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal would not have been sufficient to address the 
shortcomings of the Mexican competition regime without a constitutional 
	
238	
reform modifying the admissibility of the amparo action in antitrust 
cases, and its suspension. Additionally, it is important to mention that 
considering the new powers given to COFECE, the adoption of a 
specialised competition tribunal was an appropriate institutional design 
seeking to promote a system of checks and balances through an expert 
judicial challenge. 
 
In terms of the institutional design of the tribunal, pre-established 
administrative courts were transformed into specialised competition 
courts whose members had more than 10 or 15 years of experience in the 
judiciary as administrative judges. While choosing such experienced 
judges for the new tribunal was a wise decision, starting their training 
after the specialised tribunal began functioning was not. This 
transformation means that the generalist judges before reviewed antitrust 
cases are now the specialists, providing this research project with the 
unique opportunity to investigate their insights about the encounter of 
antitrust cases both before and after the transformation, and to assess the 
performance of this tribunal, which is the goal of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Mexico: empirical analysis  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines whether establishing a specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico has been beneficial in terms of efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity, as well as whether such a tribunal has been captured. 
Lawrence Baum has described these three factors as the neutral virtues of 
specialisation, and loss of independence as a drawback.579 Yet, these 
claims remain unsupported by evidence. For this reason, this research 
project has focused its efforts on verifying the factors through the 
analysis of the insights of some key stakeholders. 
 
The analysis also reveals that in Mexico it was very unlikely that 
generalist tribunals would outperform specialist ones given the severe 
lack of competition knowledge, and the insufficient levels of exposure to 
antitrust cases amid the judiciary. If this is the case in some other Latin 
American countries, then based on the experience provided by the 
Mexican example, specialised competition tribunals could be advisable 
for them.  
 
These findings evolved after assessing the feedback of the following 
stakeholders who were interviewed during fieldwork that took place in 
Mexico City in March 2017:  
 
i) Four out of six members of the specialised competition tribunal;  
	
579 Baum (n 7) 32‒33, 37 
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ii) Four out of seven commissioners of the competition authority 
COFECE, and two members of the investigation authority of 
COFECE; and  
iii) Five practitioners.  
 
Such assessment, as well as contributing to the findings of this chapter, 
achieves three more goals. First, it remedies the scarcity of empirical 
evidence about the real benefits and drawbacks of specialised tribunals. 
Second, it provides a good understanding about the foundation and extent 
of the most significant deficiencies of the Mexican judiciary that 
provoked the adoption of such institutional reform in Mexico. Third, it 
offers to Latin American countries the opportunity to benchmark the 
nature and dimension of their deficiencies in the implementation of 
competition law, and to use the experience of Mexico as useful reference 
to solve the issue. 
 
Such contribution builds on the empirical evidence collected over the 
course of 15 semi-structured interviews conducted from 9th March 2017 
to 4th April 2017 in Mexico. The assessment combines the performance 
feedback collected during the fieldwork with the analysis offered in 
previous chapters. In terms of methodology, a questionnaire containing 
similar questions was addressed to all of the stakeholders, and the 
answers were analysed in their respective groups. Considering that the 
perspectives of the tribunal insiders and the tribunal outsiders have a 
different value when testing their reliability, this separation of the 
collected data is justified.  
 
As an illustration, the proposition consisting of specialised competition 
tribunals being more efficient, providing better quality decisions, and 
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being more uniform, needs to be analysed prudently, as some biases 
could affect the assessment of the given opinions.580 It is plausible that 
the members of the specialised competition tribunal may be inclined to 
endorse the court’s performance, while the practitioners may undermine 
it based on how favourable the decisions have been to them.   
 
Equally, the levels of satisfaction shown by the members of the 
competition authority (COFECE) and the practitioners need to be studied 
in depth. These participants could be very critical when providing 
feedback about the performance of the specialised competition tribunal. 
This reason validates the appropriateness of evaluating their perceptions 
independently.  
 
Beyond possible partialities, one more reason why the answers given by 
the interviewees are analysed separately is that this allows a more 
comprehensive analysis of the opinions provided by the members of the 
specialised competition tribunal, whose input for the purpose of this 
research project is crucial considering that they reviewed antitrust cases 
as generalist judges, and subsequently as specialists. As explained in 
Section 3.4.2, in August 2013 the CJF decided to terminate the duties of 
two administrative district courts, the fourth and the fifth, and transform 
them into the first and second district courts on administrative matters 
specialising in Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting and 
Telecommunications, respectively.  
 
Similarly, the termination of the duties of the second and third 
administrative Collegiate Circuit Courts was decided, transforming them 
	
580 <https://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/article/27/3/281/1511097> accessed 11 February 2019; H 
Brink, ‘Validity And Reliability In Qualitative Research’ (1993) 16 Curationis 2, 35‒37 
<https://curationis.org.za/index.php/curationis/article/view/1396> accessed 11 February 2019 
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into the first and second Collegiate Circuit Courts specialised in 
Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting and Telecommunications, 
respectively. 
 
One last reason for this engagement with the collected data is because by 
grouping the interviewees and their answers, this research project benefits 
from clearly identifying the differences in understanding, approach and 
perspective of the different groups. 
 
Also, by comparing or contrasting the different perspectives, the analysis 
is more stimulating. In this sense, three groups of interviewees have been 
created, that is, practitioners, COFECE, and the tribunal.  
 
The Excel™ table that serves as a repository shows 15 columns 
presenting the answers to the respective questions. For 11 of the 
questions, the interviewees had the opportunity to say yes or no, and to 
expand on their reasons. The remaining 4 columns relate to open 
questions, where the participants responded to the following areas: 
Column 2 (efforts made to adopt the specialised competition tribunal); 
Column 4 (the most important input provided by such a tribunal); 
Column 5 (what could be improved); and Column 6 (what would be the 
situation without this tribunal).  
 
The answers given by the participants are easily identifiable using the 
Excel™ table, where the number of affirmative answers (yes) or negative 
(no) permits a calculation as to how many times such answers were 
repeated in relation to a particular question. This is then used to 
determine percentages. In the context of open questions, the number of 
times a factor was mentioned gives it its weight. To illustrate this 
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dynamic, when analysing the most important input provided by the 
specialised competition tribunal this researcher accounted for how many 
times efficiency, quality or uniformity were indicated.   
 
This chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 4.1 explores the 
perceptions of the interviewees in relation to the complexity of 
competition law. Section 4.2 examines whether the specialised 
competition tribunal has been beneficial in terms of efficiency, quality, 
and uniformity. Section 4.3 studies whether the specialised competition 
tribunal has lost its independence. Section 4.4 surveys whether the 
interviewees consider the adoption of specialised competition tribunals in 
Latin American countries advisable. Concluding remarks are presented at 
the end of each section, and at the end of the chapter. 
 
4.1.  IS COMPETITION LAW A COMPLEX FIELD?  
 
Section 2.2 exposed as a key finding the significant number of arguments 
in favour and against specialisation in competition law, particularly with 
regard to the complexity factor, which illustrates the unsettled nature of 
the debate around this issue. At one end of the spectrum, there is a cluster 
of scholars arguing that the predominant use of economics turns 
competition law into a complex field and imposes the necessity of 
creating specialised tribunals.581 Such an argument has been reinforced by 
the shared claim among competition authorities, particularly in 
developing countries, that their decisions are being persistently wrongly 
overturned due to the lack of competition knowledge and economics 
	
581 Kaplow (n 249) 184–188; Jenny (n 250) 78–79; United Nations (n 250)  
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among the judiciary, a situation that impedes the development of their 
competition regimes, and increases the litigation costs.582 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Section 2.2 presented the arguments of 
those scholars who argue that specialisation in competition law is not 
necessary. They argue that all judges have the capacity to solve any type 
of case simply by recourse to a sense of fairness,583 and that not all the 
antitrust cases are based on economic issues,584 and that the practitioners 
should present the cases in sufficiently clear a manner that any judge 
should be able to understand them.585 
 
This section helps progress the debate by establishing that in Mexico the 
magnitude of novelty and complexity of competition law made necessary 
the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal. This finding emerged 
after testing the divergent theoretical insights against the backdrop of 
extensive empirical research collected in Mexico.  
 
The next part provides the opinions given by the members of the 
specialised competition tribunal, then by the members of COFECE, and 
finally by the practitioners, about how complex they perceive competition 
law to be in Mexico.  
 
Members of the specialised competition tribunal 
 
	
582 ICN (n 261) 9  
583 Wood (n 11) 7 
584 OECD (n 19) 70  
585 Rakoff (n 12) 7–9 
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To preserve the anonymity of the four members of the specialised 
competition tribunal who agreed to be interviewed for the purpose of this 
research project, they are named as member A, B, C, and D. 
 
All members of the Mexican specialised competition tribunal who were 
interviewed agreed that competition law is a complex field. At the same 
time, two out of four also indicated that the use of economics is 
characteristic of this field. This complexity and use of economics justifies 
the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal, as Member A586 
indicated: “…In my opinion, without any doubt, it is more beneficial that 
these types of matters be solved by a specialist, because they require a 
better knowledge of regulatory law, economic law, and economic 
matters…” 
 
Member A also considered that antitrust cases and regulatory matters 
require a particular economic and legal reasoning that only specialisation 
provides. In her opinion, an insufficient analysis of the legislation and the 
economics means that generalist judges appreciate these types of cases 
differently, and thus it is preferable that specialists who have specific 
knowledge solve them. 
 
Her opinion was also rooted in the fact that competition law and 
economics evolve quickly, requiring constant training in the legal 
framework and the economic theories. This member gave special 
emphasis to the fact that economics nourishes competition law by 
affirming that “…Any judge who reviews the legality of competition law 
needs to know the phenomena that are being regulated. Specific training 
is required then to understand the economic phenomena…” 
	
586 Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F.  
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In turn, Member B587 referred to the complexity of competition law by 
providing the following personal account of dealing with an antitrust case 
as a generalist magister: “…I was in a general tribunal, and I had to solve 
a really interesting case about a monopolistic practice regarding a 
Peruvian soft drink. On this occasion one of my clerks was dedicated to 
researching the topic for four months. We did not know much, and had to 
investigate a lot… [So] that was difficult, and impeded that the tribunals 
had the time, and the disposition to study this and some other complex 
matters that we were not used to dealing with…” 
 
Similarly, Member D588 referred to the complexity of this field by 
indicating that “…competition issues require a technical knowledge and 
an understanding of the domain of some other disciplines, and these 
disciplines are unknown to generalist judges. So there is a huge distance 
from the training that a Mexican judge receives and the training that a 
specialist judge in competition law requires. The training is intense, and 
this type of training would not be possible if we were generalist judges. 
We did not have time…”. As indicated in Section 3.4.3, Article 7 of the 
General Agreement 22/2013 established that future training would be 
provided to the members of the specialised competition tribunal (to 
address one weakness already identified), and this member of the tribunal 
confirmed that they have been receiving such training. 
 
From the opinions given by the court insiders the following common and 
relevant themes made necessary the adoption of a specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico: i) competition law requires a specific knowledge, and 
	
587 Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F. 
588 Interview held 15 March 2017, Mexico D. F. 
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a specific reasoning; ii) generalist judges do not have such specific 
knowledge and reasoning; iii) the application of competition law requires 
an understanding of economics, and if generalist judges lack economic 
knowledge, then this application is more difficult; iv) competition law 
evolves quickly, so judges need constant training; v) judges are 
overloaded and do not have much time to investigate or to be trained; vi) 
the training received as generalists in competition law is insufficient 
compared to the training received as specialists; vii) the low levels of 
exposure to antitrust cases make a good understanding of competition law 
in the short term unlikely.  
 
The members of the Mexican competition authority ‒ COFECE 
 
To preserve the anonymity of the members of the competition authority 
(COFECE) who took part in the interviews for this research project, they 
will be named as COFECE A, B, C, D, E, and F. 
 
Four out of six members of COFECE clearly indicated that competition 
law is a complex matter. One of the reasons given to support this claim 
was the novelty of this regime in Mexico, as COFECE B589 stated “…I 
think that because of the novelty of the law ‒ the law project dates from 
1992 and was applicable in 1993 ‒ it was very difficult for the judges to 
understand the matter, it was really complicated…” 
 
COFECE A590 gave herself as an example in order to illustrate how 
complicated competition law may be: “I will use myself as an example; I 
have been trained to deal with these types of cases. But when I first came 
	
589 Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F. 
590 Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F. 
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to the commission it took me six months to understand exactly what I was 
doing here, all the concepts, I mean it is really complicated, it is not 
easy…” 
 
Equally, COFECE C591 referred to the complexity of competition law by 
indicating “…I think that competition law and regulation are very 
complicated matters, and sometimes it is difficult for a practitioner to 
process them…” 
 
Three important deductions can be made from the opinions given by the 
members of COFECE. First, that competition law is a novel matter in 
Mexico. Second, that if for the members of the competition authority 
competition law is a complex field, having been trained in this area and 
designated after a robust selection process, for someone who does not 
have at least a basic knowledge of this area the analysis of antitrust cases 
must be even more complicated. Third, that for the Mexican practitioners, 
competition law and regulation is a difficult matter.  
 
‒ Use of economics	
 
Two out of four interviewed members of COFECE indicated that the use 
of economics when dealing with antitrust cases is implicit. For instance, 
COFECE B stated that the competition regime is an economic regime 
translated into a legal framework. In her words: “…I am coming back to 
my fundamental topic: the Mexican competition regime is an economic 
law translated into a juridical language, and in that sense, I am not really 
sure that the judge is familiar with this economic aspect…” 
 
	
591 Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F. 
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Another member of the commission suggested that when reviewing 
antitrust cases judges put so much emphasis on the law, while 
abandoning the study of the economic aspects, which are complicated, 
and which need a different analysis. This was the suggestion made by 
COFECE D592 “All the judges on administrative matters are focused on 
the same: constitutionality, legality, laws, constitution. But I think that as 
specialists, as the name implies, they start knowing about and 
understanding the economic aspect that is implicit in this specific field of 
the law… the focus or the analysis is different…” 
 
At the same time, one more member of the commission proposed that the 
fact that economics is not part of the law programmes resulted in one of 
the first and main obstacles experienced when the competition regime 
was established in Mexico in 1993. This commissioner expressed “…one 
more complication is that at least in Mexico the law career does not 
involve economics. So it is shameful, we started to deal with antitrust 
cases, and the lack of economic knowledge made the application of the 
law more difficult…” 
 
Finally, COFECE E…593 delivered a robust position relating to the use of 
economics when dealing with antitrust cases, indicating that besides 
knowing the competition law, the knowledge of economics was 
indispensable. Her position was this: “…The competition law field is 
more complex than some other fields of law, it’s not just about law and 
competition law, it is necessary to know about economics and some 
specific knowledge is required… [In] my opinion that impedes the 
	
592 Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F. 
593 Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F. 
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specialisation that allows judges to produce review decisions with a deep 
analysis, and greater accuracy. That is my perception…” 
 
From the comments given by the members of the competition authority, it 
emerges that the use of economics is intrinsic to competition law, and a 
deficient knowledge of it could weaken a proper analysis of an antitrust 
case. 
 
The practitioners 
 
To preserve the anonymity of the practitioners who took part in the 
interviews for this research project, they will be named as practitioner A, 
B, C, D, and E. 
 
Four out of five practitioners considered competition law to be a complex 
field. Practitioner A594 stated that awareness of the complexity of the 
matter was one of the main reasons why the Mexican competition 
authority encouraged the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal, 
an aspect that was mentioned again by the same interviewee when she 
clearly stated: “…this is a complex matter…”595 
 
Equally, Practitioner B596 stated that telecommunications and competition 
law are complex matters, adding that if the specialised competition 
tribunal had not been created, the complexity of the matter would be a 
current issue considering that tribunals without knowledge would be 
reviewing antitrust cases.597 This practitioner at a later stage of the 
	
594 Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 2  
595 Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 6 
596 Interview held 9 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 1 
597 Interview held 9 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
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interview clearly indicated that: “…these matters are complex…” and that 
“…these cases could be technically complex…”598  
 
Finally, Practitioner E599 expressed that competition law is a complex 
field, recognising that there are also other fields of law equally complex, 
but the fact that economics is involved in competition law makes the 
adoption of a specialised competition tribunal desirable. She stated “…In 
competition law you could find legal-economic cases, which are really 
complex. I am not suggesting that some other fields of law are not 
complex but the use of economics makes specialisation convenient…” 
 
The practitioners’ reflections about the complexity of competition law 
presented here coincide with the undisputed position presented by the 
members of specialised competition tribunal, and the members of the 
competition authority, whose analyses were shown earlier in this section. 
 
‒ Use of economics	
 
Four out of five practitioners interviewed agreed that the use of 
economics in competition law is characteristic. In this regard, Practitioner 
B expressed that generally competition law contains wide-ranging 
economic concepts, whose interpretation requires a profound knowledge 
from the judges who undertake the review process.600 
 
Practitioner C also denoted the use of economics and its technicalities as 
a proper part of the competition field.601 To exemplify this assertion, 
	
598 Interview held 9 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 6a 
599 Interview held 4 April 2017, Skype, answer to question 6 
600 Interview held 9 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
601 Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 2a 
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Practitioner C mentioned that if a generalist judge does not have a good 
understanding of these technicalities, it would be more difficult to expect 
an accurate definition of basic concepts such as relevant market or 
competitors.602  
 
At the same time, Practitioner D proposed that special training in 
economics is required if generalist judges are to aspire to become 
specialists in competition law.603 Finally, Practitioner E604 pronounced 
that competition law has a strong economic component, observing that 
some antitrust cases may offer difficult legal-economic issues to be 
solved.605 
 
The consensus from the practitioners about the essential use of economics 
in competition law, and about the lack of such knowledge amid generalist 
judges, enables the verification of the assumption that due to the 
complexity of the matter the adoption of a specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico was necessary. 
 
4.1.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The first key finding of this section is the confirmation that competition 
law is perceived as a complex field due to the involvement of economics. 
Members of the courts as well as members of COFECE and practitioners 
shared this position. The significance of this finding resides in the fact 
that the members of the competition tribunal revealed how difficult it was 
for them as generalists to undertake the review of antitrust cases due to 
	
602 Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 6 
603 Interview held 15 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 6 
604 Interview held 4 April 2017, Skype, answer to question 1 
605 Interview held 4 April 2017, Skype, answer to question 6 
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the involvement of economics, as well as in the fact that expert court 
outsiders state that generalist judges in Mexico do not have the 
knowledge required to solve the unique technicalities involved in antitrust 
cases.  
 
Taking the answers as a whole, it has been determined that 82.2% of all 
interviewees considered that in Mexico competition law is a complex 
field. This average percentage derives from the percentages presented by 
each group. Thus, 100% of the members of the specialised competition 
tribunal, 66.6% of the members of COFECE, and 80% of the 
practitioners agreed with the statement. 
 
It is important to indicate that none of the interviewees stated the 
opposite. That is, the 33.4% of members of COFECE and 20% of 
practitioners who did not clearly state that they considered competition 
law to be a complex regime did not suggest the contrary. A special 
feature that needs to be underlined is that the majority of the members of 
the specialised competition authority considered the competition regime 
to be a complex field. 
 
Lack of competition knowledge, lack of training, low levels of exposure 
to antitrust cases, and high workload have intensified the complexity of 
the matter, making the adoption of the Mexican specialised competition 
tribunal necessary. The next section assesses whether the apparent virtues 
assigned to specialised tribunals ‒ efficiency, quality, and uniformity ‒ 
are real according to the Mexican case.  
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4.2. THE MEXICAN SPECIALISED COMPETITION TRIBUNAL: 
BENEFITS 
 
Section 2.1 established the lack of conclusive empirical evidence as to 
whether specialised tribunals outperform generalist ones. This section 
makes some progress by showing that the interviewees consider that the 
judicial review has improved in terms of efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity following the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal 
in Mexico. The structure of this chapter reflects the chosen approach 
regarding the analysis of the relevant data, focusing on aspects of 
efficiency, quality, and uniformity.  
 
4.2.1. EFFICIENCY 
 
As the theoretical analysis in Chapter 2 suggested, a specialised judge 
would be more efficient as specialisation may help to more quickly 
foresee the main issues of a case, and therefore to anticipate the answers. 
At the same time, it would be easier for a specialised judge to understand 
complex and technical matters, which would translate into faster 
decisions.606 This section confirms such assumptions after testing the 
relevant theoretical insights against the perceptions of the stakeholders 
about how specialisation has enhanced the efficiency of the Mexican 
specialised competition tribunal. A more detailed examination of the 
perceptions is presented next. 
 
 The members of the specialised competition tribunal 
 
	
606 Ginsburg and Wright (n 213) 793–795; Baum (n 7) 32‒33 
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Two out of four members of the specialised competition tribunal who 
were interviewed referred to this point. In particular, Member C607 
affirmed that it is more likely that a specialised judge will make quick 
decisions in competition law, as a generalist judge does not have the 
proper training, nor enough experience or time to devote to such complex 
matters. In her words: “…I think that if a generalist judge has the type of 
training that we have had and has good experience then they could make 
good decisions, but she is not going to be that quick, because she has so 
many other matters to look into, and this is going to diminish the efforts 
to try to solve a complex matter such as competition law. I am quite sure 
that it could be done, but may be not that quick. Experience works, and 
counts so much”. She added “…to be able to make a quick and more in-
depth decision, we need specialisation…”. 
 
The second member to refer to this point was Member B, who provided 
an example of how much time was required to investigate a monopolistic 
practice to be able to understand the case. Four months were dedicated to 
the research alone.608 Considering the workload that the judiciary in 
Mexico faces, as explored in the Section 3.2.4, it becomes evident that 
investing four months in the necessary research to solve a single case is 
inefficient and impacts negatively on the justice service, as the rest of the 
cases are neglected or delayed. 
 
In this sense, based on the comments given by the members of the 
specialised competition tribunal, it seems that specialisation, at least in 
competition law, enhances efficiency. Having established that half of the 
members of the competition tribunal who were interviewed considered 
	
607 Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F. 
608 Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F. 
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that a better understanding of this complex field impacts positively the 
time required to review antitrust cases, the next part explores the 
perceptions of the members of COFECE. 
 
The members of the Mexican competition authority ‒ COFECE 
 
One member of the commission gave an example of how the 
understanding of this field may translate into faster decisions. This 
member indicated, “…We as commissioners, case after case, start seeing 
the differences from just one word, one phrase. Things that may seem 
similar could be different…”609 
 
This observation highlights that examining antitrust cases regularly gives 
the advantage of easily recognising the source of the issues, as well as the 
veracities or subtle inconsistencies that may emerge from the arguments 
presented by the parties involved in antitrust cases. In this sense, a better 
understanding of competition law suggests quicker decisions. 
 
The practitioners 
 
Practitioner D asserted that the creation of the specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico has enhanced the efficiency of the review process, 
considering the complexity of the field.610 This assertion validates the 
tested assumption. 
 
To conclude, 28% of the total interviewees indicated that an 
understanding of the complexities and technicalities of competition law 
	
609 COFECE A 
610 Practitioner D, answer to question 5 
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would facilitate a quicker review process. This average percentage was 
comprised as follows: 50% of the members of the specialised competition 
tribunal, 16% of the members of COFECE, and 20% of the practitioners. 
The fact that the remaining percentage of interviewees did not refer to 
this topic does not mean that they did or did not agree with it. 
 
Additionally, two more questions were addressed to all the interviewees 
which sought to (i) explore the most important contribution that the 
specialised competition tribunal has made: a) “What do you think has 
been the most important contribution of the recently adopted specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico to the Mexican competition regime? 
Explain.” To this question, three out of six members of COFECE, and 
two out of four members of the specialised competition tribunal referred 
to efficiency as one of the most important inputs that the specialised 
competition tribunal has offered to the Mexican competition regime. 
 
And, (ii) to establish what the situation would have been if the specialised 
competition tribunal had not been created: b) “What do you think would 
be the situation of the competition regime in Mexico if the specialised 
competition tribunal had not been created? Explain.” To this question, 
three out of six members of COFECE, two out of four members of the 
specialised competition tribunal, and one out of five practitioners 
mentioned that the levels of efficiency shown by this new specialised 
tribunal would not have been possible to achieve, or, in other words, that 
the length of the review process would be the same. 
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Looking at their words in more detail, COFECE A611 said: “…if we had 
continued like before…I think that we had the same issue, cases lasting 
ten years, which obviously is not the best, and basically solving the 
procedural, not the substantive issues…”. COFECE B612 indicated that 
the length of the review process as it previously existed translated into 
denied justice. Finally, COFECE E613 indicated that before the adoption 
of the specialised competition tribunal the review process was 
characterised by persistent delays. 
 
Member A of the specialised competition tribunal expressed that without 
the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal the review process 
would be less efficient.614 Member D also described this situation, 
suggesting that in the absence of the specialised competition tribunal the 
review process would continue to display significant delays.615 
Practitioner D indicated that the adoption of a specialised competition 
tribunal has helped to achieve a more efficient competition regime in 
Mexico.616 
 
Finally, Practitioner C617 stated: “Yes, the efficiency has improved…”, and 
Practitioner D618 said: “Yes, despite voluminous and technically complex 
cases, they try to solve them on time…” 
 
An examination of the answers to the questions addressed to all the 
interviewees, and in particular to the practitioners, gives these results: 
	
611 COFECE A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
612 COFECE B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
613 COFECE E, Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
614 Member A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
615 Member D, Interview held 15 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
616 Practitioner E, Interview held 4 April 2017, Skype, answer to question 4 
617 Practitioner C, Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4.a 
618 Practitioner D, Interview held 15 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4.a.3 
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83.3% of the practitioners consider that the adoption of the specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico has improved the review process in terms 
of efficiency. Practitioners A, C, and D affirmed this when answering the 
question about the impact that the adoption of this tribunal may have had 
in terms of efficiency, and Practitioner E referred to efficiency as an 
objective that would not have been achieved had the specialised 
competition tribunal not been created. 
 
Practitioner B was not asked about this particular topic, as from the 
beginning of the interview she indicated that considering the recent 
creation of the specialised competition tribunal, it was too early to 
evaluate the performance. In relation to the members of COFECE, 83.3% 
expressly agreed that the review process undertaken by the new 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico was more efficient than 
before. Two of its members indicated that without its creation the levels 
of efficiency so far would not have been achieved. One member 
mentioned efficiency as one of the main inputs that the creation of the 
specialised tribunal had given to the competition regime in Mexico, and 
another member answered positively to the question about the 
implications of the adoption of the tribunal in terms of efficiency. 
 
There was one member who did not mention efficiency as a specific 
benefit of the specialised competition tribunal. Nevertheless, during the 
interview she referred to the intense length of time that had characterised 
the review process before the adoption of the legal reforms. This could 
imply that she considered the tribunal to have increased efficiency, but to 
avoid misunderstandings her opinion will not be calculated. 
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Thus, 83.3% of the members of COFECE and 83% of the interviewed 
practitioners considered that the adoption of the specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico had been beneficial in terms of efficiency. If the 
answers given by the members of the specialised competition tribunal had 
been included, then the figure would have been 72% of interviewees. 
 
4.2.1.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The main finding to come from the analysis of the opinions given by the 
different groups of stakeholders is that the review process as undertaken 
by the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico is more efficient than 
when the same process was undertaken by generalist judges. 
 
At the same time, the fact that two members of the specialised 
competition tribunal estimated that the review process is now more 
efficient is significant. This is because these members were 
administrative judges before, and now as specialists have had the 
opportunity to compare their own performance. 
 
A particular finding to be highlighted was the high number of both 
practitioners and members of COFECE who considered that the 
specialised competition tribunal is more efficient, since they have had the 
opportunity to compare the performance of this tribunal with the 
performance before its adoption. Considering that they could in fact be 
very critical of it, such a finding is significant. 
 
4.2.2. QUALITY  
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Section 2.1.1b identified quality as one of the benefits that some scholars 
have attributed to specialisation. The benefit arises from the apparent 
ability of a specialised judge to more quickly recognise the source of the 
issues subject to controversy, and presumably also from the ability to 
ponder more quickly and with more accuracy the veracity of the 
arguments presented by the parties, thanks to an in-depth knowledge of 
the matter.619 
 
It has also been stated that there is a lack of empirical evidence to 
corroborate or refute this claim.620 This statement has been given in 
conjunction with the clear recognition of how difficult it would be to 
assess the quality of a judicial decision, which is clearly not the purpose 
of this research project. However, the perception of the majority of 
interviewees for this research project is that the new specialised 
competition tribunal has improved the review process in terms of quality. 
  
The analysis starts with the following question: “From your point of view, 
are there differences in relation to the ‘quality of the decisions’ made by 
the recent specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, compared to the 
decisions made previously by generalist judges?” A detailed examination 
of the answers to this question is presented next.  
 
In relation to the practitioners, four out of five stated that there were 
differences, which tends to show that the quality of the review 
competition decisions has improved. Practitioner A clearly stated that 
there was an important difference in terms of quality, stressing that the 
new specialised tribunal better analyses and applies the competition 
	
619 Cheng (n 221) 4–5; Savrin (n 214) 116–117; Zimmer (n 216) 2 
620 Baum (n 226) 1681‒1683 
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regime, recognising also that in the past there had been good review 
decisions, but at the same time ‘catastrophic’ ones, which, according to 
her, is no longer the case.621 
 
Practitioner B also indicated that she has noticed a big difference in terms 
of quality, highlighting that now the decisions solve the substantive issues 
of the matter thanks to a better understanding of the conflicts and the 
problems inherent within them.622 
 
Practitioner D noted that in general terms she has perceived a difference. 
She explained that in the past there were good review judgments 
deserving to be published, but also a significant number of review 
decisions that, perhaps due to a lack of knowledge or high workload, 
were solved based on procedural failures rather than on the substantive 
issues of the matter. This situation seemed less common after the 
adoption of the specialised competition tribunal, thanks to an 
understanding of the technicalities of the field.623 
 
Practitioner E indicated that there has been an improvement in the quality 
of the decisions, noticing a more in-depth analysis of economic matters, 
which thereby makes them comparable to those made in other 
jurisdictions at a global level, thanks to a better understanding of the 
field.624 On the contrary, Practitioner C expressed that she has not noticed 
any difference in the quality of the review decisions after the adoption of 
	
621 Practitioner A, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
622 Practitioner B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
623 Practitioner D, Interview held 15 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
624 Practitioner E, Interview held 4 April 2017, Skype, answer to question number 5 
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the specialised competition tribunal. Comments were not given to support 
her claim.625 
 
Regarding the points of view of the members of COFECE, all of them 
indicated that with the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal 
there is a difference in terms of the quality of review decisions. They 
noticed an improvement, where the focus is less on procedural issues and 
more on substantive ones, and perceived a more thorough analysis of the 
cases.  
 
In particular, COFECE A indicated that the improvement is observed 
from the fact that now it is not necessary to explain basic concepts, which 
was not the case before the adoption of the specialised competition 
tribunal. She stated that this improvement allows for conversations where 
similar language is used and understood.626 
 
COFECE B expressed that before the adoption of the specialised 
competition tribunal, despite the fact that the judges were not well 
prepared, some of them were highly interested in the field and therefore 
there were some good review decisions. However, she noted that there 
was a trend to solve the cases based on procedural failures, combined 
with multiple and contradictory interpretations of the law.627 
 
COFECE C stated her perception that the quality of the review decisions 
has improved, considering that the selected members of the competition 
tribunal were the best among all the candidates who took part in the 
	
625 Practitioner C, Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
626 COFECE A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
627 COFECE B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
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selection process.628 COFECE D also indicated that it is possible to 
distinguish whether a review decision was made before or after the 
adoption of the specialised competition tribunal by exploring how deep 
the analysis was, which according to her, is more in-depth these days.629 
 
COFECE E mentioned that in general the quality of the review decisions 
has improved. She explained that before the adoption of the specialised 
competition tribunal there were good review decisions, but at the same 
time there were review decisions where the analysis was limited.630  
 
COFECE F expressed that the review decisions made by the specialised 
competition tribunal are better in terms of quality. She noted that the 
decisions made by this tribunal show a good understanding of advanced 
concepts in competition law, and a more in-depth analysis.631  
 
In relation to the opinions given by the members of the tribunal, one of 
them was reluctant to indicate whether she had noticed a difference in 
relation to the quality of the decisions made by the specialised 
competition tribunal, stating that it was not up to her to make this 
assessment. Nevertheless, she indicated that as they have fewer cases 
compared to the number of cases that they had to deal with as 
administrative judges, they make big efforts to better understand the 
issues, and to strongly justify their decisions.632  
 
The rest of the members of the tribunal who were interviewed, three of 
them, found differences in relation to the quality of the review decisions. 
	
628 COFECE C, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
629 COFECE D, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
630 COFECE E, Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
631 COFECE E, Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
632 Member A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
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Member B, for instance, was emphatic when saying that before the 
adoption of the specialised competition tribunal, there were few decisions 
solving the substantive issues of the case, due to the lack of knowledge 
and the workload. This statement was supported by her own 
experience.633 
 
Member C was also categorical in stating that the difference was 
“definitive”. She highlighted that the fact that they reviewed all the 
antitrust cases allowed them to gain a proper specialisation, which would 
not have been possible otherwise, particularly when they were 
administrative judges, having one or two antitrust cases per year to be 
examined rather than the large number of cases that they receive as 
specialists.634  
 
Finally, Member C indicated that for her the change has been “sensible”, 
meaning that there has been progress translated into decisions where 
criteria are adopted, where the substantive issues are solved, and where 
the decisions are congruent. These features, according to her, have been 
attained thanks to the experience that they acquire daily as specialists.635  
 
Continuing with the analysis, we now present the answers given to the 
question: “What do you think has been the most important contribution of 
the recently adopted specialised competition tribunal in Mexico to the 
Mexican competition regime?, in an attempt to explore whether there has 
been any reference to quality. 
 
	
633 Member B, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
634 Member C, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
635 Member D, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5 
	
266	
With reference to this question, Practitioner B indicated that the 
specialised competition tribunal through its decisions has helped with the 
understanding of economic concepts. Practitioner B noted that this 
development has been beneficial to them.636 
 
Practitioner E expressed that the main input offered by the specialised 
competition tribunal has been a more professional review process, where 
its members after training and specialisation have demonstrated a better 
understanding and deeper analysis of the matters under review.637  
 
In relation to the members of COFECE, COFECE B indicated that for her 
the most important input has been the evolution in terms of quality of the 
review decisions. She noticed a clarification of topics that were obscure, 
and stressed that the decisions made by this recent specialised 
competition tribunal offer a deeper analysis of the cases, are more 
interesting, and are more innovative.638  
 
COFECE C expressed that in her opinion, one of the inputs offered by 
this specialised competition tribunal has been an improvement in the 
quality of review decisions.639 Similarly, COFECE D provided this 
research project with a personal experience according to which, as a 
member of the competition authority, she noticed how difficult it was to 
have a homogeneous conversation with judges regarding an antitrust 
case, due to the judges’ lack of knowledge. Equally, she recalled that this 
	
636 Practitioner B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
637 Practitioner E, Interview held 4 April 2017, Skype, answer to question number 3 
638 COFECE B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
639 COFECE C, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
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lack of knowledge created an significant number of cases solved on 
procedural failures.640 
 
Likewise, COFECE D indicated that it is now possible to have a 
conversation about competition on an equal footing with members of the 
specialised competition tribunal. Concepts such as market definition, 
economic agent, and demand or offer substitutions are now part of their 
terminology that has been incorporated into wording sentences. COFECE 
D added that this advance would not have been possible without the 
adoption of this specialised competition tribunal.641 
 
In relation to the members of the specialised competition tribunal, 
Member A determined that specialisation has allowed for a better 
rationality of economic matters, as well as a better understanding of legal 
matters. In this sense, this has been one of the main inputs provided by 
the specialised competition tribunal.642 
 
At the same time, Member C stated that the fact that they are solving only 
antitrust cases allows them to resolve the substantive issues of the cases 
and to define concepts which were undefined, and which would otherwise 
remain unclear.643 Equally, Member D confirmed that one of the main 
inputs of this specialised competition tribunal has been a deeper analysis 
when studying the cases.644 
 
Lastly, the answers to the following question could provide more 
information about how the interviewees perceive the quality of the 
	
640 COFECE D, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
641 COFECE D, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
642 Member A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
643 Member C, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
644 Member D, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
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decisions made by the specialised competition tribunal. The question 
was: “What do you think would be the situation of the competition regime 
in Mexico if the specialised competition tribunal had not been created? 
Explain.” 
 
Practitioner B indicated that if this specialised competition tribunal had 
not been created, then judges with insufficient knowledge of this complex 
field, and with poor understanding of the problems that the antitrust cases 
embody, would continue to review them. For this reason, this practitioner 
considered that it was worthwhile to adopt this type of judiciary.645  
 
Practitioner D expressed that the creation of this specialised competition 
tribunal has allowed the competition regime to be interpreted with greater 
technicality, and has avoided the ‘aberrant’ review decisions of the 
past.646 
 
Contrary to what was stated by practitioners B and D, Practitioner C 
claimed that the members of the specialised competition tribunal are not 
in fact specialists, and as a consequence the quality of their decisions 
does not differ from those made previously by administrative judges.647  
This affirmation may reflect the fact that when the specialised 
competition tribunal started functioning its members were not specialists, 
but received training just after the tribunal was adopted.  
 
Regarding the members of COFECE, one of its members stated that in 
the absence of the competition tribunal, the situation would be decisions 
solving just procedural issues and neglecting more substantive matters. 
	
645 Practitioner B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
646 Practitioner D, Interview held 15 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
647 Practitioner C, Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
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She also perceived progress in terms of the level of the analysis, from 
analysing only basic concepts such as relevant markets to a more 
elaborate economic analysis.648  
 
Similarly, COFECE F stated that due to the low levels of exposure to 
antitrust cases, particularly in places outside Mexico City, the level of 
attention was minimal, and the chances of finding decisions based purely 
on procedural failures were higher.649 
 
COFECE E expressed the same opinion by saying that before the 
adoption of the specialised competition tribunal it was common to see 
judges solving antitrust cases for the first time, some of them very 
complex. This situation had as a result decisions characterised by modest 
analysis, and a preference for finding procedural failures in an attempt to 
avoid solving the substantive issues.650  
	
In relation to the members of the tribunal, one of them signified that the 
situation would be the same as before, having decisions that neglected the 
analysis of the substantive issues of the cases.651 This position was shared 
by Member D who asserted that the situation would be characterised by a 
lack of knowledge of the competition regime, and the technicalities 
proper of this field. A generalist judge, according to her, due to lack of 
training and workload, cannot easily obtain this knowledge.652 
 
4.2.2.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
	
648 COFECE A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
649 COFECE F, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
650 COFECE E, Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
651 Member C, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
652 Member D, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
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To conclude, 85% of the total number of interviewees perceived a 
difference in terms of the quality of review decisions made by the 
specialised competition tribunal compared to the review decisions made 
before its adoption. Their insights are useful because they provide this 
research project with crucial data such as the finding that the majority of 
the members of COFECE have perceived an improvement. This is 
significant, considering the difficulties the authority faced when its 
decisions were reviewed by judges who were not familiar with the 
competition regime, with antitrust cases, or with the economic concepts. 
 
It is also important to consider that 85% of the practitioners perceived an 
improvement. They noticed that the decisions made by the specialised 
competition tribunal now contain a deeper analysis of the matters, and 
solve the substantive issues of the cases. This appreciation is important 
given that one may consider practitioners difficult to satisfy ‒ it would be 
easier for them to disapprove the decisions made by the judges based on 
their own expectations.  
 
Equally, the practitioners recognised that in the past there were good 
decisions, but also a trend whereby a good number of cases were solved 
based on procedural failures due to a lack of knowledge. This is no longer 
the case, or perhaps not that prominent. 
 
In relation to the members of the specialised competition tribunal, from 
their opinions it can be seen that they perceive a significant difference. 
This statement is relevant considering that in the past they were also 
responsible for reviewing antitrust cases, but, after training, and 
encountering antitrust cases every day, their reflection is that this training 
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and high level of exposure has allowed them to carry out a deeper 
analysis of the cases. 
 
4.2.3.  UNIFORMITY 
 
Section 2.1.1.c identified uniformity as a presumed benefit of 
specialisation, according to which decisions made by specialised judges 
will be more consistent. Uniformity, it has been stated, prevents 
conflicting decisions in cases under similar circumstances, which 
provides citizens with certainty about the consequences of their acts, and 
counteracts forum shopping.653 
 
This section provides crucial insights about the validity of this alleged 
benefit from the interviewees’ views as to whether the creation of the 
specialised competition tribunal could have had an impact in relation to 
the uniformity of the review decisions. The next part analyses the 
answers to the following question: “Could the creation of the specialised 
competition tribunal have had an impact in relation to the uniformity of 
the review decisions?” 
 
The majority of the members of the specialised competition tribunal 
affirmed that after the adoption of this tribunal, the decisions were more 
uniform. Member A supported her answer by explaining that before the 
adoption of the specialised tribunal, just in Mexico City, to give an 
example, 20 collective circuit tribunals on administrative matters, as well 
as 16 district courts on administrative matters, had jurisdiction to review 
antitrust cases. 
 
	
653 Baum (n 226) 1678; Zimmer (n 216) 2; Savrin (n 214) 118 
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This example, according to Member A, denotes how difficult it was to 
expect uniformity from a total of 20 collective circuit tribunals on 
administrative matters, compared to the 2 collective circuit tribunals in 
place today as part of the specialised competition tribunal. The same 
situation was described with regard to the 16 district courts compared to 
the 2 district courts that now make up the tribunal.654 
 
In Member A’s opinion, the small number of collective circuit tribunals, 
and district courts having jurisdiction to review antitrust decisions made 
by the competition authorities, facilitates uniformity, which is reinforced 
by the fact that in the case of conflicting decisions, there is a procedure 
known as a ‘contradiction of thesis’.655 
 
This contradiction of thesis is a quick and simple procedure, as Member 
A explained it, where any member of the specialised competition tribunal 
may raise a concern about a conflict decision, and all members meet in 
order to find an agreed position.656 Section 3.4.3 describes how the 
specialised competition tribunal is divided into two courts. Court 1 
comprises the first Collegiate Circuit Court on administrative matters 
specialised in Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting and 
Telecommunications (second instance), joined by the first district court 
on administrative matters specialised in Economic Competition, 
Radiobroadcasting and Telecommunications (first instance). Court 2 
comprises the second Collegiate Circuit Court on administrative matters 
specialised in Economic Competition, Radiobroadcasting and 
Telecommunications (second instance), joined by the second district 
	
654 Member A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5,b 
655 Member A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5,b 
656 Member A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5,b 
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court on administrative matters specialised in Economic Competition, 
Radiobroadcasting and Telecommunications (first instance). 
 
Member B indicated that to ensure consensus, there have been occasions 
when the two tribunals have worked together, particularly when solving 
very complex cases, to find harmony at least on basic topics.657 
 
Four out of five members of COFECE said that the adoption of the 
specialised competition tribunal has had a positive impact in terms of 
uniformity. COFECE A, C, D, and F agreed the specialised competition 
tribunal has provided the Mexican competition regime with uniform 
decisions thanks to the contradiction thesis procedure, and to the small 
number of judges having jurisdiction to review them. 
 
In contrast to the position expressed by the majority of COFECE 
members, COFECE E indicated that it is too early to have a position on 
this, and that as yet she has not noticed any impact in terms of uniformity 
from the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal.658  
 
Two more indirect questions were addressed to the interviewees to try to 
obtain a consensus about the apparent benefits that specialised tribunals 
might provide, in this particular case, uniformity. One of the questions 
was: 
 
‒ “What do you think has been the most important contribution of the 
recently adopted specialised competition tribunal in Mexico to the 
Mexican competition regime? Explain.” 
	
657 Member B, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5,b 
658 COFECE E, Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 5,b 
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COFECE A expressed that in her opinion the most important input has 
been certainty, which contrasts with the situation that was experienced 
before the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal, when review 
decisions were inconsistent.659 
 
The second question was: “What do you think would be the situation of 
the competition regime in Mexico if the specialised competition tribunal 
had not been created? Explain.” 
 
Reflecting on this question, Practitioner D noted that the situation would 
be characterised by a lack of uniformity, adding that the new specialised 
competition tribunal has endorsed homogeneity when reviewing the 
decisions made by the competition authorities.660 
 
Equally, COFECE B661 mentioned this lack of uniformity, with 
homogeneity eroded by forum shopping. COFECE D662 described how 
diverse and contradictory the review decisions were before the 
establishment of the tribunal, and reinforced the situation described by 
COFECE B. COFECE C663 indicated that without the adoption of the 
specialised competition tribunal, forum shopping would subsist as 
practitioners would have the opportunity to keep choosing the courts of 
their preference. 
 
4.2.3.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
	
659 COFECE A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 3 
660 Practitioner D, Interview held 15 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
661 COFECE B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
662 COFECE C, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
663 COFECE C, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 4 
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According to the answers given to the questions about uniformity, it 
seems clear that 87.7% of the interviewees perceived that the adoption of 
the specialised competition tribunal has been beneficial on this measure. 
Key factors supporting this perception are the small number of members 
having jurisdiction to review antitrust cases, and the contradiction thesis 
procedure, which facilitates the adoption of agreement in case of 
conflicting decisions. 
 
An important feature that could be underlined is that a good proportion of 
the members of COFECE, and even one practitioner, stressed that 
without the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal lack of 
uniformity would still be affecting the Mexican competition regime. The 
fact that the new specialised competition tribunal has been centralised, 
and that a procedure has been contemplated to solve the ambiguities 
among the members of the tribunal, seems to have alleviated this 
difficulty. 
 
After reviewing the questions designed to test whether the apparent 
benefits of specialised competition tribunals are indeed in evidence in the 
Mexican case, this research project can affirm that the insights of the 
interviewees seem to endorse the view that this tribunal has been 
beneficial in terms of efficiency, quality, and uniformity. The next part of 
this section analyses whether these types of tribunals are particularly at 
risk of losing their independence, or in other words, to be captured, as 
some scholars have claimed.  
 
4.3. THE MEXICAN SPECIALISED COMPETITION TRIBUNAL: 
DRAWBACKS  
 
	
276	
Section 2.1.2.a indicated that specialised tribunals have been criticised by 
some authors who consider that having a small group of judges hearing 
the same types of cases makes it easier for interest groups to identify and 
approach them in an attempt to force decisions that advantage them. In 
this regard, one study has been presented which depicts how when 
industries with highly concentrated markets and strong political influence 
are involved in a case; the policies implemented by specialised tribunals 
tend to favour them.664 Equally, another study has shown how influence 
during the appointing process of the judges has oriented the decision-
making.665  
 
This section explores the perceptions of the interviewees in relation to a 
likely case of capture after the adoption of the specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico. Such analysis shows that opinions among the 
stakeholders are divided, inhibiting conclusive findings. As was the case 
when analysing the apparent benefits, the interviewees are separated into 
groups, and concluding remarks are presented at the end. 
 
4.3.1.  LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE (OR CAPTURE) 
 
In order to explore this alleged drawback, the following question was 
addressed to all interviewees:  “What would you say about the possibility 
that specialised judges may be captured by interested groups?” The 
opinions were divided, as the analysis below demonstrates. 
 
The first group to which the question was posed were the members of the 
specialised competition tribunal. Two out of four members recognised 
	
664 Unah (n 215) 851‒853, 861, 869 
665 Landes and Posner (n 239) 111‒112 
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that it was more likely that specialised tribunals would be captured 
compared to general tribunals. One member refused to accept this 
assumption, and the remaining member listed some actions required to 
prevent this from happening, and explained why with the specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico it has not been the case.  
 
This latter one indicated that to prevent the risk some measures had been 
taken, among them, the live transmission of the sessions of the tribunal 
using the website of the CJF, the publication of the decisions made by the 
tribunal, and the publication of the thesis adopted by the tribunal. 
According to this member, all these measures ensure transparency, and as 
a result prevent capture.666  
 
Member B expressed agreement with this statement. Nevertheless, he 
also stated that generalist judges face a different and worse type of 
capture when cases are reviewed by judges who do not have sufficient 
knowledge, making it easier for practitioners to distract them by 
presenting inaccurate arguments.667  
 
Contrary to what members A and B expressed, Member C rejected the 
veracity of this claim. In her opinion, the independence and autonomy 
that the members of the tribunal possess ensure that capture will not be a 
risk. She added the caveat that short- or long-term tenure should be 
avoided, because the former does not allow for enough training and the 
latter may cause judges to embrace strong points of view that are difficult 
to modify. This last condition, she continued, cannot, however, be 
categorised as capture.  
	
666 Member A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 9 
667 Member B, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
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Finally, Member C stated that the regular rotation of the members of the 
tribunal, together with a good selection process and high levels of 
transparency, safeguard the impartiality and independence of the review 
decisions. Particularly in Mexico, she stated, media companies have been 
involved in the most relevant antitrust cases reviewed by the tribunal, 
which has provoked a close scrutiny of the decision-making process.   
 
From the analysis of the answers given by the members of COFECE, it 
was found that four of its members believe that there is no risk of capture, 
while two consider that there is. Those who think that there is no risk 
have affirmed that it is easier to invigilate judges when they are few in 
number, which is the case with the recently adopted specialised 
competition tribunal, with just six members.668 COFECE C, who added 
that the tribunal itself has adopted certain measures to prevent being 
captured, agreed with this position.669  
 
COFECE D illustrated that it is natural to believe that it could be easier to 
capture a small number of judges who are concentrated in the same place. 
However, she thinks that this cannot be the rule especially if they have 
good salaries, and benefits, or if after a period of time they will continue 
as judges or magistrates in different areas, as is the case for the members 
of this specialised competition tribunal. She insisted, then, that 
specialisation does not mean it is easier to be captured.670 
 
Similarly, COFECE E indicated that the fact that the tenure of the 
members of this specialised competition tribunal is short makes their risk 
	
668 COFECE B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
669 COFECE C, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8  
670 COFECE D, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
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of capture unlikely (Section 3.4.3 indicated that the tenure of the 
members was established as follows: i) three, a tenure of three years, ii) 
three, a tenure of two years and six months, and, iii) two, a tenure of two 
years), adding that if a party intends to approach a judge to try to 
influence a decision, this will occur irrespective of whether the judge is 
specialist or generalist. COFECE E indicated that she has not experienced 
this situation since the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal.671 
 
Of the two members of COFECE who agreed with the assumption that 
there is a higher risk of capture with a specialised tribunal, one signified 
that her opinion derives from the fact that if the same group of 
practitioners litigate regularly before the same judges, then familiarity 
emerges between them. This jeopardy is reduced, however, when the 
judiciary is a tribunal whose decisions are made by majority.672 
 
COFECE F took the same position as COFECE A regarding the higher 
risk of capture. She grounded her position on the fact that prior to the 
adoption of the specialised competition tribunal, approximately 74 
members of the judiciary had jurisdiction to review antitrust decisions, 
whereas now this numbers just 6.673  
 
COFECE F continued by saying that capture is facilitated when a reduced 
number of members are responsible for the review process. This is not 
just because it would be easier for interest groups to approach the 
members of the judiciary, but also because the members of the 
specialised tribunal would be less flexible in adopting different points of 
	
671 COFECE E, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
672 COFECE B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
673 COFECE E, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
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view. For this reason, she argues, it would be necessary to rotate them 
frequently.674 
 
In relation to the practitioners, two of them did not consider it more likely 
that a specialised judge would be captured. For instance, Practitioner A 
argued that regardless of whether a judge is specialist or generalist, if an 
interest group wants to approach her, they will do it.675 Likewise, 
Practitioner D claimed that the experience in Mexico is that the judges 
are independent, and that capture is not in evidence. Nonetheless, she 
mentioned that the specialised tribunal has been deferential towards the 
competition authorities and that this, in her opinion, should be quickly 
remedied.676  
 
Conversely, three practitioners considered that the likelihood of capture is 
higher. Practitioner B in particular expressed that capture is one of her 
biggest concerns.677 At the same time Practitioner C indicated that 
considering that specialised competition tribunals have a small and 
identifiable number of members, and that usually it is the big industries 
involved in antitrust cases, the chances that capture will take place are 
greater. However, she clarified that she has not witnessed any case of 
capture so far.678 
 
Finally, Practitioner E recognised that the adoption of specialised 
tribunals implies a risk of capture, which can be diminished if the judges 
are rotated gradually, and if the jurisdiction scope is wider.  
 
	
674 COFECE E, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
675 Practitioner A, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
676 Practitioner D, Interview held 15 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
677 Practitioner B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
678 Practitioner C, Interview held 23 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 8 
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4.3.1.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It has been observed that the opinions given by the different groups of 
interviewees regarding the greater possibility that specialised tribunals 
could be captured by interest groups are divided. For instance, 50% of the 
members of the competition tribunal, 33.3% of the members of COFECE, 
and 60% of the practitioners agree that the risk is higher. An important 
feature is that two members of the specialised competition tribunal 
recognised capture as a threat, and one of them was emphatic in saying 
that transparency measures are required to lessen the threat.  
 
In relation to the members of COFECE and the practitioners who agreed 
with the proposition, they backed up their statements by referring to the 
proximity that arises when a small number of judges are frequently in 
contact with more or less the same practitioners. They also spoke about 
how judges can become inflexible about new or different points of view, 
and that capture can occur simply because it is easier to identify and 
approach a small number of judges rather than a larger group. The 
common measure that was proposed by the interviewees to alleviate this 
jeopardy was the rotation of the members of the specialised tribunals.  
 
By contrast, one member of the competition tribunal was reluctant to 
accept this postulate, given the levels of independence and autonomy that 
the specialised competition tribunal enjoys. One member of COFECE 
stated that it is easier to invigilate a small number of judges, which makes 
capture less likely. Similarly, another member of COFECE noted that the 
good salaries enjoyed by the members of the competition tribunal, 
accompanied by their short tenure, reduce the risk of capture. Finally, one 
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practitioner indicated that irrespective of whether a judge is generalist or 
specialist, if an interest group intends to approach her they will do so. 
 
So, it is clear that by having fewer judges responsible for reviewing 
certain types of cases it is easier for interest groups to identify them, and 
probably to approach them, but at the same time also easier to supervise 
the performance of the judges. In any case, transparency measures should 
be adopted to prevent captures from happening, and attractive salaries 
and benefits need to be in place to ensure that the chances of capture 
remain minor. Ultimately, long-term tenure should be avoided.  
 
Reflecting on the interviewees’ views with regard to the alleged benefits 
and drawbacks that some scholars have attributed to specialised tribunals, 
and taking the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico as a gauge, this 
research project has identified a lack of competition knowledge and low 
levels of exposure to antitrust cases as the common themes behind why in 
this case specialists outperform generalists. The main finding is that these 
severe hurdles led to the widespread practice of finding procedural 
failures to solve review processes, and greatly impeded a better 
implementation of competition law in Mexico. The next part explores if 
according to the interviewees the adoption of specialised competition 
tribunals in Latin American countries is advisable. 
 
4.4. SPECIALISED COMPETITION TRIBUNALS IN LATIN 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES: ADVISABLE? 
 
The first significant finding of this section is that all the stakeholders 
solidly recommend the adoption of specialised competition tribunals by 
Latin American countries that do not currently have them. Their 
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recommendations derive from the scale of the deficiencies shown by the 
judiciary in Mexico, and the improvement that the specialised 
competition tribunal has brought in terms of efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity.  
 
The second finding is that the claims made by some scholars who do not 
support the adoption of this type of judiciary since they consider that 
simply a sense of fairness is needed to solve any case,679 that not all the 
antitrust cases are based on economic issues,680 and that the practitioners 
should present the cases in a sufficiently clear manner that any judge 
should be able to understand them,681 were not endorsed by the members 
of the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico. There follows a more 
detailed evaluation of the opinions given by the stakeholders. 
 
All members of the specialised competition tribunal recommended the 
adoption of specialised competition tribunals in Latin American countries 
that do not currently have them. Member A signified that it is not 
advisable to make generalist judges responsible for reviewing antitrust 
cases that day by day are becoming more difficult to understand, with the 
aggravation that inaccurate decisions might negatively impact the 
economy of a country.682 
 
Member B stated that it is time to cease solving antitrust cases based on 
procedural failures, and to start creating rational decisions, particularly 
when the law does not provide the solution. In the end, she insisted, it is 
	
679 Wood (n 11) 6‒7 
680 OECD (n 19) 70 
681 Rakoff (n 12) 7–9 
682 Member A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 7 
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necessary to count on highly prepared judges.683 Equally, Member C 
strongly advised the adoption of specialised competition tribunals in 
Latin America.  
 
Finally, Member D admitted that she was not convinced that 
specialisation was necessary, but after performing as a specialist member 
of the competition tribunal, she has realised that specialisation is 
convenient, considering that specific and constant training is required to 
be able to solve antitrust cases accurately.  
 
The majority of the members of COFECE estimated that the adoption of 
specialised competition tribunals would be advisable for Latin American 
countries. For instance, COFECE A indicated that if some other Latin 
American countries are experiencing what Mexico did, in terms of having 
judges reviewing antitrust cases once in their lives, then specialisation 
could be a sensible solution. If this option is not viable, then this member 
of the Commission considers that the adoption of a system where 
generalist judges regularly review antitrust cases is fundamental.684 
 
COFECE B estimated that after the positive experience of Mexico 
following adoption of a specialised competition tribunal, some other 
Latin American countries should consider this option, particularly in 
cases similar to Mexico where the number of judges having jurisdiction 
to review antitrust cases decreased from 300 or 400 to just six, with the 
result that there is less time spent discussing formal issues.685 
 
	
683 Member B, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 7 
684 COFECE A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 7 
685 COFECE B, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 7 
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COFECE C indicated that the replication of the Mexico case by some 
other jurisdictions in Latin America might be a useful instrument to 
improve the service of justice.686 COFECE D suggested that the adoption 
of these types of tribunals in some other Latin American countries would 
be a suitable option if the scope were wide enough to make the decision 
justifiable. This has been the case in Mexico where the specialised 
competition tribunal is responsible for competition, telecommunications, 
and broadcasting.687  
 
COFECE E based her recommendation on the complexity that the 
competition field possesses, making of specialisation the most favourable 
option.688 Finally, COFECE F strongly recommended the adoption of this 
type of judiciary, considering that some other Latin American countries 
are similar to Mexico in terms of traditions, ideology, legal system, but 
also in terms of backlashes such as a lack of competition culture or 
corruption. For all these reasons, she considers that the adoption of 
specialised competition tribunals will bring these competition regimes 
closer to international standards.689 In terms of the practitioners, all those 
interviewed would also recommend the adoption of this type of judiciary 
for some other Latin American countries.  
 
Having seen the extent to which the adoption of this type of judiciary has 
been recommended, this research project explores whether the allegations 
stated by some scholars who do not support the adoption of this type of 
judiciary, such as the need for only a sense of fairness for a judge to be 
	
686 COFECE C, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 7 
687 COFECE D, Interview held 14 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 7 
688 COFECE E, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 7 
689 COFECE F, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 7 
	
286	
able to solve any case,690 the claim that not all antitrust cases are based on 
economic issues,691 and that the lawyers should present the cases in 
sufficiently clear a manner that any judge should be able to understand 
them,692 are valid.  
 
In this regard, Member A was emphatic in saying that to expect that a 
judge can learn about a specific field of law by just reading the law, or to 
expect that a judge knows about a specific field of law simply because 
she is a judge, was in her opinion a ‘fiction’, insisting that is necessary to 
learn about the reality behind the regulations, something that only 
specialisation makes attainable.693  
 
Member D shared the same position presented by Member A in the sense 
that she felt it is not enough for a judge to read the law for her to be able 
to understand the reasoning of the competition authorities. She added that 
it is complicated for a judge to become a specialist in a particular matter 
if at the same time the scope of jurisdiction includes some other areas of 
law, even if some training is provided.694 
 
Member B illuminated this research by indicating that a generalist judge 
needs a proper and constant training to be able to understand the 
problems that antitrust cases display. This member supported his claim by 
arguing that this field is not the domain of many, so if the judge does not 
have sufficient training it is likely that misleading arguments may appear 
convincing.695  
	
690 Wood (n 11) 7 
691 OECD (n 19) 70 
692 Rakoff (n 12) 7–9 
693 Member A, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 6 
694 Member D, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 6.b 
695 Member B, Interview held 10 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 6 
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In the opinion of Member C, every judge is intellectually capable of 
solving cases, but specialisation provides important tools to produce 
quicker and deeper decisions, particularly given that a good number of 
judges in Mexico did not receive competition law as part of their law 
programmes at university, so this lack of knowledge could undermine any 
efforts to try to solve such a sophisticated matter.696  
 
Interpreting what the specialised members of the specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico have indicated about how qualified a generalist judge 
in Mexico is to solve an antitrust case, it appears that, based on their own 
experiences, specialisation is desirable. In conclusion, the claim presented 
by some scholars that the creation of specialised competition tribunals is 
not necessary, loses influence in countries where the levels of 
competition knowledge, levels of exposure to antitrust cases, and levels 
of a culture of competition are low.  
 
4.4.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It is clear that the interviewees unanimously recommend the adoption of 
specialised competition tribunals for some other Latin American 
countries, based on the Mexican experience. Beginning with the 
comments given by the members of the specialised competition tribunal, 
they recognised that specialisation has provided them with better tools to 
review antitrust cases, and that as specialists, they feel more assured and 
better prepared to analyse the complexity that competition law involves 
than they were when acting as generalists. 
 
	
696 Member C, Interview held 13 March 2017, Mexico D. F., answer to question 6, 6a 
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Continuing with the opinions given by the members of COFECE and the 
practitioners, it is clear that this type of judiciary has diminished the large 
number of review decisions based purely on issues of form and has 
introduced a review process where the analysis of the cases goes deeper, 
combined with a more standard definition of new or ambiguous concepts.  
 
Some scholars estimate that specialised competition tribunals are not 
indispensable for the following reasons ‒ 1) judges are prepared to solve 
any case based on fairness; 2) not all the debates around antitrust cases 
rely on economics; and, 3) the facts of the cases should be presented in 
sufficiently clear a manner by the practitioners that it is easy for a judge 
to understand them. However, these seem inapplicable at least in 
countries like Mexico. The fact that competition knowledge was scarce 
amid the judiciary, that law programmes do not offer exhaustive 
competition law training, that levels of a culture of competition are low, 
and that generalist judges have insufficient levels of exposure to antitrust 
cases, render such arguments unconvincing.  
 
A judge will find it more difficult to understand an antitrust case if they 
have not received a fundamental training in economics or competition 
law either during their time at university or during their time as a judge. 
Such a judge may produce an accurate decision, but it is also more likely 
that the analysis process will take longer, be shallow, and that procedural 
failures will be used as a way to avoid deeper analysis of the case. 
 
This scenario was experienced in Mexico before the adoption of the 
specialised competition tribunal, and after its adoption an improvement 
has been perceived by 100% of the members of COFECE and 85% of the 
practitioners interviewed. The improvement has been so significant that 
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the majority of the interviewees would recommend the adoption of this 
type of judiciary to some other Latin American countries experiencing 
the same issues faced by Mexico before. 
 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to analyse the data collected during the 
fieldwork which took place in Mexico in March 2017, consisting of 
interviews where similar questions were addressed to the members of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, the members of the Mexican 
competition authority (COFECE), and to some practitioners.  
 
The questions were designed in a way that the perceptions of the 
interviewees can provide vital insights about how beneficial the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico has been in terms of quality, 
quantity, and uniformity. Also, one question was formulated to explore 
whether the stakeholders share the views of those how believe that this 
type of judiciary brings higher risk of capture.  
 
One more aspect that was investigated was whether the interviewees 
would recommend the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal to 
some other Latin American countries. Finally, in the context of the 
opinions given by the stakeholders, the arguments presented by some 
scholars who do not support the necessity of adopting specialised 
tribunals were queried.  
 
In terms of the supposed benefits that specialised competition tribunals 
may deliver, such as efficiency, quality, and uniformity, the first step 
taken by this research project was to examine the perceptions of the 
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interviewees regarding the complexity of competition law, and to what 
extent economics is involved when solving antitrust cases. If these two 
postulates were accepted as true, then specialisation would be advisable, 
as it would have a positive impact in terms of efficiency and quality. 
 
From the analysis of the answers given by the stakeholders, it is clear that 
all of them regard competition law to be a complex field, and that they 
agree that the use of economics is inherent. These two postulates have 
therefore been accepted. Based on this finding, the next step was to 
investigate whether the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico has had any impact in terms of efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity. 
 
The evaluation of the perceptions of the members of the specialised 
competition tribunal, the members of the Mexican competition authority 
(COFECE), and the practitioners provide this research project with the 
insights that the levels of efficiency have improved after adopting the 
specialised competition tribunal. In terms of quality, the result is that an 
improvement has been observed, thanks to fewer review decisions based 
on procedural failures, and decisions based on more in-depth analysis. 
 
In relation to uniformity, the agreement has been unanimous. All the 
interviewees consider that after the adoption of the specialised 
competition tribunal, the decisions are more uniform and less 
contradictory.  
 
The interviewees were also asked whether capture, one of the drawbacks 
that have been ascribed to specialised tribunals, has been in evidence in 
Mexico after the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal. The 
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results from this analysis were unsettling, as the perceptions from the 
interviewees about this particular aspect were divided. On the one hand, a 
group of participants considered that specialised tribunals favour capture 
as it is easier to identify the members of such tribunals and to try to 
persuade them to your cause. On the other, some participants considered 
that capture is less likely when adopting specialised tribunals as it is easy 
to monitor the members. Regardless of the divided opinions, the majority 
of the participants indicated that in any case it is important to adopt 
transparency measures, to avoid long-term tenures, and to ensure good 
salaries and benefits to the members of these tribunals. 
 
The assessment of the performance of the specialised competition 
tribunal has also informed this research project with the identification of 
the two main deficiencies faced by generalist judges reviewing antitrust 
cases: i) lack of competition knowledge; and ii) low levels of exposure to 
antitrust cases. The research project has also identified the origin of these 
two main deficiencies as the insufficiency of law programmes, 
aggravated by a lack of training and a heavy workload. Together these 
insufficiencies represent to what extent the judiciary in Mexico interfered 
with the enforcement activities, explain why the adoption of a specialised 
tribunal was necessary, and highlight why it was unrealistic to expect that 
generalist judges could outperform specialist. 
 
Finally, based on the experience collected in Mexico and after analysing 
the opinions regarding the alleged benefits and drawbacks appointed to 
specialised tribunals, this research project has established that the 
participants collectively recommend the adoption of specialised 
competition tribunals to some other Latin American countries that do not 
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currently have them. The next chapter studies the implications of this 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The benefits of specialised competition tribunals: Lessons from 
Mexico 
 
	
INTRODUCTION 
	
The main purpose of this research project is to establish whether 
specialised competition tribunals are advisable for Latin American 
countries, using Mexico as a case study. The previous chapters of this 
thesis have been structured in such a way as to help achieve this purpose. 
The introduction to this thesis presented the methodology used to collect, 
analyse and organise the data, while Chapter 1 provided a conceptual 
framework about institutions, transplants, institutional change, culture, 
and designs of transplants in order to explain the institutional transplant 
phenomenon as well as to appraise how to make it workable.  
 
Chapter 1 also established the commonalities present among Latin 
American countries ‒ young agencies, under-developed competition 
regimes, low levels of competition culture derived from income levels, 
poverty levels, barriers to entry, barriers to import, and informal economy 
‒ in an attempt to appreciate why the outcomes of the Mexican case 
might be applicable to them. It also determined that the judiciaries in the 
majority of Latin American countries are perceived as untrustworthy, a 
situation that has implications for enforcement activities, given the 
interplay between competition agencies and the courts.  
  
After setting the theoretical framework and context, Chapter 2 then 
introduced the debates around the benefits and drawbacks of specialised 
tribunals, and then discussed these in more detail, this time specifically 
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regarding specialised tribunals in the field of competition law, and 
including debates about specialised competition tribunals in developing 
countries. Finally, the chapter explored how actively international 
organisations have been persuading developing countries to adopt this 
type of judiciary. 
 
Chapter 3 looked at the history of the development of Mexican markets, 
including how the judiciary is integrated, how judges are selected, and the 
main obstacles that this branch faces. Lastly, there was an evaluation of 
the development of the Mexican competition regimes, the Mexican 
competition authorities, the development of the review process of 
antitrust cases, and the reasons why a specialised competition tribunal 
was adopted in Mexico. Such comprehensive analysis was essential to 
appraise the significance of adopting the specialised competition tribunal. 
 
Subsequently, Chapter 4 evaluated the data that was collected during the 
fieldwork in Mexico, where the interviewees were divided into three 
groups (competition authority members, specialised competition tribunal 
members and practitioners). Such an approach sought to separately 
evaluate the answers to the similar questions formulated to all 
interviewees regarding how beneficial the specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico has been in terms of efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity, as well as whether the body in question has been affected by 
loss of independence (capture).  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of this research 
project by referring back to the arguments, doctrine, and collected data, 
and then providing some recommendations based on the empirical 
evidence collected from the case study in Mexico. Therefore, this chapter 
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is structured as follows: Section 5.1 will offer narrow and broader 
findings; Section 5.2 will describe the limitations of the findings; and 
Section 5.3 will provide some recommendations to improve policy 
application of future work, and future research. 
 
5.1. FINDINGS 
 
As Chapter 2 has illustrated, the creation of specialised tribunals has 
become an important phenomenon mainly seen as a way to alleviate the 
common issues that the judiciary confronts, such as delays, unreliability, 
and lack of independence, among others. Nonetheless, Lawrence Baum 
has expressed concerns about the scarcity of empirical evidence to prove 
the veracity of the virtues generally assigned to this type of judiciary, 
adding that systematic comparable studies when some form of 
jurisdiction is transferred from a generalist to a specialised body are 
insufficient and at the same time required.697 Baum has also claimed that 
due to the lack of empirical evidence ‘specialisation is a product of 
inadvertence rather than design’.698 
 
This research project has been devised to try to remedy this weakness by 
studying the recent adoption of the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico, where jurisdiction was transferred from a generalist to a 
specialised tribunal. The approach devised for this purpose was to assess 
the performance of the latter based on the perceptions of key stakeholders 
in terms of efficiency, quality, and uniformity, and also to establish 
whether specialised tribunals are more likely to be captured, this being 
one of the most common drawbacks assigned to this type of judiciary. 
	
697 Baum (n 7) 213–218 
698 Ibid. 5 
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Similarly, and with a view to shedding light on whether specialisation is 
to be recommended, Legomsky proposed a number of indicators, 
complexity being one of them. This research project undertook a 
literature review which sought to establish whether competition law was 
indeed complex and identified two main streams within the relevant 
literature. On the one hand, the literature suggests that competition law is 
a highly complex matter and that economics nourishes competition law 
such that it would be unrealistic to expect a generalist judge to come to a 
correct decision in antitrust cases based purely on precedents, untrained 
intuition or through interpretation of the law. On the other hand, opposing 
arguments do not support the need for specialised competition tribunals 
since not all antitrust cases involve economic issues, judges merely need 
a good sense of fairness to solve any case, and practitioners are obliged to 
present the facts in a sufficiently simple way that it is easy for judges to 
understand them all.  
 
The next part of this section presents the findings of this research project, 
which will be divided into narrow and broad findings. The narrow 
findings refer specifically to the Mexican case. In brief, the impact of the 
amparo action on the outcomes of the specialised competition tribunal, 
the lack of competition knowledge amid the judiciary, the low levels of 
exposure to antitrust cases experienced by generalist judges, and the 
market characteristics.  
 
The broader findings refer to the conclusions drawn from the Mexican 
case and potentially applicable to Latin American countries that are 
affected by obstacles in the implementation of competition law and that 
are searching for remedies. The analysis starts with Baum’s and 
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Legomsky’s claims, continues with the question as to whether specialised 
tribunals are preferable to generalist ones in competition law, examines 
the role played by international organisations in persuading countries to 
adopt this type of judiciary, and ends by examining whether specialised 
competition tribunals are advisable for Latin American countries. Section 
5.1.1 describes the narrow findings from the Mexican example.  
 
5.1.1.  NARROW FINDINGS: MEXICO 
 
A comprehensive assessment of the findings of this research project 
requires an awareness of the four aspects that made justifiable the 
adoption of the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, which at the 
same time may explain why the majority of the participants regard the 
performance of this specialised tribunal as beneficial in terms of 
efficiency, quality, and uniformity. These four aspects are: a) the amparo 
action; b) lack of competition knowledge; c) low levels of exposure; and 
d) market characteristics. A brief analysis of each one is presented next. 
 
a. The amparo action 
 
The fact that amparo actions were invoked to challenge and suspend a 
significant number of the decisions made by the competition authority 
resulted in three negative consequences. First, a negative impact on the 
length of the procedures; second, the incorrect annulment of decisions by 
judges without a good knowledge of competition law, resulting in 
reviews excessively based on formal issues, and, third, incongruous 
decisions resulting from the significant number of judges across the 
country with jurisdiction to solve the cases. These three shortcomings 
underpinned the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal. 
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Hence, the overuse of amparo actions signified a limited enforcement 
experience given the length of the cases provoked by the endless number 
of challenges against intra-procedural and final decisions. As a result, the 
adoption of the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico was 
accompanied by the introduction of an important reform consisting of the 
possibility to challenge only final decisions through indirect amparo, 
thereby limiting its power. 
 
In terms of efficiency, it could be suggested here that without the 
introduction of such a reform, the specialised competition tribunal would 
have had to face an unlimited number of amparo actions against every 
single decision made by the competition authorities, as was indeed the 
case before the introduction of the reform. In such a case, the question 
would be whether the performance of the tribunal could be the same in 
terms of efficiency.  
 
It could be also proposed that once the large number of amparo actions 
was halted due to the legal reform, and with the reform coming into being 
in parallel with the adoption of the new specialised competition tribunal, 
then instinctively the perceptions of the participants would be that 
efficiency had been greatly improved by the adoption of the tribunal. 
Otherwise, it could be conjectured that the reason for having a more 
efficient review process rested on the intra-procedural decisions being no 
longer challengeable.   
 
Given the nature of the collected data, it is not possible to determine what 
the performance of the specialised competition tribunal would have been 
like in terms of efficiency in the absence of the legal reform, neither can 
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we anticipate whether such efficiency would have been obtained solely 
with the introduction of the reform. What remains undisputable is that the 
reform of the admissibility of amparo actions against intra-procedural 
decisions was indispensable to enable the new specialised competition 
tribunal to perform under normal conditions. 
 
In other words, without the reform and with the specialised competition 
tribunal only, efficiency would have been hindered. Then, having 
transited from a very inefficient review system to a new one where the 
time required to review a case fell from 18 months to 6 months, 
according to the information provided by one member of COFECE, it is 
not surprising that participants regard the performance of this new 
specialised tribunal as more efficient. 
 
In relation to the quality of review decisions, the excessive use of amparo 
actions against all the decisions made by the competition authority had a 
negative impact for two main reasons. First, the endless number of 
amparo actions against almost every decision made by the competition 
authority generated huge delays, with it often taking years for a case to 
reach final decision review stage. This meant the chances of creating 
jurisprudence and developing the competition regime were small. 
Second, the preference for solving the unlimited number of amparo 
actions against the decisions made by the competition authority based on 
procedural failures, as a way to cope with the workload, meant the 
analysis of substantive issues were left to one side. This problem was so 
evident that the Mexican parliament adopted a specialised competition 
tribunal, and reformed the admissibility of amparo action against intra-
procedural decisions made by the competition authorities. 
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Overall, the interviewees perceived an improvement in terms of the 
quality of review decisions made by the specialised competition tribunal 
compared to the review decisions made before its adoption. The members 
of COFECE revealed that the issue whereby the decisions of the agency 
were reviewed by judges who were not familiar with antitrust or 
economic concepts has now been resolved. The practitioners have also 
noticed that the judicial review is now an in-depth one, and that decisions 
made on mere formal failures are no longer in evidence, or at least not 
that prominent. At the same time, the members of the specialised 
competition tribunal estimate that continuous training and high levels of 
exposure have allowed them to carry out a deeper analysis of the cases. 
 
The incidence of the amparo action in the quality of the review decisions 
was so embedded as to justify the decision of adopting a specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico, as it seemed unlikely that by just 
providing training in competition law to generalist judges the quality 
issue would have been remedied effectively.  
 
Finally, in relation to uniformity it is clear that the amparo action against 
all decisions made by the competition authority created an unprecedented 
number of ambiguous decisions, where numerous judges across the 
country had jurisdiction to review them. In this regard, the legal reform 
designed to admit this legal action against final decisions only was the 
right move, because the reform came into effect alongside the adoption of 
a body where all review decision processes are now concentrated. This 
has reinforced the positive outcomes, as illustrated by all the participants.  
 
This research project has offered suggestive evidence that the amparo 
action was a very important factor in determining the necessity of a 
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specialised competition tribunal. In its absence this necessity might have 
been less strong; the perceptions in terms of improvements in the quality 
of decision-making might have changed; and most likely other options to 
remedy the issue like training would have been as effective. 
 
b. Lack of competition knowledge 
 
Another fundamental factor in determining the necessity of adopting a 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico is the lack of competition 
knowledge among the judiciary. Chapter 3 described the core of this issue 
as being the poor quality of law programmes in some universities in 
Mexico, where more and more new universities are offering law 
programmes but without proper scrutiny from the respective authorities 
with regard to their sufficiency, and where the requirements to become a 
practitioner are modest, with no previous practice needed.  
 
In Chapter 4 participants referred on several occasions to the lack of 
competition knowledge as an issue that has impeded the development of 
the Mexican competition regime, and negatively affected the quality of 
the judicial decisions made in antitrust cases. In particular, some 
members of the specialised competition authority illustrated that they did 
not receive competition law training when they were law students, nor 
when they were generalist judges.  
 
Similarly, some members of COFECE said that they attended schools of 
law where competition law or economics were not included as part of the 
law programmes, and they highlighted the lack of competition knowledge 
among some members of the judiciary, which was a times aggravated by 
judges from remote parts of the country reviewing decisions made by the 
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competition authority. The practitioners expressed the same concern, 
stating that on some occasions the lack of knowledge generated 
‘aberrant’ decisions. 
 
This profound lack of competition knowledge explains why the 
perceptions about the improvement of the quality of the review decisions 
are so strong, and why the members of the specialised competition 
tribunal affirm that they feel better equipped to analyse the cases more 
comprehensively after receiving training and dealing with antitrust cases 
daily. It is questionable whether other options, such as training generalist 
judges, would have offered the same results.  
 
c. Low levels of exposure 
 
The members of COFECE repeatedly indicated that levels of exposure to 
antitrust cases were so low that judges would review just one antitrust 
case in their entire career, or one or two in busy cities like Mexico City. 
These low levels of exposure to antitrust cases were a major factor in the 
lack of competition knowledge among judges, because there was no 
imperative to learn about it. 
 
Some members of the specialised competition tribunal stated that 
reviewing one or two antitrust cases per year was not enough to obtain 
the knowledge and experience that this field requires, thereby confirming 
the negative impact of low levels of exposure. These members added that 
the specialisation that comes from reviewing antitrust cases daily has 
provided them with better tools to make quicker and better decisions. 
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It could be suggested that the perceptions about the improvement of the 
review process of antitrust cases in terms of efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity in the Mexican case were noticeable due to the radical 
transition experienced by the members of the judiciary ‒ from no training 
and insufficient exposure to more training and high levels of exposure. 
As a result, it seems clear that specialisation is advisable when a lack of 
knowledge and low levels of exposure are patent, though it remains 
unclear whether under such conditions just training would have been as 
effective as specialisation. 
 
d. Market characteristics 
 
The functioning of the Mexican markets, as explored in Chapter 3, has 
been influenced by specific circumstances. First, the geographic 
closeness with America has represented a threat, which at times has been 
met by Mexico strengthening trade with its larger neighbour, at others by 
closing the markets. Second, the predominance of the PRI for more than 
six decades has signified an unprecedented concentration of political 
power translated into the implementation of economic policies primarily 
seeking to preserve this power. 
 
Third, this unprecedented concentration of power has also been observed 
in the active role that the government has played in the Mexican 
economy, represented by measures such as price controls, subsidies to 
local business, import tariffs, nationalisation of enterprises, privatisation 
of enterprises, stimulation and protection of monopolies, and regulation 
or deregulation of markets.   
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Fourth, the economic crises that Mexico has experienced have been met 
with the adoption and implementation of different economic policies 
intended to remedy only the immediate effects, thereby making them 
inconsistent and short term. The combination of all these factors depicts a 
market that is complex, uncompetitive, aligned with the interests of 
political actors, perhaps distant from the needs of the economy, and with 
policies that vary erratically due to a lack of proper design.  
 
The presence of such issues made it difficult to envisage the adoption of a 
specialised competition tribunal, which at the time was seen as an 
unprecedented reform. Indeed, it could be that the opinions given by the 
interviewees regarding the performance of this new authority were a 
reflection of their awareness of the particular characteristics of the 
Mexican markets, which display a compelling need for supervision by 
specialist judges rather than merely trained generalists. 
 
5.1.1.2. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
After studying the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico, where the assumed benefits of efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity have been confirmed, the findings of this research project 
appear to support the argument for the advisability of adopting 
specialised competition tribunals in other Latin American countries.  
 
However, these findings cannot be seen separately from the specific 
circumstances of Mexico that have made of this a positive case. The 
suggestion here is that under these circumstances, the adoption of a 
specialised competition tribunal constituted a necessary institutional 
change, and a profoundly beneficial one.  
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The first specific circumstance was the overuse of the amparo, which for 
decades impeded the normal implementation of the competition regime. 
The second was the deep lack of competition knowledge originating in 
the insufficient law programmes and aggravated by the lack of training 
among the members of the judiciary. The third was the low levels of 
exposure to antitrust cases, which meant that training in the field was not 
deemed necessary.  
 
The fourth specific circumstance was to do with the particular 
characteristics of the Mexican markets: highly concentrated; moving 
from extremely open to extremely closed or vice versa; with governments 
stimulating the creation and existence of monopolies; and with erratic 
short-term economic policies usually designed to alleviate immediate 
issues.  
 
The combination of these circumstances, which negatively impacted the 
development of the competition regime in Mexico, makes the adoption of 
a specialised competition tribunal advisable, and may also explain why a 
good percentage of the interviewees recommended the adoption of this 
type of judiciary for some other Latin American countries, as for them, 
the benefits in terms of efficiency, quality, and uniformity have been 
much in evidence.  
 
It should be stressed that without these prevailing circumstances, the 
adoption of the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico may not have 
been the most advisable option, and the implementation of different 
measures may have been more suitable. The experience provided by the 
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Mexican case will be used to present broader conclusions for Latin 
American countries as a whole. 
 
5.1.2. BROADER FINDINGS  
 
a. Empirical evidence  
 
Lawrence Baum has expressed his concern over the scarcity of empirical 
evidence to prove the veracity of the virtues generally assigned to these 
types of judiciary; and the insufficiency of systematic comparable studies 
when some form of jurisdiction is transferred from a generalist to a 
specialised body. For this reason, this thesis, using the adoption of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico as a case study, where 
jurisdiction from generalists was relocated to specialists, has advanced 
the argument by offering crucial insights, from the perceptions of key 
stakeholders, into how beneficial this specialised tribunal has been in 
terms of efficiency, quality, and uniformity. In relation to loss of 
independence, conclusive findings are not presented. 
 
‒ Efficiency 
 
The finding here is that 83.3% of the members of COFECE and the 
interviewed practitioners perceive the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico to be more efficient in reviewing antitrust cases than the previous 
generalist tribunal responsible for such a task (Section 4.2.1.1).  
  
‒ Quality 
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The finding here is that 85% of the interviewees consider that the quality 
of the review process has improved following the adoption of the 
specialised competition tribunal (Section 4.2.2.1).  
 
‒ Uniformity 
 
The finding here is that 87.7% of the interviewees perceived uniformity 
to be one of the most important contributions of the specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico (Section 4.2.3.1). 
 
‒ Loss of independence (capture) 
 
This research project was unable to provide definite findings regarding 
the likelihood of loss of independence or capture following the adoption 
of specialised tribunals (one of the most common drawbacks assigned to 
this type of judiciary), as the opinions among the participants were 
profoundly divided. 
 
For instance, some participants considered that when there is a small 
group of judges reviewing the same types of cases the risk of capture is 
higher, while others claimed the opposite as it is easier to monitor these 
small groups than when there is a large and diffuse number of judges 
across the country. One practitioner indicated that the risk is the same 
whether the judge is generalist or specialist because if an interest group 
intends to approach a judge, it will do so. 
 
Those who estimated the likelihood of capture to be higher when the 
jurisdiction is given to a specialised tribunal referred to ‘deference’ 
towards the decisions made by the competition authorities as an 
	
308	
illustration of how the specialised competition authority in Mexico has 
been captured. 
 
Regardless of whether they felt the likelihood of capture to be greater 
with the adoption of specialised competition tribunals or not, the 
participants all recommended the following: 1) reasonable tenure periods; 
2) rotation of the members of the tribunals; 3) good salaries and benefits 
for the members of the judiciary; 4) public debates; and, 5) public 
decisions. 
 
b. Specialisation: a product of inadvertence rather than design 
 
With regard to the increasingly common phenomenon of specialisation of 
tribunals, whose adoption happens generally without an accurate analysis 
of the real benefits of this type of judiciary, Lawrence Baum has asserted 
that ‘specialisation is a product of inadvertence rather than design’.699 
The findings of this research project appear to support such an argument.  
 
In the Mexican case, there was no evidence that studies regarding the 
benefits of specialised competition tribunals were either provided or 
examined during the debates inside parliament. Reference was not made 
to cases in other countries or in other fields where the adoption of 
specialised tribunals had turned out to be successful, so no similar 
outcomes could be derived.  
 
The emphasis during the parliamentary debates was on the importance of 
the telecommunications sector, as the initiative to adopt a specialised 
tribunal was part of a telecommunications law project. Likewise, the law 
	
699 Baum (n 7) 5 
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initiative presented to the parliament mentioned that the adoption of a 
specialised competition tribunal would alleviate efficiency, quality, and 
uniformity issues, but no empirical evidence was provided to support this 
(Section 3.4.2). 
 
This situation reveals that the decision to adopt a specialised competition 
tribunal did not enjoy careful scrutiny ‒ there was no analysis about why 
or how this type of judiciary would achieve the desired results; no 
examination of different alternatives which could have brought the same 
results; and no explanation of why the adoption of this type of judiciary 
was the only or best solution to mitigate the inflicted issues.  
 
To conclude, even if the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal 
in Mexico has proven to be beneficial, it is clear that this finding is 
broadly in line with what Baum has asserted, that the adoption of this 
specialised competition tribunal has been another product of inadvertence 
rather than design. In this sense, if some other Latin American countries 
intend to adopt a similar institutional reform, they should devote enough 
time to an in-depth analysis. 
 
c. Specialisation: Legomsky’s indicators 
 
The tentative conclusions of this study seem to suggest that the indicators 
proposed by Legomsky (Section 2.2) are met in the field of competition 
law, making specialisation suitable in such a case. Particularly in relation 
to the complexity indicator, which still remains debatable among 
scholars, this research project has progressed the argument by showing 
that the members of the specialised competition tribunal, the members of 
the competition authority, and the practitioners in Mexico consider this 
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field to be complex, an aspect that influences the interpretation of the 
next finding.   
 
d. Competition law: generalists vs specialists 
 
 
The outcomes of this research project appear to endorse the argument of 
Judge Posner regarding the assumption that it is unrealistic to expect the 
average judge to fully understand the complexity that an antitrust case 
offers, given the involvement of economics.700 This argument has been 
expanded on by Baye and Wright who have claimed that it is very 
unlikely that a judge without an economic training could come to a right 
decision in antitrust cases based purely on precedents, untrained intuition 
or by interpreting the law.701 
 
The Mexican case has offered crucial insights from the judges who had 
the opportunity to review antitrust cases as generalists and now do so as 
specialists. These judges have noted that in their three years working as 
specialists in competition law, where training and levels of exposure have 
increased significantly, they have acquired the proper tools to review 
antitrust cases more quickly and with a more in-depth analysis. This 
situation was unlikely to happen when they were generalists mainly 
because of workload. As training was not provided, they did not have the 
spare time to self-teach, or a high-enough number of antitrust cases from 
which to learn.  
 
Regarding Baye and Wright’s argument about it being unrealistic to 
expect an average judge to produce a good review decision in an antitrust 
case simply by using precedents or interpreting the law, two members of 
	
700 Posner (n 235) 91–99 
701 Baye and Wright (n 9) 4 
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the specialised competition authority confirmed that this would indeed be 
illusory. Similarly, two members of the tribunal explained that antitrust 
cases are so complex that training and a good understanding of 
economics are essential.  
 
The interviewees repeatedly indicated that the lack of competition 
knowledge prompted a marked preference for solving the review of 
antitrust cases based on procedural failures, as a way to avoid the analysis 
of substantive issues. They observed that on the rare occasions when 
generalist judges intended to solve the substantive issues, the results 
could be unfortunate. 
 
It is clear, then, that the claims made by Posner, Baye and Wright are 
well-reflected in the Mexican case, where it was unlikely that generalists 
judges would have performed as specialists do, considering that for 
decades the judiciary was afflicted by a deep lack of competition 
knowledge, scarcity of training in competition law or economics, and 
very low levels of exposure to antitrust cases.  
 
Perhaps the claims gain more weight in the Mexican case if factors such 
as very low levels of competition culture, highly concentrated markets, 
governments preventing competition and encouraging monopolies, low 
levels of enforcement, ineffective competition regimes, and, for decades, 
the absence of competition authority, are considered. The combination of 
all these factors may explain why having a knowledgeable judiciary in 
competition law was for years certainly not a priority in Mexico.  
 
While the claims about the pertinence of specialisation in competition 
seem to hold true according to the tentative conclusions offered by this 
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research project, the arguments against such pertinence look improper. 
The critics of specialisation in competition law have stated that judges 
simply need a good understanding of the meaning of fairness;702 that 
practitioners need to explain the matters using simple language;703 and 
that not all the matters in antitrust cases are related to economic issues, 
but rather some are related to procedural issues, such that any generalist 
judge would be expected to be well-prepared to protect procedural rights 
in any field.704 
 
The insights offered by this research project have shown that fairness was 
not enough to overcome the deep lack of competition knowledge amid 
the judiciary. If it had been, then the preference for using procedural 
failures to solve the review of antitrust cases would not have been so 
evident; and feasibly the members of the competition tribunal who were 
interviewed would not have said that as specialists they felt more 
prepared to make quick and deeper decisions, and that the difference in 
terms of performance between generalist and specialist in competition 
law would not have been so significant.  
 
In relation to the probability of having practitioners explaining antitrust 
matters in a very simple manner as a mechanism to substitute 
specialisation, such an option seems less practicable in the Mexican case 
considering that competition law or economics were not part of the law 
programmes, that some judges lacked basic knowledge of competition 
law and economics, that some judges reviewed antitrust cases once in 
their lifetime, and that levels of competition culture were so low.  
 
	
702 Statement by Judge Leventhal in Currie and Goodman (n 10) 81–82 
703 Rakoff (n 12) 13 
704 OECD (n 19) 
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Finally, regarding the claim made by Judge Dianne Wood that not all the 
allegations concerned involve economics, that there are many cases 
where the allegations refer to procedural matters and that any judge 
would be capable of protecting such procedural rights,705 the argument 
related to procedural issues is indeed valid, but the claim that the debate 
rests on economics remains unclear. It could be speculated that, as was 
the case in Mexico, a judge may be inclined to find procedural issues to 
effortlessly solve the reviews while at the same time alleviating the 
workload. 
  
e. Specialised competition tribunals in Latin America: Advisable? 
 
The finding here is that all the participants unanimously recommended 
the adoption of this type of judiciary to some other Latin American 
countries, a circumstance that endorses the claims of scholars who 
estimate that adopting specialised competition tribunals in developing 
countries is advisable. For instance, Arthur argues that if a country is 
pursuing the development of its competition regime, and improvement in 
the levels of enforcement, then specialisation is the best option 
considering that specialist judges are superior to generalist.706  
 
The Mexican case has offered evidence about how the combination of 
low levels of competition knowledge whose review process was 
undertaken by a judiciary and emerging or weak competition agencies 
applying new or modernised competition regimes negatively affected the 
development of the competition regime. This scarcity of expertise amid 
	
705 Wood (n 11) 7; OECD (n 19) 
706 Arthur (n 305) 77–78 
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the judiciary led to a tendency to solve antitrust cases based on 
procedural failures as a way to avoid the substantive analysis of the cases.  
 
Having an overloaded judiciary that was i) lacking competition 
knowledge; ii) lacking training in competition law, and with iii) low 
levels of exposure to antitrust cases obstructed the implementation of 
competition law. Since the adoption of the specialised competition 
tribunal, Mexico has improved the review process of antitrust cases in 
terms of efficiency, quality, and uniformity, so in addressing these three 
shortcomings it has promoted the development of the competition regime.  
 
For this reason, the Mexican case confirms what Arthur claims about 
specialised competition tribunals being advisable for developing 
countries characterised as having undeveloped competition regimes. 
Assessing the score obtained by Mexico in the goods market efficiency 
pillar of the Global Competitiveness Index (see Section 1.2.2c), it is clear 
that there has been an improvement since the adoption of the specialised 
competition tribunal, with Mexico moving from rank 86 in 2014‒2015, to 
rank 82 in 2015‒2016, and rank 70 in 2016–2017. Similarly, the general 
score on this index has moved from rank 61, to 57, to 51 in the same 
periods. 
 
The dataset in Chapter 1 will be used to establish which Latin American 
countries have undeveloped competition regimes, inferred in cases when 
the adoption or modernisation of both competition regimes and 
competition agencies has been recent, and when levels of enforcement are 
low. This will help determine in which Latin American countries the 
adoption of a specialised competition tribunal may provide similar 
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positive outcomes to those shown by the Mexican case. Table 5.1 
condenses the information. 
 
Table 5.1: Competition regimes, competition authorities and enforcement 
 
Country 
New or modernised 
competition regime 
Emerging or weak 
competition agency 
Lower levels of 
enforcement than 
developed countries 
 
Argentina ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Bolivia ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Brazil ✓ ✗ ✓ 
Colombia ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Costa Rica ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Dominican R ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Ecuador ✓ ✓ ✓ 
El Salvador 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Honduras ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mexico ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Nicaragua ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Panama ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Paraguay ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Uruguay ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Venezuela ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
   
Table 5.1 reveals that the majority of the Latin American countries have 
undeveloped competition regimes, as these countries have new or 
modernised competition regimes, new competition agencies or limited 
enforcement experience, and lower levels of enforcement than developed 
countries (Section 2.1.3), with Brazil being the exception by having a 
mature competition agency. Hence, considering that De Leon707 has 
asserted that agencies with limited enforcement experience require a 
proper judicial review to address the lack of information about 
administrative precedents, a situation that affects the predictability of 
their decisions, then the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal 
seems suitable to ensure a proper control of enforcement decisions, 
especially if such agencies enjoy both investigative and decision-making 
powers.  
 
	
707 De Leon (n 130) 215 
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The Mexican case has shown how the adoption of this specialised 
competition tribunal has in a short time fostered the development of the 
competition regime. This case is representative because it ticks all the 
boxes in Table 5.1 and so reveals such institutional reform as being very 
practical, particularly if some other hurdles like low levels of competition 
culture are also present. 
 
In relation to low levels of competition culture, Fels and Ng	 have 
suggested that specialised competition tribunals are desirable in countries 
affected by this issue, as well as by high levels of corruption, and by lack 
of resources.708 Mexico has been a representative example of a country 
with low levels of competition culture that have affected the development 
of its competition regime, also as a middle-income country, with high 
levels of poverty, dominance of informal markets, uneasiness in doing 
business, and undeveloped infrastructures. The information in Table 5.2 
helps establish which other Latin American countries are also afflicted by 
this lack of competition culture. 
 
Table 5.2: Levels of a culture of competition 
	
708 Fels and Ng (n 307) 183 
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Country 
 
Income 
Classification 
(Low or 
Middle) 
 
High 
Levels of 
Poverty 
 
Low 
Economic 
Growth & 
Prosperity 
 
High 
Barriers 
to Entry 
 
High 
Barriers 
to Import 
 
High Levels 
of Informal 
Economy 
 
Undeveloped 
Infrastructure 
Argentina ✓ ü  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Bolivia ✓ ✓ N/A ✓ ✓ N/A N/A 
Brazil ✓ ✓ 
✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Colombia ✓ ✓ ✓ 
❖ 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Costa Rica ✓ ✓ ❖ ❖ ❖ ✓ ✓ 
Dominican 
R ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ❖ ✓ ✓ 
Ecuador ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
El Salvador ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ❖ ✓ ✓ 
Honduras ✓ ✓ ✓ 
✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mexico ✓ ✓ ✓ ❖ ❖ ✓ ✓ 
Nicaragua ✓ ✓ 
✓ 
✓ ❖ N/A ✓ 
Panama ✓ ✓ ❖ ❖ ❖ ✓ ❖ 
Paraguay ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Uruguay ✗ ✗ ✓ 
✓ 
✓ ✓ ❖ 
Venezuela ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ N/A ✓ 
 
✓Presence of the issue ✗Absence of the issue 
❖ Moderate presence of the issue N/A Information not available 
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The analysis of the data also reveals that the majority of the Latin 
American countries largely shared the indicators of low levels of 
competition culture, except Uruguay, Panama and Costa Rica. Colombia, 
Dominican Republic and El Salvador have one issue with moderate 
levels, but a prominent presence in the rest, thereby still reflecting low 
levels of competition culture.  
 
Of the rest of the Latin American countries under examination, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Honduras and Paraguay show a significant presence on all the 
indicators, which translates to very low levels of competition culture. In 
this context, and based on the findings from the ICN study that proposed 
that competition culture was perceived to be stronger in countries with 
specialist competition tribunals,709 then the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal would be advisable in Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras and Paraguay. 
 
In relation to corruption, neither the interviewees nor the law project nor 
the debates inside the Mexican parliament mentioned it as an obstacle 
that has disturbed the development of the competition regime or hindered 
the levels of enforcement in Mexico. However, it is possible that the 
interviewees may have preferred to avoid comments about this very 
sensitive topic, and the same reasoning might apply to the terms of the 
law project and the parliamentary debates. 
 
Notwithstanding the absence of mentions of corruption during the 
interviewees’ interactions and the parliamentary debates, Chapter 3 has 
revealed that the judiciary in Mexico has been observed as corrupt, 
creating a lack of confidence among the citizens who have been 
	
709	ICN (n 20) 8	
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disinclined to bring their disputes before the judges. Similarly, Chapter 1 
has shown that corruption is a common hurdle among Latin American 
countries, being the most problematic factor for doing business in five 
Latin American countries, and the second-most in three others. 
 
Similarly, the most recent surveys conducted by Latinobarometro on 
behalf of Transparency International between May 2016 and December 
2016 have indicated that 40% of people across Latin America consider 
that judges and magistrates are corrupt; over two-thirds consider that 
corruption has increased; half of the Latin American populous agree that 
governments are not doing enough to fight it; and over 90 million people 
across Latin America have had to pay a bribe to access public services, 
courts included.710 The levels of corruption in Latin America have also 
been assessed quantitatively by Transparency International, by which a 
rank indicates the corruption perceptions among 180 countries (180 = 
highly corrupt), and a public sector corruption score (0 = highly 
corrupt/100 = very clean).711  
 
Likewise, corruption has been measured using the WJP Rule of Law 
Index 2017‒2018, a tool designed to offer an image of the extent to 
which 113 countries adhere to the rule of law in practice, where the most 
significant indicator is corruption.712 Table 5.3 summarises the data.713 
 
Table 5.3: Levels of corruption 
	
710 Coralie Pring, ‘People and Corruption: Latin American and the Caribbean’ (2017) Transparency 
International 5 
711 Transparency International <https://www.transparency.org/country> accessed 28 June 2018 
712<https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2018-June-Online-
Edition_0.pdf> accessed 28 June 2018 
713 Pring (n 730) 15, 18, 19 
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Country 
Transparency 
International 
/180 (worst) 
Corruption 
Score 0 
(highly 
corrupt) /100 
(very clean) 
Rule of 
Law 
Final 
Rank/113 
(worst) 
 
Bribery 
 
Courts 
Argentina 85 39 46 16% 1‒10% 
Bolivia 112 33 106 28% 1‒10% 
Brazil 
96 
37 52 11% 1‒10% 
Colombia 96 37 72 30% 11‒20% 
Chile 26 67 27 22% 1‒10% 
Costa Rica 38 
59 
24 24% 1‒10% 
Dominican R 135 29 90 46% 11‒20% 
Ecuador 117 32 85 28% 1‒10% 
El Salvador 112 33 79 31% 1‒10% 
Honduras 135 29 103 33% 51% 
Mexico 135 29 92 51% 1‒10% 
Nicaragua 151 26 99 30% 1‒10% 
Panama 96 37 61 38% 
10‒20% 
Paraguay 135 29 N/A 23% 1‒10% 
Peru 96 37 60 39% 1‒10% 
Uruguay 23 70 22 22% 1‒10% 
Venezuela 169 18 113 38% 41‒50% 
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Considering that the majority of the Latin American countries are 
corroded with high levels of corruption, with Honduras and Venezuela in 
particular showing the highest levels of bribery in the courts, the adoption 
of specialised competition tribunals with better knowledge of competition 
law and able to provide decisions more efficiently, uniformly, and 
accurately, should help combat such afflictions. This assumption 
confirms the findings of the study by Albanese and Sorge, which 
proposes that well-functioning judicial systems serve as a deterrent to 
corruption or, in other words, that inefficient judicial systems serve as an 
incentive to corrupt deals.714 
 
Finally, in relation to the lack of resources mentioned by Fels and Ng as a 
reason why the adoption of specialised competition tribunals is to be 
recommended, this research project has highlighted the high rates of 
poverty among Latin American countries; with a vast percentage of them 
belonging to the group of upper-middle income or lower-middle income 
countries, and greatly dependent on the incomes generated by informal 
economies. 
 
While it has been confirmed that the majority of Latin American 
countries lack resources, one caveat needs to be mentioned: the lack of 
qualitative data regarding the cost of adopting the specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico. Nonetheless, we should point out that since existing 
generalist judges were moved to be specialist ones, the adoption of this 
tribunal did not entail the creation of additional posts, and even the 
selection process did not appear to be expensive.  
 
	
714 Albanese and Sorge (n 181) 3 
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In this sense, having seen the benefits that this specialised competition 
tribunal has provided in a short period of time, Latin American countries 
may find it beneficial to adopt this type of judiciary as a way to remedy 
similar issues, to strengthen their economies, and to improve the levels of 
acceptance and legitimacy of their judiciaries. 
 
The outcomes of this research project have also validated the argument 
provided by Savrin in favour of specialised competition tribunals in 
developing countries. According to Savrin, judges in developing 
countries have very low levels of exposure to antitrust cases and low 
levels of competition knowledge, which makes it unreasonable to expect 
that a generalist judge would be able to handle these types of cases in an 
efficient and proper manner, characterised as they are by novelty and 
complexity.715 
 
The Mexican case has been a clear example of a judiciary that has had 
very low levels of exposure to antitrust cases and low levels of 
competition knowledge, as well as a good illustration of the extent to 
which competition law is novel and complex. Indeed, a member of the 
specialised competition tribunal asserted that it would be a ‘fiction’ to 
expect a generalist judge to perform as well as a specialist judge, a 
statement that confirms Savrin’s assertion.  
 
In relation to the arguments opposing the adoption of specialised 
competition tribunals in developing countries, Aditya Bhattacharjea has 
claimed that developing countries should focus their scarce resources on 
fighting hard-core cartels, and investigating cases that bring a significant 
	
715 Savrin (n 214) 126 
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benefit to the poor.716 The findings of this research project could 
potentially dismiss this argument if future research were able to confirm 
that the design and functioning of the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico was inexpensive. 
 
Assuming that the adoption of such a specialised tribunal was indeed 
inexpensive, it could be speculated that such institutional reform could 
produce further achievements in the short term, such as the development 
of the competition regime, and improvements in the levels of 
enforcement and levels of legitimacy of the judicial branch. Long-term 
gains such as economic growth, reduction of levels of corruption, and 
reduced levels of informal economy could also be attained. Consequently, 
it would be unreasonable to limit the efforts of the judiciary to fighting 
cartels or only the most harmful conducts.   
 
Accordingly, the findings of this research project should not be taken in 
isolation from the above arguments, and should not be applied broadly, as 
Section 5.2 will explore in more detail.  
 
5.2. LIMITATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
 
5.2.1. Scope 
 
The findings of this study do not imply that the adoption of specialised 
competition tribunals will be advisable in every case. As has been 
established, the Mexican case has been marked by specific characteristics 
that have made the adoption of this type of judiciary justifiable, and 
confirmed the presumed benefits of efficiency, quality, and uniformity.  
	
716 Bhattacharjea (n 287) 65 
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If a country suffers from a deep lack of competition knowledge, a deep 
lack of competition culture, with competition regimes recently adopted, 
competition agencies newly created, highly concentrated markets, 
uncompetitive markets, underdeveloped competition regimes, and low 
levels of enforcement, then the adoption of a specialised competition 
tribunal seems appropriate. It could be speculated that this type of 
tribunal will offer the same positive outcomes in terms of efficiency, 
quality, and uniformity as shown by the Mexican case.   
 
On the contrary, if a country does not suffer simultaneously and severely 
from all the issues and causes mentioned above, it could be said that the 
adoption of a specialised competition tribunal does not seem necessary, 
and that the implementation of diverse alternative measures will equally 
bring improvements in terms of efficiency, quality, or uniformity. 
 
Thus, if the findings of this study were to be replicated, in order to obtain 
the same positive benefits and justify the option of a specialised 
competition tribunal, then some of the obstacles experienced in Mexico 
should be present in the mirroring case. Further research is desirable to 
investigate whether specialised competition tribunals are equally 
beneficial in countries where the circumstances experienced in Mexico 
are absent. The implications of such a study will bring more certainty. 
 
5.2.2. Research methodologies 
 
a. Qualitative 
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As a caveat, due to time and funding limitations, it was not possible to 
interview some members of the OECD, in particular those who produced 
the studies recommending the adoption of specialised competition 
tribunals to some Latin American countries. As a result, the analysis of 
the evidence used by this international organisation to generate such a 
conclusion is missing from this research project, so future research in this 
area would be useful.  
 
The same situation occurred with market players. This researcher 
intended to interview some members of different industries in Mexico 
with the aim of exploring their views about the adoption and functioning 
of the specialised competition tribunal in this country. Nonetheless, due 
to time and funding constraints it was not possible to proceed.  
 
b. Quantitative 
 
- Efficiency 
 
The finding about how beneficial the adoption of the specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico has been in terms of efficiency has to be 
read with the caveat of the lack of qualitative comparative data analysis 
about the time previously required to obtain a review judicial decision in 
an antitrust case compared to the time required now. This research project 
is therefore only able to support the findings about qualitative data 
analysis, in this case, the perceptions of the interviewees. 
 
- Costs examination 
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Although it seems that the adoption of the specialised competition 
tribunal in Mexico was not an expensive choice, considering that 
administrative courts and administrative magisters or judges were 
transformed into specialists as a devised scheme to allow the functioning 
of the new tribunal, this research project does not have costs information 
about this aspect. 
 
- Examination of cases 
 
This research project would have benefited from an examination of 
previous decisions made by generalist judges, and some decisions made 
by the specialised competition tribunal. Nevertheless, such an 
examination was not provided due to scarcity of financial resources and 
time constraints. At the same time, the collection of data in this regard 
proved cumbersome, which complicated the task. Finally, as stated in 
Chapter 2 with regard to the difficulty of analysing the quality of the 
judicial decisions, this research limited its scope to the insights of the 
interviewees.   
 
5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.3.1. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
Having outlined the possible limitations faced by this research project, we 
now look at potentially valuable areas for further study:  
 
a. Scope 
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With a view to expanding the findings of this research project, it would 
be useful to investigate whether a developing country suffering from a 
deep lack of competition knowledge; a deep lack of competition culture; 
competition regimes recently adopted; competition agencies newly 
created; highly concentrated markets; uncompetitive markets; and low 
levels of enforcement would experience the same positive outcomes in 
terms of efficiency, quality, and uniformity as shown by the Mexican 
case by adopting a specialised competition tribunal.  
 
Equally, it is important to analyse whether different measures, such as 
training generalist judges in competition law to, would prove equally 
effective in remedying the issues listed above as a way of testing the 
necessity of adopting specialised competition tribunals. Further research 
is also desirable to investigate whether specialised competition tribunals 
are equally beneficial in countries where the circumstances experienced 
in Mexico are absent. The implications of such a study would be wider. 
 
b. Qualitative analysis: OECD and market players 
 
Further research should include an investigation into which evidence the 
OECD has used to recommend the adoption of this type of judiciary in 
Latin American countries, especially in Mexico. The findings in this 
regard may confirm or contest the claim made by Baum that the adoption 
of this type of judiciary tends to be made inadvertently rather than 
determinedly. At the same time, the inclusion of the insights of market 
players will enrich the considerations of the real benefits that specialised 
tribunals may offer. 
 
c. Quantitative analysis: Efficiency 
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A future study testing whether the adoption of a specialised tribunal has 
improved levels of efficiency would be even more forceful if it were to 
include quantitative data analysis that compares the time required to 
obtain a review decision before and after the adoption of such tribunals. 
Similarly, a comparison between decisions made by generalist with those 
made by specialists.  
 
d. Quantitative analysis: Costs examination 
 
Analysis of detailed data costs in future research is important to confirm 
the suggestion that the adoption of the specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico was not an expensive choice. Without further research into this 
matter it will not be possible to confirm that the model adopted in Mexico 
has had reasonable costs, so caution needs to be taken if emulation is 
contemplated, to avoid the risk of economic detriment in the transplanted 
country. 
 
5.3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER POLICY 
 
For countries seeking to implement a specialised competition tribunal in 
an attempt to obtain the similar positive results shown by the Mexican 
case, the following recommendations seem relevant: 
 
1. It is indispensable to take into account local needs, local 
knowledge, and local experience. 
2. It is important to consider different design models and give 
preference to the most suitable regarding local needs. 
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3. Consideration of advantages, disadvantages, or limitations is 
essential. 
4. Careful scrutiny of the institutional transplantation is imperative, in 
terms of whether the adoption of the new body will bring the 
desired outcomes, and over what time period. 
5. Before the specialised competition tribunal starts its functions, it is 
critical that training be provided for the members of the tribunal, so 
that they will be already knowledgeable. 
6. Tenure periods of six or seven years seem reasonable. Less time 
would be impractical, and more years would increase the risk of 
capture. 
7. Good salaries and benefits are important to avoid the risk of 
capture. 
8. The rotation of the members of the tribunal is important, and it 
should happen gradually to avoid them all changing 
simultaneously.  
9. Perhaps the jurisdiction of the specialised tribunal should include 
some other matters such as telecommunications or intellectual 
property, to justify its adoption in terms of the volume of cases.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This research aimed to provide empirical evidence about the real benefits 
of specialised tribunals, focusing particularly on the performance of the 
recently adopted tribunal system in Mexico. Such evidence clarifies 
whether the adoption of this institutional reform improved the three main 
types of constraints that usually afflict the judiciaries: efficiency, quality, 
and uniformity. The findings of the research around this system 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature, magnitude and most 
significant deficiencies associated with its implementation. At the same 
time, the findings offer significant lessons to Latin American countries 
facing similar challenges, which, when carefully implemented, could 
solve these challenges quickly and with a rational use of their scarce 
resources. 
 
a. Research questions 
 
This concluding chapter consolidates the findings of the thesis 
thematically, in light of the research questions discussed in the 
introduction. In relation to the first research question: Has the specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico been beneficial in terms of efficiency, 
quality, and uniformity, and has it been afflicted by loss of 
independence?, it has been indicated that the adoption of the specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico improved all three of these factors. The 
findings were grounded on the perceptions of the interviewees, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Such an outcome is essential to remedy the lack 
of empirical evidence within the relevant literature as exposed in Chapter 
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2, and also to guide future efforts or initiatives to tackle similar 
constraints by adopting specialised tribunals.  
 
While the reflections of the interviewees, particularly the insights of the 
members of the specialised competition tribunal, provide this research 
project with special importance, additional research applying qualitative 
methods to investigate the efficiency factor would be extremely 
beneficial. In time, further records and information will be available and 
will also facilitate this task considerably. 
 
In response to the second research question: Has the adoption of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico been a product of 
inadvertence rather than design?, this research confirms the claim made 
by Baum717 around the adoption of this type of judiciary without 
sufficient reflection. Analysis of the governmental proposal and the 
subsequent parliamentary debates regarding the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal in Mexico (Chapter 3) demonstrated the absence of 
discussions about studies, lessons, or any other type of data that might 
confirm the appropriateness of such institutional reform. Although the 
initiative has been positive, it is important that, in future, adequate 
debates considering institutional design, alternatives, limitations and 
empirical evidence take place to ensure a greater degree of accuracy in 
this matter.   
 
Notwithstanding the limited examination of the necessity and design of a 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, this thesis demonstrated 
nevertheless that such an initiative came from within the judiciary and the 
Mexican government (Chapters 3 and 4). Such a bottom-up approach 
	
717 Baum (n 7) 5 
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explains the achievement shown by this specialised tribunal. This 
approach proves useful in expanding the understanding of how 
institutions or lessons should be transferred, in the light of the theory of 
transplants as developed in Chapter 1. Another significant implication to 
emerge from this research is that unless prevailing informal institutions, 
local needs and local expertise are considered, it is unlikely that positive 
transplantations of formal institutions or lessons will be attained.  
 
In answering the third research question:  Is competition law a complex 
field in Latin American countries such that the adoption of specialised 
competition tribunals seems necessary?, this thesis has identified that, in 
Mexico, competition law is a very complex field. The interviewees 
generally agreed on this, as well as on the deficiency of the law 
programmes, the lack of competition knowledge amid the judiciary, the 
insufficiency of training in competition law, the novelty of the matter, the 
low levels of exposure to antitrust cases and the workload as aggravating 
factors that made the field even more complex. The combination of all 
these problems made the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal 
indispensable.  
 
The implication of this finding is that if some other Latin American 
countries exhibit the same problems, and to the same extent, it is 
plausible that the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal would be 
the most suitable solution. Similar research exploring alternative 
remedies such as generic training would be useful to either confirm that 
specialisation is the most practical and effective solution, or to gain new 
visions that could assist Latin American countries in utilising their 
insufficient incomes.  
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Referring to the fourth research question: Would specialised competition 
tribunals outperform general tribunals in Latin American countries?, 
the data reported here supports Judge Posner’s718 assumption that it is 
unrealistic to expect an average judge to fully understand the complexity 
that an antitrust case offers. This position is enhanced by Baye and 
Wright who have also claimed that it is very unlikely that a judge without 
an economic training could come to the right decision in antitrust cases 
based purely on precedents, untrained intuition, or by interpreting the 
law.719 
 
The members of the specialised competition tribunal in Mexico, who 
previously were generalist judges responsible for solving antitrust cases, 
reflected on this finding. The assessment (Chapter 4) of those who were 
previously involved in efforts to solve such complex cases without 
sufficient knowledge of competition law or economics, with infrequent 
opportunities to work on such cases, and with an excessive workload, 
represents a vital insight. These factors emerge as a reliable predictor of a 
similar situation in some other Latin American countries (Chapters 1 and 
5) afflicted by ineffective judiciaries, low levels of a culture of 
competition, and deficient implementation of competition law. This 
finding suggests that it is very improbable that in this region general 
tribunals would outperform specialised competition tribunals.  
 
The second major finding with regard to this research question is that the 
Mexican case has shown that a sense of fairness, as was argued by Judge 
Leventhal,720 was not enough to overcome the lack of understanding of 
competition law among generalist judges, or in other words, did not 
	
718 Baye and Wright (n 9) 4 
719 Posner (n 235) 91‒99 
720 Judge Leventhal in Currie and Goodman (n 10) 81‒82 
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prevent them from selecting the use of procedural irregularities to avoid 
the substantive analysis of the matter (Chapter 4). It also allows us to 
predict that if generalist judges in other Latin American countries face the 
same constraints, a sense of fairness may not be sufficient to overcome 
them. It might work in countries with a long history of competition law, 
with strong enforcement bodies, and with high levels of a culture of 
competition, but certainly not in the good number of Latin American 
countries which are still in the process of learning by doing (Chapter 1).  
 
Finally, in relation to the fifth research question: Are specialised 
competition tribunals advisable for Latin American countries?, this 
thesis has found that the interviewees unanimously recommend the 
adoption of a specialised competition tribunal (Chapter 4) and identify 
the judiciary in Mexico as one of the main obstacles in the 
implementation of competition law. The relevance of these findings is 
that once some other Latin American countries also identify the 
performance of the judiciary as a significant deficiency, which Chapter 1 
has previously anticipated, then the lessons that the Mexican case offer 
may be used as a reference to solve such an issue.  
 
b. Lessons 
 
The broad lessons that Latin American countries can learn from this case 
are summarised as follows. First, Chapter 3 has recognised that the major 
drawback in the implementation of competition law is the lack of political 
support. Mexico was a clear example of governments disregarding the 
importance of competition, and actively controlling the functioning of the 
markets, as well as the creation and prolongation of monopolies. This 
lesson signifies that the first crucial step from governments is the 
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recognition of the importance of competition, the identification of the 
obstacles that impede its effective implementation and the evaluation of 
the most suitable solutions. 
 
The second lesson is that it is preferable that the initiative comes from 
within local governments. Chapter 3 outlined the OECD’s 
recommendation of the adoption of a specialised competition tribunal in 
Mexico, yet this research was limited for the reasons stated in Chapter 5 
with regard to the absence of the data used by the OECD to reach this 
conclusion. However, Chapter 5 confirmed that such a recommendation 
gained more weight after the local government requested it. The major 
implication here is that although the recommendations given by 
international organisations are highly regarded by developing countries 
(Chapter 2), options where local needs, limitations and expertise are 
contemplated predict greater chances of positive outcomes (Chapter 1).  
 
The third lesson is that if one of the main obstacles in the implementation 
of competition law is the judiciary, then the adoption of a specialised 
competition tribunal is advisable, particularly if the judiciaries are 
unreliable and ineffective (Chapter 1). It is doubly advisable where 
corruption is embedded, where there is a lack of resources and of 
competition knowledge amid the judiciary, a deficit of a culture of 
competition, and limited opportunities to develop expertise in 
competition. The adoption of a tribunal that is beneficial in terms of 
efficiency, quality, and uniformity remedies or lessens the above 
constraints. In relation to a lack of resources, it is important to point out 
that although this research project has assumed that the adoption of the 
specialised competition tribunal in Mexico was an inexpensive choice, 
further research is essential to confirm the assumption. 
	
3 3 7 	
 
T h e  f o urt h  l e s s o n  is  t h at  a n y  i nt e n d e d  r ef or m  s h o ul d  i n cl u d e  a  wi d er 
pi ct ur e  of  t h e  c o m p etiti o n  l a n d s c a p e.  T h e  a d o pti o n  of a  s p e ci alis e d 
c o m p etiti o n  tri b u n al  will  n ot  b e  eff e cti v e  if  t h er e  ar e  ot h er  h ur dl es 
aff e cti n g  t h e  i m pl e m e nt ati o n  of  c o m p etiti o n  l a w.  T h e  M e xi c a n  c as e  h as 
cl e arl y  ill u str at e d  h o w  t h e a m p a r o a cti o n  o b str u ct e d  t h e  n or m al 
f u n cti o ni n g of t h e c o m p etiti o n a ut h orit y a n d t h e j u di ci ar y ( C h a pt er 3). If 
t h e i ntr o d u cti o n of s u c h a r ef or m d o es n ot i n cl u d e f urt h er c o n stit uti o n al 
or  l e g al  r ef or m  r e q uir e d  t o  s ol v e  s o m e  ot h er  r el at e d  b arri ers,  t h e n  t h e 
p erf or m a n c e  of  t his  t y p e  of  j u di ci ar y  will  b e  c o m pr o mis e d.  E q u all y, 
s uffi ci e nt d e b at e s a n d a n al y sis ar e n e c ess ar y t o e n s ur e a pr o p er di a g n o sis 
of t h e n at ur e of all t h e is s u e s, a n d t o wis el y c h o o s e a m o n g t h e diff er e nt 
alt er n ati v e s t o s ol v e t h e m.  
  
T his r es e ar c h h a s r e v e al e d t h at t h e a d o pti o n of a s p e ci alis e d c o m p etiti o n 
tri b u n al  i n  M e xi c o  s e e ms  t o  b e  a  p o siti v e  i n stit uti o n al  r ef or m.  L ati n 
A m eri c a n  r ef or m er s  m a y  fi n d  t h e  e x p eri e n c e  of  M e xi c o  t o  b e  a  u s ef ul 
r ef er e n c e.  N e v ert h el e s s,  it  is  i m p ort a nt  t o  p a y  cl o s e  att e nti o n  t o  t h e 
tr a n s pl a nt ati o n  p h e n o m e n o n,  b e c a u s e  l ess o n s  c a n n ot  si mpl y  b e 
tr a n s pl a nt e d; t h e y  n e e d  t o  b e  c ar ef ull y  a d a pt e d  t o  a v oi d  r ej e cti o n,  as 
C h a pt er 1 h a s e x pl ai n e d t h or o u g hl y. O n c e t h e a d a pt ati o n is c o m pl et e , t h e 
f oll o wi n g s p e cifi c r e c o m m e n d ati o n s m a y h el p l e a d t o  b ett er r es ults.  
 
c. R e c o m m e n d ati o n s  
 
 T r ai ni n g:  t h e  m e m b ers  of  t h e  s p e ci alis e d  c o m p etiti o n  tri b u n al 
s h o ul d  b e  tr ai n e d  (f or  at  l e ast  6  m o nt h s)  pri or  t o  t h e  tri b u n al’s 
i m pl e m e nt ati o n, a n d t his tr ai ni n g s h o ul d b e d eli v er e d c o nti n u o u sl y 
aft er. 	
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 S al a ri e s:  t o attr a ct g o o d c a n di d at es a n d t o e n s ur e th at t h e y r e m ai n 
w or ki n g f or t h e j u di ci ar y, attr a cti v e s al ari es a n d b e n efits s h o ul d b e 
pr o vi d e d. 	
 
 R ot ati o n:  p eri o d s  of  6  or  7  y e ars  s e e m  r e as o n a bl e f or  j u d g e s  to 
d e v el o p pr o p er e x p ertis e a n d t o a v oi d c a pt ur e. T h e r ot ati o n s h o ul d 
h a p p e n  gr a d u all y  t o  pr e v e nt  c h a n gi n g  all  t h e  m e m b ers  of  t h e 
s p e ci alis e d tri b u n al at t h e s a m e ti m e. 	
 
 J u ris di cti o n:  if  t h e  n u m b er  of  a ntitr u st  c as es  is  n ot  si g nifi c a nt, 
s o m e ot h er fi el d s s h o ul d b e i n cl u d e d i n t h e r e mit of t h e tri b u n al t o 
m a k e t h e i n stit uti o n al r ef or m w ort h w hil e. F or i n st a n c e, i nt ell e ct u al 
pr o p ert y, t el e c o m m u ni c ati o n s, c o n s u m er pr ot e cti o n, et c. 	
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ds of 
judges 
with 
the 
possibil
ity of 
solving 
the 
cases 
(someti
mes for 
the first 
time in 
their 
lifes), 
lack of 
knowle
dge; 
length 
of the 
cases; 
in DF 
judged 
overloa
ded so 
solving 
based 
on 
proced
ural 
issues 
most of 
the 
time 
   
Yes 
(in 
gener
al, 
altho
ugh 
in the 
past 
there 
were 
good 
decis
ions) 
Its 
too 
earl
y to 
tell, 
but 
so 
far 
no 
The 
issue 
is no 
the 
capa
citie
s (its 
more 
abou
t 
work
load, 
and 
speci
alisa
tion) 
 
Yes 
(the 
field 
is 
reall
y 
com
plica
ted) 
Not 
(as 
their 
period
s are 
short 
which 
is also 
a 
backla
sh) 
  
A 
Yes Cal 
refor
m, 
OEC
D 
Yes Enforce
ment; 
make 
the 
competit
ion 
authoriti
es more 
efficient
; review 
process 
more 
efficient
; 
definitio
n of 
concepts 
Training 
(speciall
y before 
the 
designati
on) 
The 
whole 
system 
would 
be less 
efficien
t 
/ / / The 
are 
maki
ng 
big 
effort
s, 
plus 
spen
d 
more 
time 
unde
srtan
ding 
the 
issue
s, 
and 
Yes 
(Th
anks 
to 
the 
cont
radi
ctio
n of 
thes
is 
proc
edur
e) 
Its 
not 
abou
t 
capa
citie
s, its 
abou
t 
speci
alisa
tion 
(It is 
diffi
cult 
to 
kno
w 
the 
No 
(It is 
not 
enou
gh to 
kno
w 
the 
regi
me) 
Yes It is 
likely, 
that's 
why 
measu
res are 
requir
ed 
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1)OE
CD's 
recom
mend
ation 
was 
right? 
2)W
ho 
mad
e the 
effor
ts 
mad
e 
a) 
We
re 
the
y 
nec
ess
ary
? 
3)Most 
importa
nt input 
a)What 
could be 
improve
d? 
4)Situa
tion 
withou
t the 
Tribun
al 
C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n 
Inde
pend
ence 
Eff
ici
en
cy 
5)Dif
feren
ces 
in 
term
s of 
quali
ty of 
the 
decis
ions? 
Uni
for
mit
y 
6)Di
ffere
nces 
gral 
vs 
spec 
judg
e in 
com
pet 
Situ
atio
n in 
Lati
nam
eric
a 
7)Ar
e 
Spec 
Trib 
in 
Co
mpe
t 
advi
sabl
e x 
Lati
nA
me 
cou
ntri
es? 
8) 
Captu
re 
solvi
ng 
them 
field 
with
out 
train
ing) 
TRIBU
NAL 
B 
Yes Jean 
Clau
de 
Petit, 
Mem
bers 
of 
the 
judic
iary, 
OEC
D, 
Cal 
refor
m 
Yes The 
competit
ion 
authoriti
es are 
taken 
more 
seriousl
y 
More 
areas 
should 
be 
included 
(energy, 
intelectu
al 
property
) 
The 
decisio
ns of 
the 
compet
ition 
authorit
ies, and 
the 
regulat
ors 
would 
be 
ineffect
ive 
/ / / Yes Yes The 
gene
ral 
judg
e 
won'
t 
have 
the 
capa
bilit
y to 
unde
rstan
d the 
prob
lem 
Read 
it 
agai
n 
Yes Yes 
(but 
they 
have 
taken 
some 
measu
res) 
also 
the 
genera
l judge 
could 
be 
captur
ed due 
to the 
lack of 
knowl
edge 
  
C 
Yes Pact
o por 
Mexi
co 
Yes Now 
there is 
a 
definitio
n of 
concepts 
Workloa
d (More 
tribunals 
are 
required
) 
Like 
before 
(not 
solving 
substan
tive 
issues, 
and 
lack of 
unifor
mity) 
/ / / Yes 
(defi
nitely
) 
Yes capa
city 
to 
solv
e in 
gral, 
but 
you 
need 
the 
speci
alisa
tion 
to be 
solv
e 
quic
ker, 
and 
deep
er 
She 
perc
eives 
that 
the 
gral 
judg
es 
have 
now 
a 
more 
redu
ced 
kno
wled
ge 
com
pare 
to 
the 
speci
alists 
Yes 
(wid
ely) 
She 
rejects 
the 
idea of 
captur
e. 
Tenur
e 
impact
s this 
(but 
beyon
d 
captur
e is 
being 
attach
ed to 
certain 
ideas) 
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1)OE
CD's 
recom
mend
ation 
was 
right? 
2)W
ho 
mad
e the 
effor
ts 
mad
e 
a) 
We
re 
the
y 
nec
ess
ary
? 
3)Most 
importa
nt input 
a)What 
could be 
improve
d? 
4)Situa
tion 
withou
t the 
Tribun
al 
C
o
rr
u
pt
io
n 
Inde
pend
ence 
Eff
ici
en
cy 
5)Dif
feren
ces 
in 
term
s of 
quali
ty of 
the 
decis
ions? 
Uni
for
mit
y 
6)Di
ffere
nces 
gral 
vs 
spec 
judg
e in 
com
pet 
Situ
atio
n in 
Lati
nam
eric
a 
7)Ar
e 
Spec 
Trib 
in 
Co
mpe
t 
advi
sabl
e x 
Lati
nA
me 
cou
ntri
es? 
8) 
Captu
re 
  
D 
Yes 
(numb
er of 
cases) 
Pact
o por 
Mexi
co, 
Cal 
refor
m, 
legal 
refor
m 
Yes Efficien
cy, 
deeper 
analysis 
of the 
cases, 
trust in 
the 
function
ing of 
the 
instituti
ons; 
empowe
rment of 
the 
competit
ion 
authoriti
es 
When 
the cases 
go to the 
Supreme 
Court it 
takes 
time to 
have a 
decision 
Lack of 
knowle
dge, 
and 
decisio
n 
making 
delays 
/ / / Yes 
(it 
has 
move
d 
from 
proce
dural 
to 
subst
antial 
analy
sis) 
Yes Tech
nical 
capa
citie
s 
Mix
ed 
tribu
nals 
don't 
have 
the 
same 
level 
of 
expe
rtise 
Yes She 
didn't 
agree 
or 
disagr
ee/Me
asures 
should 
be 
taken 
	
 
 
